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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the problems of most interest to students of communication 
is the analysis and conceptualization of the social processes by which 
our common notions of what exists, what is important and what is 
legitimate are shaped. These notions are social and cultural mean-
ings -- values, norms, practices -- the stuff of social and cultural 
reality, and they are sometimes most manifest and perceptible when 
they are changing. 
Students of communication will recognize in the paragraph above 
the suggestions, if not the actual phrasings, of important thinkers 
who have influenced approaches to communications: George Gerbner 
(1972a, 1972b, 1972c) and the "cultural indicators" approach to com-
munication; and James Carey (1975, 1978) and Raymond Williams (1974) 
and the cultural approach to communication. One can also readily dis-
cern the influence of an area of sociology known as the sociology of 
culture or knowledge (see Crane, 1972:129-142; Curtis and Petras, 
1970; Kadushin, 1976; Peterson, 1976), especially the influence of 
Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality (1967). 
This projeci began as an effort to integrate these two general 
areas of study in communication and sociology in a case study of the 
communication and social organization underlying the development and 
1 
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institutionalization of an idea -- the redefinition of death in terms 
of brain function. The redefinition of death is itself an instance of 
cultural change; it is also an integral part of a larger process of 
cultural change, the recent reexamination of death and dying in our 
society (see Parsons, Fox and Lidz, 1973; Crane, 1975; and Fox, 1974). 
The reconceptualization of death in our society has consisted of 
three areas of major concern: more humane care of the terminally ill; 
euthanasia and death with dignity; and the redefinition of death in 
terms of brain, rather than cardio-respiratory function. Each area of 
concern has been gradually becoming a part of our social structure as 
each continues a career of institutionalization. By institutionaliza-
tion I mean the process of arriving at some consensus and legitimation 
about, for instance, the definition of death, which becomes stabilized 
within the social structure in the form of what Smelser (1962) calls a 
"mark" -- an accepted norm, organization or law. The career of each 
area to date has included the appearance of various marks: several 
hospices devoted to the humane care of the terminally ill are now in 
operation; the "right" to die a "natural" death has been formalized 
into various documents (the Living Will, among them) and state law 
(the "Natural Death Acts" of Cal iforn i a and Oregon, among others); and 
no less than 22 states (at the time this study was begun, six) have 
enacted statutes defining death in terms of brain criteria. In all 
these instances our concepts of death and dying are being transformed; 
they are in the process of being culturally redefined. 
The process of cultural definition of only one of those areas2 
the redefinition of death in terms of brain function -- and the 
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participants in the process -- those who produce, explicate and refine 
the definition (the "cultural definers") -- are the primary foci of 
study. The "managers" of the institutional ization of "brain death,,3 
themselves, the process of redefinition and the enactment of the rele-
vant policies are at issue: the ways in which redefining death may 
have effe.cted clinical practice are not,4 and neither is the effect of 
the definers' work on the public conception of death. If evidence 
that the,redefinition of death is indeed an emergent cultural notion is 
required, the fact that a number of states (at this time, 22) have en-
acted statues readjusting their definition of death in that regard 
should be sufficient. 5 
The Institutionalization of the Redefinition of Death 
The institutionalization of cultural definitions (or cultural 
change) is a difficult process to manage conceptually (cf. Parsons, 
1951). One meaning supplants or supercedes another when the older 
meaning becomes inadequate in some regard. For instance, a problem or 
anomaly (Kuhn, 1970) arises which the older meaning or set of meanings 
cannot contain. 
In this case, the use of medical technologies which separated the 
function of the three major physiological systems (respirator tech-
nology, resuscitation technology and the electronic monitoring of 
brain function, and no less, heart transplantation) provided families 
and staff with a rather macabre sight: persons who breathed (with the 
aid of a respirator) and whose hearts still beat, but whose brains were 
"ruined". The question arose: what can be done about this dehuman-
izing and both emotionally and financially exhausting state of 
4 
affairs? In the late '60s a still-beating heart was removed from one 
person and transplanted to another. Another question arose: How could 
that be accomplished, if the sign of life was just that -- a still-
beating heart? The center of life and character, the treasured subject 
(true, strong, aching or otherwise) of many a poem, story and song was 
reduced to a "replaceable muscle" (Ramsey, 1970). 
These events were anomalies -- they could not be understood with 
reference to traditional concepts of death. The strain they provoked 
stimulated a deep rethinking of what is meant by "life", "death" and 
"personhood", cultural concepts of profound consequence. 
The redefinition of death has been the quietest aspect of the 
reconceptualization of death. Of the three death and dying topics, 
it has appeared least often in the popular press and broadcast media, 
the only exception being the time during which the Karen Quinlan case 
was being litigated in 1975. Before that case discussions on the topic 
were located primarily in professional arenas: the courtroom, hospi-
tals, special organizations concerned with bioethics issues, profes-
sional journals, conferences and symposia. And after the Quinlan case, 
the issue has again returned to those arenas. Both before and after 
the Quinlan case, definition of death discussions included three kinds 
of participants: physicians, lawyers and theologians or philosophers. 
Motives and Goals 
This relatively contained topic provided an opportunity to analyze 
the institutionalization of the idea from first mention to its explica-
tion in formal state law, as well as to include several interests. 
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The primary motivation in choosing the topic was to closely examine a 
process of cultural change, to try to come to some terms with how it 
happens that old meanings become inadequate and new ones emerge. 
Secondly, I wanted to contribute to the study of the ways in which 
professionals and academics define cultural issues. Little is known 
about how communication and related social processes (influence, 
contact, diffusion, interdisciplinary collaboration, participation in 
symposia, conferences, the mass media and use of the professional 
journal) are associated with the organization and dynamics of institu-
tionalization. Since many if not most of contemporary societal 
dilemmas require interdisciplinary competence and collaboration, the 
more we can learn about the problems and general conduct of interdis-
ciplinary discourse the better. This particular topic provided a 
context for investigating the extent of interdisciplinary association 
and communication and the role it played in a process of definition. 
In order to analyze the professional communication and social 
organization of the definers who have managed the redefinition of 
death, it was necessary to examine the definers' published interpreta-
tions of the issue and to assess the degree of consensus among them. 
And since the issue had been codified into formal state law, there was 
an opportunity to see how and to what extent professional and academic 
defining came to bear on local state policy-making. These constitute 
the goals and motivations of the study. The following section 
describes the conceptual frames I have adopted toward these ends. 
5 
Conceptual Frameworks 
Institutional ization and Social Organization 
6 
A social movement? What model fits this process of institutional-
ization? Can the redefinition of death be considered a social movement? 
If, according to Smelser (1962), there are social movements in the name 
of the establishment of a norm, value or generalized belief, then why 
not a social movement in the name of a cultural redefinition? 
Part of what is meant by "social movement" is a deliberate, some-
what strategic and organized attempt to change an aspect of the social 
structure. Moreover, participants in social movements are advocates 
who agree (more or less) on the major points of advocacy. It somehow 
makes little sense to describe a change in our cultural meanings as 
the result of a deliberate, strategic and organized attempt, however 
formal or informal, to change them. It just does not seem as if the 
speakers in the redefinition process came together and determined to 
redefine death in terms of brain function in the same ways the Ku Klux 
Klan organized to "protect white racial integrity" or that feminists 
have made efforts to change policies and behaviors associated with 
rape, female competence and the status of women. Changing or attempt-
ing to change some aspect of social structure (organizations, roles, 
practices, norms) is different from cultural redefinition or cultural 
problem solving. (Surely feminists have determined cultural meanings, 
but did they intend to do so?) 
That is not to say there are no advocates among the cultural 
definers, not that all advocacy for change of whatever sort fits 
into the Procrustean bed of the social movement model. But the 
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advocacies present in the redefinition process are far too disparate 
for a social movement. Aside from the objection that it does not seem 
altogether proper to conceive of a change in cultural meanings as a 
result of an organized determination to change them, there is simply 
too much diversity in motivation, goals and interpretation of the 
issues involved for this process to be considered a social movement. 
Social circles, invisible colleges and the like~ It is more 
appropriate to regard this process of institutionalization as a process 
of fixing a definition rather than as a process of fixing the claims 
embodied in a social movement. I would adopt an approach from the 
sociology of knowledge or culture which specifies a concept, idea or 
style and focuses on the social organization (and, in this study, 
communication) underlying, and in some sense comprising, the develop-
ment of the idea. The idea has a career partially constituted by the 
social organization of those who work with it, explicate it, use it, 
etc., and that career is not the career of a social movement. What is 
needed is not a model of the social organization of a kind of social 
or political advocacy -- what is needed is a model of the social 
organization associated with the career of an idea. 
The best descriptive models for the social structure underlying 
the institutionalization of the redefinition of death derive from 
Kadushin's notions of "social circle" (1968; 1975) and Crane's 
"invisible colleges" (1972). Both models of social organization were 
designed with the purpose of describing the loose, informal organiza-
tion that characterizes decision-making and cultural groups and 
research areas, and can apply as well to cultural defining groups 
8 
with their varieties of goals, interests and interpretations. 
Two stages of institutionalization: After all the disclaiming of 
the social movement model, I propose to do something that social 
movement theorists sometimes do -- posit "stages" in the redefinition 
of death. 
The process of the redefinition of death is composed of two 
general, overlapping stages: 1) the defining stage -- stating the 
issue; and 2) the policy-making stage -- formalizing the issue in legal 
code. The relation between the two and their participants (the 
definers and policy-makers), and the organization and dynamics of 
each broadly outlines the organization of this study. 
Cultural Definers 
The major participants in the process of redefining death are 
members of three institutions: medicine, law and philosophy/theology. 
(Since the advent of the term "bioethics", the term "ethicists" has 
become widely used to refer to philosophers and theologians concerned 
with death and dying and other bioethica1 issues, and for the sake of 
brevity, I will use it also.) . Physicians, lawyers and ethicists have 
been the definers of death; they have assessed the appropriateness 
of the redefinition of death and its validity in specific medical and 
social contexts. They have discussed and sorted what it means -- in terms 
of medical and legal practice, moral issues and traditional concepts of 
death. They have been directly concerned with reaching consensus on and 
clarifying the problems which are entailed in redefining death. 
Obviously, however, not all members of these three institutions 
have participated in the process of defining, 'but some did. The 
question is, then, why did some enter this particular arena, while 
others did not? They certainly have not been allocated the role of 
"cultural definer" by their respective institutions. They do not con-
duct their defining work in the same way editors of magazines conduct 
theirs -- through the execution of primarily occupational role respon-
sibilities. These definers all have primary occupational commitments 
elsewhere. Obviously, none are paid regularly to "define death", 
although some (perhaps neurologists or medical lawyers) are paid 
regularly to perform tasks which include something like "working on 
defining death". In studying the topic, one identifies particular 
people, such as Henry Beecher or Paul Ramsey (see Chapter 3) and 
organi zati ons such as the Ad Hoc Committee of the Har,vard Medi ca 1 
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School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death (the Harvard Committee), 
rather than institutions (cultural defining) or institutional roles 
(cultural definers). But that is not to say that other social 
factors -- for example, particular prominence within certain legal, 
medical and philosophical areas -- do not contribute to the making of 
cultural definers, but rather the cultural definers do not crank out 
definitions by virtue of their positions or roles within a cultural 
defining institution. There is simply no such formal institution 
(though I suspect that with thorough investigations on several topics, 
one would uncover a consistent pattern of allocation of cultural tasks 
within institutions). How the definers happened to undertake this 
particular task is discussed in Chapter 4. 
However they became involved with the issue, it is these 
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professionals who shape the definition, who are producing it, if you 
will, rather than merely adopting or simply transmitting it. Opinion 
leaders (Katz, 1957; Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Menzel and Katz, 1966), 
as the concept is most often used, serve transmitting and interpreting 
functions in opinion formation. The opinion leader is a link in a 
chain of influence from the mass media to the community; he is the 
first to adopt an opinion given by mass media institutions or decision-
making elites. The definition of death did not come out of the blue 
or as a result of someone's inspiration or some group's determination. 
It was given in part as a solution to problems raised by life-
prolonging technologies and the advent of neurophysiological knowledge 
and technique. Though a social, cultural and medical fabric was given, 
some group cut the pattern of the definition of death, subsequently 
tailored it, and cut again. Opinion leaders and gatekeepers playa 
major role in cultural definition processes which include transmitting 
and selecting. However, cultural definers are not primarily relay or 
selection mechanisms in the process; and adoption and diffusion are not 
the central processes in this conceptualization of institutionaliza-
tion. Production in some sense is at issue; the definers explicate, 
mold and develop cultural definitions. 
Neither the "great man" nor a strictly Durkheimian conception of 
social and cultural processes is an adequate conception of social or 
cultural change. The reconceptualization of death has not taken place 
in a social and cultural vacuum; however, it can't be adequately under-
stood as the result of social and cultural drift. One of the major 
problems I have with sociogenic conceptions of social processes is the 
11 
frequent imp 1 i cation that 'soci a 1 change occurs in ways s imil ar to 
natural changes such as continental drift, and tidal and atmospheric 
fluctuations an implication that is unfortunate at best.? Persons 
are products of society, to be sure; and persons maintain, shape and, 
in some sense, produce society (Berger and Luckman, 1967). "It is 
against something that the self can emerge" (Goffman, 1961:320); it 
is also against the activity and consciousness of members of society 
(persons) that elements of the social and institutional order are 
both reconstituted and maintained. 
There is the social and cultural fabric; there are conventions 
and rules about how it is to be cut; and there are the fabric-cutters 
and designers. I am not interested in conceptualizing the fabric-
cutters as transmitting and filtering mechanisms in processes that 
shift and emerge as a function of the drifting social tides of 
fashion. I am not interested in asking, as Erving Goffman has, "What 
minimal model of the actor is needed if we are to wind him up, stick 
him in amongst his fellows, and have an orderly traffic of behavior 
emerge?" (1967:8). I am interested in conceptualizing a role and 
function in social defining that accounts for persons doing the wind-
ing, the sticking in, the observing, i.e., the cutters and designers 
of cultural definitions. 
lawyers and ethicists. 
And in this case they are physicians, 
Communications Processes and Content 
Communication channels. Within the professional arenas there are 
two primary locations for direct and indirect communication on the 
topi c: 1) i nforma 1 i nterpersona 1 i nteracti ons with co 11 eagues at 
symposia, conferences and committee meetings, in the lunchroom and 
emergency room, etc.; and 2) more formal communication in settings 
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such as professional journals (Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion (JAMA), university law reviews and the like), symposia and 
conferences. Of particular interest here is the extent to which 
definers addressed members of other disciplines in both formal and 
informal settings. In order to reach even the most minimal amount of 
consensus in a three-way debate, there would have to be some degree 
of interdisciplinary communication and association. 
This study was also designed to consider the definers' partici-
pati on in non-profess i ona I communi cat ion setti ngs, such as sympos.i a 
and panels addressed to the lay public and the mass media. Though 
public conceptions of death are not considered in this study, I wanted 
to have some index of the definers' communication with lay audiences. 
Thus, there are basically three kinds of communication channels 
involved in this instance of cultural defining: interpersonal associ-
ations; and "places" of professional discourse -- profeSSional journals, 
symposia and conferences; and settings which include the lay public 
audiences. The differences in the kinds.of channels turn, obviously, 
on two dimensions: informal-formal communication settings and 
professional-lay audiences. 
Specialized communications. Part of the emphasis of this study 
focuses on the role of specialized, as opposed to mass, communications 
in the institutionalization of the definition of death. The profes-
sional journals act as a "meetinghouse" for cultural definers and are 
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vehicles for shaping and spreading definitions as well. They are used 
for conducting cross-disciplinary communication and consensus "work" 
to some extent. The question is, how were the professional journals 
used by the definers and what function did they serve in the process? 
Communications content. The content of the journal articles, from 
the first suggestions of a need for a concept of "brain death" to the 
recommendations, definitions and statutes proposed and the criticisms 
and discussions that follow, provide an index of the development of 
the issue as well as of the definers' consensus on the issue. The 
concept itself has a specific, evolutionary career, and there is simply 
no way to understand that career without a close examination of the 
public statements in which it is embodied. An analysis of the 
definers' articles provides a means to assess the relation of the 
social organization and communication of the definers to the evolution 
of the concept. 
The Basic Conceptual Problem 
Lurking behind the goals of the study, the conceptual frameworks 
and all, is the spectre of an .agonizing conceptual problem: the 
relation among social processes (communication, diffusion, etc.), 
social structure (social organization and social relatedness) and the 
content and development of an idea. Perhaps the easiest of the rela-
tions contained in the triad is that between social structure and the 
"content and style" of ideas, and even that relation has recently been 
acclaimed as "the most vexing problem in the sociology of knowledge" 
(Kadushin, 1976:119). 
After a couple of isolated attempts at wrestling with the two-way 
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relations (social organization and social process, in Chapter 6, and 
social organization and conceptual approach, in Chapter 7), I close 
with one final effort at specifying the larger interrelation for this 
particular case study. 
Apologia: The Relations of This Study to Other Research 
As already noted, I have taken my bearings from the areas of the 
sociology of knowledge and culture and communication and cultNre. The 
approach taken to the study of those interests is an integration of 
several approaches and falls squarely under the rubric of none. I 
know of no study which specifies a group of professionals and academics 
from three disciplines involved in defining a cultural issue which 
marks an instance of cultural change and institutionalization. I 
have borrowed heavily from several scholars and researchers from some-
what different areas insofar as their work has suggested to me the 
possibilities embodied in this project. 
The conceptualization of the cultural definers is taken from the 
conception of human nature presented by Berger and Luckmann in the 
Social Construction of Real ity (1967). It was in the context of reading 
their treatment of the social processes of conceptualization and insti-
tutionalization by which the social order is maintained and constit~ted, 
that I began to wonder how one might conceptualize and study empiri-
cally a change in the social or cultural order. 
Anyone familiar with the work of George Gerbner and his "cultural 
indicators" approach (1972a; 1972b; 1972c) will recognize a version of 
institutional and message analysis adapted to the goals of this study 
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(rather than to the analysis of mass media institutions and messages). 
I like to think that this project is infused in places with something 
like the "cultural orientation" Renee Fox brings to her work in the 
ethnography of medicine, in particular Experiment Perilous (1972) and 
The Courage to Fail (1974). And the way in which many of the motiva-
tions of this study reached some degree of specification, method and 
organization derives primarily from the work of Diana Crane in the 
sociology of science, medicine arid culture (1970, 1972, 1975, 1976). 
Generally, any particular instances of indebtedness or similarities to 
other areas of research are discussed in the relevant chapters, as 
would be the case in a study of this length and complexity. 
Part of the study could be broadly characterized as a study of 
the social organization of a particular population and as having 
commonalities with the study of the social organization of science 
(see Crane, 1969, 1970, 1972; Griffith and Miller, 1970; Nelson and 
Pollock, 1970; Mullins et al., 1977; Coleman, Katz and Menzel, 1966; 
Brieger, 1976; White et al., 1976; Friedkin, 1978) and intellectuals 
(Kadushin, 1974, 1976), as well as other populations. But as I 
discuss in Chapter 6, the cultural definers are not quite scientists 
or intellectuals in terms of either the contexts or the substance of 
their work. 
Portions of the design of this research were provoked by dissat-
isfaction with traditional concepts of diffusion (Coleman, Katz and 
Menzel, 1966; Katz et al., 1963; Rogers, 1962), influence (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955; Parsons, 1963) and, as is no doubt obvious already, 
opinion leaders (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Menzel and Katz, 1955; 
16 
Katz, 1960) and social movements (King, 1956; Smelser, 1962). These 
particular conceptual bones are picked in the chapters in which they 
arise, primarily this chapter and Chapter 6. 
To conclude the apologia whith a suggestive note: For some time I 
have been intrigued by a definition of communication anthropologist 
Ray Birdwhistell introduced in class (at the Universityof Pennsylvania) 
one day: "Communication is the dynamic aspect of social structure". 
Preview 
To manage all the goals of this study I had to locate the cultural 
definers and ask them about their involvement in redefining death, 
their communication activities and their social relations with other 
definers. To get some idea of the development of the issue and the 
consensus on the issue, I analyzed the articles they wrote that ap-
pea red in professional journals. To understand the relation between 
the definers and policy-makers, I asked each group questions about 
their relations with the other. The details of this research method 
and analysis are given in the next chapter, Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3, the History of the Redefinition of Death, contains an 
introduction to the major characters and events that comprise the 
medical, social and conceptual development of the redefining process 
(in chronological order). In studies like this one, there are two 
simultaneous concerns: the development of the focus of study, in this 
case, redefining death; and the social analysis of the process. Of 
course, I am not involved in the business of redefining death, but I 
cannot see how the reader can understand what I am doing as a 
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researcher without knowing as much as possible about the issue itself. 
The bulk of the chapter is based on primary research (interview data). 
Chapter 4 simply introduces the definers as a population. 
Included in Chapter 4 are the definers' stories of how they became 
involved in the topic to begin with. 
Chapter 5 discusses the communication activities of the definers: 
their use of professional journals and their objectives in publishing 
their articles; their participation in formal professional discussions 
and lay discussions on the topic; and the extent of interdisciplinary 
communication that occurred. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the social cohesion and structure of the 
definer population. The findings are given after a brief discussion 
of problematic conceptual issues involved in studying networks, com-
munication and social relationships, and the general relation between 
social process and structure. 
Chapter 7 contains the results of the content analysis of the 
definers' articles and an integration of the article data with the 
social organization findings to specify the relation of conceptual 
approach and social organization. 
Chapter 8 is a brief discussion of who the policy-makers are and 
the extent of policy-maker/definer interaction. 
Chapter 9 is an integration of the findings of Chapters 5-8 into 
a discussion of the dynamics involved in the institutionalization of 
death in Chapter 9 which responds to the question, What got the issue 
going, or in other words, what kinds of social factors had a bearing 
on its development? 
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The concluding chapter provides a summary of Chapters 4-9, an 
epilogue of the events that have occurred since 1975 regarding the 
redefinition of death and suggestions both for cultural defining and 
cultural definers as well as for communication researchers and social 
scientists who would embark on studies like this one. 
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ENDNOTES 
lThis study was partially funded by The Russell Sage Founda-
ti on. 
2The Appropriateness of a Case Study: A different approach 
which fits in no particular tradition and its workings is appropri-
ate to an exploratory or case study which can provide the ground 
for a comparison in the future. Indeed, one must start somewhere. 
I originally had suggested that I would compare the development of 
the idea of "brain death" with the development of one of the other 
"death and dying" strains of interest -- either care of the dying or 
euthanas i a. 
The more involved with the redefinition issue I became, the 
more inappropriate that plan seemed. First of all, the other two 
strains of interest have substantively different kinds of careers 
and do not provide ready comparisons -- both issues have been ex-
tensively treated in the mass media and have popular figures and 
devotees, and entail far more complex historical and political 
IIstori es 1/. 
Secondly, with the added set of data, this project would have 
undoubtedly suffered eventually from "the futil e prolongation of 
life", not to begin to mention the probable extent of the author's 
brai n dysfunction. 
30ne of the ethicists' objections to the notion of "brain death" 
is that it implies that the death of a person can be reduced to the 
death of an organ. In honor of that objection, I have tried to use 
the term "brain death" as infrequently as possible and then, in 
quotes. The consequence is the use of a particularly long phrase 
"the redefi ni tion of death" or 'I:leath definition", etc. This may be 
confusing because the focus of the study is the cultural definition 
of the redefinition of death (instead of "brain death"). I have 
assumed that the ethical point is worth the inconvenience. The 
reader may disagree. 
4In this study, the only aspect of institutionalization exam-
ined is the formation of public policy. The intriguing question of 
how definitions or policies affect actual practice is not con-
sidered; the answer requires extensive collection of a different 
kind of data than that obtained in this study -- in fact, it re-
quires another effort altogether. 
5Just for the record: A Missouri public opinion firm has as-
sessed its citizens' notions of when a person should be considered 
dead. Of the resident respondents, 71.3% said "when he has lost 
consciousness, lung and heart function" (traditional criteria); when 
he has permanently lost consciousness was the response of 21.7% 
(cerebral criteria) and only 7% said when the person has lost both 
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consciousness and lung function -- the criteria basically recom-
mended in the statutes and by medical and legal authority (Charron, 
1975 :979-1008). 
60ne of the important aspects of social movements is their 
political nature. In taking one's bearings from the sociology of 
knowledge, one need not fall prey to the assumption sometimes im-
plicitly or explicitly present in research in that area -- that 
styles, ideas or concepts develop apart from political pressures or 
considerations. I have no intention of ignoring the politics of 
this process of institutionalization. 
7The analogy is as unfortunate politically as individualism 
is. As members of our society, we are too accustomed to relegating 
the responsibility for important decision-making to vague, anony-
mous forces such as God, the State, the weather and the tides. It's 
unfortunate that we are not socialized as decision-makers of impor-
tant issues; and it's just as unfortunate that a good deal of so-
cial and science epistemology does not acknowledge our roles in 
constructing the social and cultural order. 
CHAPTER 2 
CONDUCT: DEFINITIONS, INSTRUMENTS, AND ANALYSES 
The details of my modes of attack on the research questions, the 
instruments used, and the details of general research conduct are given 
below. Substantive conceptual issues are, of course, discussed in the 
relevant chapters. 
Locating the Definers 
One of the major problems in the study of elites, decision-makers, 
opinion leaders, scientists or other "cultural producers" consists in 
developing a method for locating them. In this case, a simple method 
was utilized. Cultural definers are the physicians, lawyers, and 
ethicists who have written one or more articles which have as their 
major topic the redefinition of death or the application of various new 
techniques in determining death, and which are published in profes-
sional journals in the United States through 1974. 
I located articles with the use of various sources, among them the 
journal indexes: Index Medicus, The Guide to Legal Periodicals, and The 
Philosopher's Index. All were searched from 1955-1974. In addition, I 
utilized bibliographies compiled by various sources: The Hastings 
Center Bibliography (1975); The National Institute of Neurological 
Diseases and Stroke Bibliography, Brain Death (Smith and Penry, eds., 
1972); and The U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare's 
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Selected Bibliography on Death and Dying. I also had access to the 
libraries at the Hastings Center in New York and the Kennedy Institute 
of Bioethics of Georgetown University and to the personal files of sev-
eral definers. In other words, the most complete bibliography of the 
kinds of articles defined below may well be in the hands of the present 
author. In still other words, I have a universe of such articles. 
Operational Definitions 
Cultura 1 Defi ners 
The professionals, i.e., the physicians, lawyers and ethicists who 
author articles and documents as defined below. Sociologists, another 
professional group involved in discussions of death and dying, are not 
included because, for the most part, they are not concerned with defin-
ing death as much as they are with disclosing the social and cultural 
aspects of death and dying situations. They are not in the business of 
defining death themselves, though they may be in the business of showing 
how death is socially defined. 
Articles 
All articles, documents, reports (including statutes), for which an 
author(s) or a committee of authors can be specified which have as their 
major topic the redefinition of death (see below), but omitting "anony-
mous" editorials and law review notes, as well as letters to the editors 
of various journals. 
Maj or Topi c 
All articles which discuss the need for a definition of brain death, 
the application of electroencaphalography or other neurological tech-
niques (e.g., angiography) to death determination, the appropriateness 
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of the brain death definition or criteria as represented in major state-
ments of definition (e.g., the Harvard Report), and legal, moral and 
religious aspects of the concept of brain death are included. Articles 
concerning only technical aspects, clinical aspects or physiological 
aspects of cerebral anoxia and the technical details of determining 
death according to brain criteria are not included. It is assumed that 
those aspects of the technological and physiological discussions which 
are relevant to general or specifically moral, legal and medical defini-
tions of death (e.g., that the EEG is not a reliable indicator of 
cerebral death in cases of barbiturate poisoning and hypothermia), will 
be raised in other discussions. Insofar as I am relying on that assump-
tion, I am trusting cultural definers as editors of their own literatures. 
Professional Journals 
Periodicals, utilized primarily by professionals and academics, 
with total circulation less than 250,000, according to Ulrich's Inter-
national Periodicals Directory, 1973 - 1974, including interdisciplinary 
periodicals such as Daedalus (58,000), Science (154,000), The Hastings 
Center Studies (later called The Hastings Center Report) (7500) and pro-
fessional periodicals such as The Journal of the American Medical 
Association (239,000), The New England Journal of Medicine (140,000), 
and various law journals and reviews which are published in the United 
States. 
Contacting the Definers: the Survey 
After fixing the article universe, a cover letter and survey were 
sent to 90 senior authors in two waves, followed by a phone call. My 
incessant requests to the definers as well as excellent advice on 
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formulating, printing and distributing the survey and cover letter from 
Diana Crane resulted in an 83.3% return. The cover letter and question-
naire appear in Appendix B. 
Mailing Considerations 
Deciding to whom I should mail the survey in most cases was straight-
forward, but there were exceptions. In the sample were three articles 
with committee authorship--the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee, the Hastings 
Task Force (Research Group) on Death and Dying, and the Ad Hoc Committee 
of the American Electroencephalographic Society. Each of these commit-
tees contained authors who had written other articles on the redefinition 
of death. I sent surveys to the chair and to all authors of other 
articles. I attempted, with partial success, to schedule interviews 
with all members of the Harvard Committee. Most of the Hastings Task 
Force who had worked on the Hastings publications on death definition 
had also written articles on their own. 
If the chair or senior collaborator was deceased, I sent the survey 
to the second author. In one case, a pair of authors wrote four 
articles on the topic, and I considered it appropriate to send them both 
a survey. With the exception of the articles authored by committees 
mentioned above, articles with one or more authors appear only in the 
medical literature (usually with one or two senior authors and research 
associates); ethicists and lawyers, in these articles and in general, 
tend to write alone. It was often the case that when authors of consid-
erable repute collaborated, the second author was the first or sole 
author of another publ ication. Several authors wrote more than one 
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article. My general rule was to include anyone whose name showed up in 
the literature or in bibliographies more than once. 
The Survey: Content 
The survey contains questions on what I considered to be the most 
important aspects of the authors' participation in the redefining 
process. The survey (see Appendix B) contains sections (in order) con-
cerning (1) the ways in which authors became involved in the issue; 
(2) their occupations and involvement with either transplantation or 
dying patients; (3) their social ties with other persons involved in 
this or closely related issues; (4) their "communication intent" in 
writing and publishing their articles and the journals they read in 
keeping up with the discussion; (5) their participation in other public 
discussions on the issue (symposia, conferences, the mass media); 
(6) their participation in efforts to pass legislation defining death in 
terms of brain function; (7) their involvement with other death and 
dying and bioethica1 issues; and (8) the place and year of their profes-
sional or academic degrees, membership in professional and bioethics 
organizations and the nature and importance of their religious back-
ground. All but the sections on social ties and communication intent 
are rather straightforward. 
Communication intent: Presumably, in participating in the cultural 
definition of an issue, authors would intend to determine it in some 
ways and not others. In particular, they would intend to reach certain 
audiences and accomplish certain objectives in publishing articles in 
professional journals. I asked questions to this effect to assess their 
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"communication intent." In addition, I was interested to see to just 
what extent authors viewed their articles as attempts to shape public 
policy, as opposed or in addition to, influencing specific readerships. 
These items on the survey, as well as the definers' participation in 
other public discussions on the issue (besides publication) are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
The sociometric section: I included in the survey a section asking 
them to indicate their ties to other authors and policy-makers. Obvi-
ously, anyone author could have a variety of social ties established in 
professional organizations, in hospitals or universities, in interper-
sonal relationships and ties established through publication. The survey 
was designed to assess all of these, though the sociometric section 
focused only on the interpersonal ties of Recognition, Contact, Impor-
tance and Professional Friendship. (Recognition and Importance could 
be ties established through publication as well.) These ties were used 
because I thought they would be the kinds of ties that would have most 
to do with how the redefinition of death took shape. The ties, and 
their similarities and differences, are discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
A major goal was to assess the relationship between the definers'. 
social ties and the development of the issue. Unfortunately, I hadn't 
the foresight to add to the sociometric section a means of assessing 
the temporal development of relations in the context of the issue's 
progress. It became clear in interviews that friendships and impor-
tance relations developed in the context of working on the issue, 
but I did not utilize a means for empirically assessing the development 
of the relations. 
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At that time, no one had conducted a network or sociometric study 
which attempted to assess these particular relations--a fact which makes 
for little means of comparison with other sociometric populations. But 
it seemed important to use these ties, in part to exemplify the notion 
that social organization is constituted by a variety of different kinds 
and aspects of social relations. 
The sociometric list: At Crane's suggestion a list of persons which the 
definers could check was added to the questionnaire, under the assumption 
that a more representative depiction of the social organization of the 
definers would emerge than if the definers were asked to name their own 
friends, discussion partners, etc. I included in the list all authors, 
all legislators and other policy-makers who had enacted death statutes in 
the five states, all persons who had been members of any committees which 
had published articles but who had not published articles themselves, and 
a few others well-known for their efforts in closely related areas (trans-
plantation, Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation--CPR). 
The names were organized by disciplinary affiliation into the fol-
lowing areas: ethics--bioethics; law--medical law--legislation; and 
medicine. Two definers were related to two areas: Leon Kass and Robert 
Morison, both physicians by training, have become identified with either 
bioethics (Kass) or general university programs in science and society 
(Morison). They each had occupational commitment to these areas--these 
were not just side interests (Kass worked at the Kennedy Institute for 
Bioethics and now holds a titled professorship of bioethics at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, and Morison was a professor of science and society 
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at Cornell.) For these reasons I thought that they would be more readily 
recogn ized under ethi cs-bi oethi cs than medi ci ne, so there they were 
placed. l 
The open questions--11-14: As a check to see whether the persons most 
significant in the development of the issues were included, I added an 
open question in which respondents could name anyone they wanted. I was 
also interested to see how many persons would mention family or close 
friends who were not colleagues. Most respondents named local profes-
sional cohorts and close colleagues; only a few mentioned personal 
friends (probably because many of their friends were also professional 
colleagues) and only a very few (two) mentioned family. Of all that were 
mentioned, no more than three persons were named as many as three times--
one of those was Pope Pius XII, another was Don Harper Mills. I take 
that as verification that I had identified the most important persons 
in comprising the list, although not all of them, for whatever reasons, 
participated in the study. They were additionally asked to name any 
books or articles they considered to be particularly important to their 
interpretation of the issue. 
For the most part, no one was omitted from the study whom I judged 
necessary to include, with one exception. After an initial interview, 
the most central person to the redefining effort in several respects, 
Henry Beecher, became too ill to pa rti ci pate further and respond to the 
final questionnaire. 
Respondent accuracy: Of course some respondents probably fudged a bit on 
their sociometric choices, enlarging their lists of whom they had 
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contacted and who was a professional friend, and neglecting to mention 
those who had been important. However, from my knowledge of symposia and 
conference attendance and bibliographic citations, most choices seemed 
reasonable. In addition, the persons most peripheral to the effort, such 
as students, either chose no one or chose only on the basis of what CQuld 
be bibliographic or publication familiarity, and the persons most central 
to the effort chose several others on all ties. 
The Network Analysis 
The fo 11 owi ng di scuss i on concerns only the method chosen for execut-
ing a network analysis. Other conceptual issues involved in the use of 
concepts of "network," "social ties," and "communication" are discussed 
below in Chapter 6. 
Searching for a computer program (algorithm) which would manage the 
four large sociometric matrices and uncover a structure of relations 
without imposing what I consider to be distorting assumptions on the 
original data was an agonizing process. The matrices were too large to 
draw a simple sociogram by hand, and the kinds of algorithms available 
at the time either assumed reflexivity or transitivity (discussed below) 
or forced mutual exclusivity on the clusters obtained. Neither of these 
choices was altogether satisfactory. 
Some "network" researchers, notably Crane (1972) and Kadushi nand 
Alba (1976), assume transitivity. In tracing research influence among 
scientists, Crane has argued that often influence is relayed through 
parties one never meets face to face and that it is important to consider 
such persons as links in a network of influence (Crane, 1972:42). For 
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my purposes I am not willing to assume that if A chooses B as important 
to him in his conceptualization of the issue, and B chooses C, that 
there is any necessary relation at all between A and C. Such an assump-
tion seems even less tenable considering the other ties--Contact, Recog-
nition and Professional Friendship. 
Alba and Kadushin (1976) consider that persons have a symmetrical 
relation if either mentions the other. "Thus, if individual A stands in 
a certain relationship to individual B, B will, by assumption, stand in 
the same relationship to A" (1976:8). Such an assumption obliterates a 
pattern of choice frequently representative of relations in the real 
world, i.e., unrequited ones. In assessing social structure it is impor-
tant to be able to distinguish those who receive attributions but may 
not return them from those who make them but do not receive them. 
Another group of algorithms--hierarchical clustering algorithms 
(see Johnson, 1967; Brieger, 1976; White et al., 1976)--partition a 
matrix of binary data into mutually exhaustive clusters. A map of social 
relations derived from such a program would be highly misleading--most 
persons have ties with more than one social grouping (cluster, circle, 
coalition, clique, interaction act, network or whatever). A represent-
ative "picture" of the social relations in any population would have to 
depict overlap. In this study, for instance, one ethicist chose many of 
the same people other ethicists and other physicians also chose. Accord-
ing to the operations of these algorithms, he would be placed in a 
cluster along with the group with whom he had the most in common (ethi-
cists) and his commonalities with other groups (physicians) would not be 
revealed at all; and that is not an accurate map of his social relations. 
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Not satisfied with either alternative--with either an algorithm 
which depicted overlap but assumed transitivity or reciprocity or an 
algorithm which assumed neither transitivity nor reciprocity, but imposed 
mutual exclusivity on the social groupings that emerge--I chose the 
latter because (1) I could then use the networks as variables and (2) I 
could "fill in" overlap through my own analysis of the sociometric 
information. 
Many methods of matrix analysis were considered, among them: 
"blockmodeling" (Brieger, 1976; White et al., 1976); Alba and Kadushin's 
"new measure of social proximity" (1976); Krippendorf's "2m strong associ-
ative clustering" (1975); and Coleman's "Sociometric Connectedness" 
method (see Crane, 1972:42).. Because of monetary and computer space 
constraints, a version of Johnson's hierarchical clustering method (1967) 
adapted for use in the BIOMED P statistical package (1973--BMDP1M) was 
used. The definers were clustered on the basis of the similarity (corre-
lation) of their choices, rather than on the basis of who chose them. 
Definers who had the greatest similarity of choices were paired and 
others were added to the pair on the basis of an amalgamation measure. 
I chose from the program options the "maximum," or "diameter," method 
of amalgamation, the strongest in the program. For a definer to be added 
to a cluster with this method, his choices must be correlated with all 
members of the cluster--not just anyone member of the cluster. 
In hierarchical clustering programs it is not customary to include 
choices of self in the data matrix. However, if the choices of the per-
sons who chose another but did not choose themselves are compared, the 
vectors representing their respective choices will be dissimilar and the 
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overall similarity between the two will be lowered. Mutuality, when it 
occurs, is worth noting, and should add to the similarity of two defin-
ers. With this in mind, I arranged the data so that each person chose 
himself. 
To obtain a measure of the relations among clusters, I simply 
averaged the correlations among the members of each cluster contained in 
the space on the final matrix where the two clusters intersected. 2 The 
BIOMED output rearranges the original correlation matrix, making this 
a relatively simple procedure. I assessed cluster overlap on the basis 
of the strength of the correlations between members of different clus-
ters. I spent several weeks familiarizing myself with the patterns of 
choices of each respondent,3 partially to convince myself that the 
algorithm was indeed giving a reasonable image of the network of rela-
tions among the definers. 
Contacting the Definers: the Interviews 
In addition to sending all authors a copy of the survey, I arranged 
interviews with as many as would consent to them (16) on the Eastern sea-
board. In addition to the authors, I interviewed several members of the 
Harvard Ad Hoc Committee, as well as two physicians who were excellent 
informants on the role of Massachusetts General Hospital and Peter Bent 
Brigham Hospital (both associated with Harvard University Medical School) 
in the evolution of the issue. In all cases, I followed the format of 
the survey, requesting elaboration on their personal intellectual and 
professional history with the issue, the role of others in developing 
the issue (particularly those who were deceased at the time of collecting 
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the data), and details regarding the history and evolution of the issue. 
All but two permitted me to tape the conversation, and several gave me 
access to their personal files. The information collected in inter-
views provides the basis for several portions of Chapter 3. 
Managing the Articles: The Content Analysis 
After the respondent sample was stabilized at 75 (see Appendix A), 
each article written by each author was analyzed according to a rather 
conceptually complex content analytic scheme (Appendix 0). 
If the author wrote more than one article, the article which was 
most inclusive of the two or three written was used. Since the data 
from the questionnaire had to be combined with the data obtained from 
the content analysis, only one article was finally selected for each 
author, giving 75 complete author-article data units. 
The scheme itself is too complex to be covered substantively apart 
from the text and is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 7. The general 
conceptual scheme fit all but a very few articles. It framed each 
article as a discussion of a problem(s) for which the redefinition of 
death was considered a solution or as a discussion of problems arising 
from redefining death. 
Reliability 
A computer program devised by Klaus Krippendorf (1973) at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania was utilized to assess the agreement between two 
coders on the content analysis scheme for 20 articles randomly selected 
from the sample. Because the scheme was rather complex, I intensively 
trained another coder (fellow PhD candidate at the Annenberg School of 
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Communications, Jo Holtz) in the subtleties and intricacies of the redef-
inition issue and in the general writing styles of physicians, lawyers 
and ethicists. We first practiced on ten articles selected for their 
complexity, and discussed them and the scheme in detail. Because we were 
thoroughly famil iar with the scheme and the issues by the time we coded 
the 20 randomly selected articles, the reliability obtained for most 
items was very high. All but six items had scores of .8 or above, with 
most items having scores of .9 or above. 
The Cluster Analysis 
Sixty-eight items in the scheme are binary items designed to be used 
in a clustering analysis to assess which issues or themes are associated 
with one another apart from any particular article's content or any par-
ticular author's approach. The analysis was undertaken for two reasons: 
(1) to assess the structure of the article sample and the structure of 
consensus and (2) to attempt to assess the relation between the clusters 
of themes and the social organization of the authors. 
For this set of "cluster" data, I used Krippendorf's "Strong Asso-
ciative Clustering of 2m Data" (1975). This program was not convenient 
for the analysis of the four sociograms, but it was particularly useful 
for the content analysis data. The output lists the frequency with which 
each item is mentioned--a handy feature for assessing the themes that 
were mentioned most often by the sociometric clusters of authors. 
The "2m" method is a hierarchical clustering method like, the B.IO~lED 
program, but which, instead of adding items into clusters on the basis of 
similarity of pairs of items, forms clusters on the basis of the 
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cooccurrence of all items in the cluster. In other words, the BlaMED 
program amalgamates pairs of variables as such; no higher-order cluster 
based on the cooccurrence of all those pairs at once is obtained as it 
is in the 2m method. In Krippendorf's algorithm, a cluster of four items 
is constructed on the basis of what they all have in common, not just on 
what any two items have in common. He argues that a four-item cluster 
implies lower-order clusters--four three-variable clusters and six two-
variable clusters. One can reason from the higher order to the lower 
order clusters, but one cannot reason in reverse--from the lower order 
to the higher order clusters. It is easy to see how conceptually appro-
priate the "higher order clustering" is for the analysis of sociometric 
data, if one assumes, as do most social scientists, that a group or net-
work is more or other than a sum of its members or a sum of its dyads. 
In the same way, one could argue that conceptual approaches present in 
the articles have an integrity best tapped by this method. 
Krippendorf's program does not rearrange the matrix of associations 
according to the clusters obtained, as the BlaMED program does, and I 
could not assess the relations among the clusters in the same way I did 
for the social networks. In this case, I specified the relations among 
the clusters by tediously noting the association of each item in a clus-
ter to each other item and arranging them according to the strength and 
number of links from items of one cluster to items of another. 
i . 
; 
, 
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Contacting the Policy-Makers 
The Survey 
Besides contacting the definers, I sought information from the 
policy-makers, as well. By writing to each state's legislative council 
and requesting the name of the sponsor(s) of the bill, I obtained the 
names of persons who were closely involved in the passage of each bill. 
I then wrote to the sponsor asking him/her to name five persons who were 
important in stimulating interest in the issue, drafting the bill or 
supporting the bill once before the legislature. A cover letter and 
short version of the author questionnaire was sent to each. The ques-
tionnaire sent to the policy-makers included only the sociometric list 
and questions. I wanted some means of assessing the interaction among 
policy-makers from different states and among policy-makers and definers. 
In the cover letter, I alerted the addressee that I would try to arrange 
a telephone interview. All in all, I interviewed 18/22 policy-makers 
and received completed questionnaires from as many. The cover letter 
appears in Appendix C. 
The Telephone Interviews 
Open, informal interviews were conducted and tape recorded with 
permission. I asked each "policy-maker": 
1. What were local pressures or interests which led to the bill's 
being passed? 
2. What was your role in the process of getting the bill passed? 
3. Who, or which group, originally stimulated interest in a 
"brain death" statute? 
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4. Who was responsible for the language of the bill? 
5. How was the link with the legislature provided or arranged? 
6. Who, or which groups, were primary supporters of the bill? 
7. ,Was opposition to the bill voiced? If so, by whom? What was 
the substance of the opposition? 
Almost all of the "stories" of the policy developments in the five 
states in Chapter 3 derive from these interviews. 
Each was then asked standard demographic questions regarding his 
(there were no women) education, membership in professional organi-
zations, religious background and importance, and political party 
affiliation. 
In the process of gathering information, I was astounded by 
the lack of formal legislative histories and general information 
regarding the formation of legislative policy. Social investigation 
of the development of policy is bound to the memories of individual 
legislators who have been involved in numerous legislative efforts 
and who may have been in office for only one term. 
Data Analysis 
Needless to say, the questionnaires and the content analysis 
scheme produced a good deal of information. Of course, I did not use 
all the information collected, nor will I :-eport all of the analyses 
performed. 
Aside from the network and clustering analyses, I cross-tabulated 
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many variables with the SPSS "crosstabs" program. Consistently the most 
interesting and most inclusive variable is the author's discipline--
throughout the discussion, the primary independent variable. A "second-
ary" independent variable, also an organization variable, is "elite" or , 
'sociometric star" status, obtained from the network analysis. 
Statistics 
Since I hadn't a random sample, but had in fact begun with a uni-
verse, I did not consider any statistics other than simple measures of 
the strength of the relationship between two variables to be appropriate. 
For the 2X2 tables, I used phi 2 a "proportionate reduction in error 
measure" based on the chi square and argued by several sociologists to 
be more conceptually appropriate than chi square (Mueller, Schuessler, 
and Costner, 1970:244-247; Costner, 1965 and Blalock, 1972:300-302). 
For 2X3 tables, I used Cramer's V. Though not popularly used in the 
social sciences, it is an adequate measure derived from phi for other 
than 2X2 tables (Blalock, 1972:297), and it is certainly less clumsy 
than assymetrical measures of association in large tables. 
The Rest to Come 
It might help the reader if the data sources used in the following 
chapters were specified once more. Primary research and the information 
coll.ected from interviews with definers and policy-makers provide the 
basis of Chapter 3, "The History of the Redefinition of Death." Chap-
ter 4, "The Definers: Who They Are," derives from the survey data, par-
ticularly questions 1-5 and 27-34. Questions 16-24 of the definer survey 
provide the data for Chapter 5, "Communication Activities in Cultural 
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Defining." Chapter 5 includes the discussion of the definers' communi-
cation intent, and their participation in public discussion on the topic. 
The chapter on social organization, 6, is based on the sociometric sec-
tion of ,the definer survey (questions 7-14) and the network analysis. 
The content and clustering analyses performed on the articles are dis-
cussed in Chapter 7, "Conceptual Approach: Article Content." "The 
Policy-Makers and Definer/Policy-Maker Interaction" was constructed from 
the policy-maker survey and interviews. Chapter 9, a discussion of what 
facilitated and constrained the institutionalization of the redefinition 
of death, is an integration of the findings of the previous chapters. 
ENDNOTES 
lMuch to my dismay (after the questionnaire had been mailed), I 
discovered that I had omitted one important name from the list by 
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acci dent -- Don Harper t~i 11 s. The omi ss i on may have made a difference 
in the sociometric integration of policy-makers and definers, since 
Mills was highly active as medico-legal editor of JAMA and as a primary 
consultant on legislation in both Kansas and California. But the 
omi ss i on as ide, as they say in soci 01 ogy, "one person doth not soci a 1 
organization make". 
2Suggested to me by Robert Norton, Purdue University. 
3Having recorded all the data from the surveys and having con-
structed the binary matrix for each tie, I was quite familiar with 
the choice patterns. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORY OF THE REDEFINITION OF DEATH 
FROM RESEARCH TO STATUTORY DEFINITION 
Interest in defining death in terms of the brain began when it 
became possible to measure the brain's pathological states with respect 
to cardiorespiratory function. Until cardiac resuscitation and arti-
ficial respiration were possible, with the exception of those suffering 
certain kinds of coma, persons died all at once, and it was not possible 
to explicitly determine the differential functioning of the three major 
systems -- the central nervous system, respiratory system and circula-
tory system. Comas such as Karen Quinlan is suffering at present, in 
which spontaneous respiratory and circulatory activity is ongoing, must 
have presented the first notions of something like "brain death" and 
these cases were probably characterized as "hopeless", or perhaps 
"i rrevers i b 1 e" . But there were few such persons who 1 i ved without the 
.benefit of antibiotics and other modern supportive techniques. The 
concept of the definition of death as dependent on brain function 
follows the development of technologies for measuring brain function, 
primarily electroencephalography and angiography, and for reactivating 
cardiac and respiratory function after failure. 
Electroencephalography began in 1929 when German psychiatrist, Hans 
Berger, first demonstrated the possibility of recording the brain's 
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electrical activity from electrodes attached to the scalp (Woolsey, 
1975). From that time on, the electroencephalogram (EEG) was used as a 
guide for monitoring changes in brain function due to trauma, pathology 
and drugs. The EEG is a kind of map or graph of the electrical activity 
of an organ not otherwise accessible to clinical observation or through 
the use of radiation. 
The earliest experiments of the effects of drugs on the brain, as 
well as the differential functioning of parts of the brain measured by 
the EEG, were performed on animals (Beecher and McDonough, 1939; 
Belleville, 1957; Tentler, 1957). In a classic study using cats, Sugar 
and Gerard (1938) determined the differential death of the major compo-
nents of the central nervous system when oxygen was withdrawn. They 
found that the "lower" brain centers, e.g., the spinal cord, midbrain 
and medulla, had the longest survival time and the shortest recovery 
time when resuscitated. The "higher" centers however (the cortex or 
cerebrum) were the first to lose their function, after about five 
minutes of oxygen deprivation, and the last to regain it (Alderete 
et. al., 1968; Belleville, 1957). The brain was quite different from 
other organs: its cells do not regenerate, and its tissue is much more 
sensitive to oxygen loss than other body tissues. 
Hence the problem: other organs of the body will generate new 
cells to replace others that have been destroyed, and other organs 
endure oxygen deficiency and are able to be resuscitated. Not so the 
cortex, the seat of our symbolic and social competencies. and person-
alities. And when cardiorespiratory supportive and resuscitative 
technologies were developed, our society was faced with the bizarre fact 
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of a disintegrated person or an otherwise functioning body of organs 
housing a dead brain. This bizarre by-product of an otherwise bene-
ficial advance in life-support technology provided a major stimulus to 
reevaluating the meaning of life, death and personhood. 
The Development of Life-Supporting Technologies and the Role 
of the Anesthesiologist in Defining Death 
Resuscitation technology developed during the forties and fifties, 
usually in the context of operating room emergencies. Pharmacological 
and electrical defibrillation of the heart became increasingly effective 
. over the years (Negovsky, 1961). Cardiologists involved in cardiac 
resuscitation and emergency coronary care (CPR-ECC) were among the first 
to ask the questions, "When is a person dead?" and, "When can one stop 
resuscitative measures?" 
Respirator technology grew partially out of efforts to transport 
supplies at high altitudes in non-pressurized planes during World War II. 
At that time, it was found that positive pressure could be tolerated by 
pilots. After the war, drugs which paralyze the respiratory muscles 
were used during anesthesia and mechanical ventillation in surgery and 
intensive care wards became the daily function of anesthesiologists. 
The polio epidemic of the late forties and early fifties increased the 
need for mechanical respiration to restore respiratory function in those 
whose respiratory muscles had been paralyzed by the disease. (Informant 
notes) . 
During this time, anesthesiologists began to utilize the EEG to 
monitor and control levels of barbiturate and general anesthesia and 
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hypothermia (Tentler, 1957; Belleville, 1955). Anesthesiologists were 
thus in an excellent position to notice and describe the electroenceph-
alographic changes that occurred during anesthesia and interruptions in 
normal procedure such as cardiac arrest and hypoxia. (Maintaining 
life-support systems during surgery and frequently in emergency settings 
is their responsibility.) 
Some anesthesiologists have been particularly prominent in the 
definition of death discussion. The first mention of the use of the 
EEG to determine prognosis for recovery of cerebral function after sus-
tained oxygen loss in the literature reviewed for this study was made 
by an anesthesiologist (Belleville, 1955, 1957). Henry K. Beecher, the 
late Henry Isaiah Dorr Professor of Anesthezia at Harvard University 
Medical School, and by far the most prominent figure in the American 
definition of death debate, published one of the first studies on the 
application of the EEG in studying cortical potentials during anesthesia 
and under the administration of barbiturates (Beecher, 1938). Another 
anesthesiologist active in the recent definition debate, Vincent Col-
lins, noted the problem of deciding when a person is dead during resus-
citation in a statement to the 1956 meeting of the American Society of 
Anesthesiologists. And it was the International Congress of Anesthe-
siologists who posed the three well-known questions regarding anesthesi-
ologists' responsibilities in maintaining life in hopeless cases to 
Pope Pius XII. The Pope's reply is among the most constantly quoted 
statements in the literature (see McHugh, 1976; Pius XII, 1958). 
One anesthesiologist informant mentioned that he had become inter-
ested in the topic of "brain" death through research his laboratory had 
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executed. He had been engaged in research attempting to quantify sub-
jective responses such as analgesia, nausea and drowsiness, and found 
the definition of death a topic to which they might apply their 
experience. Anesthesiologists, as well as neurologists and neurosur-
geons, would seem to have substantial interest and experience in the 
study of consciousness, a background which would lead to an involvement 
with the ways in which death, or even personhood, could be defined. It 
was frequently the anesthesiologists who assumed responsibility for 
initiating the use of respirators in emergency and operating room 
situations. They were prominent figures in the settings in which the 
first tragic cases of mindless bodihood emerged (Informant notes). 
The Electroencephalograph and the Determination 
of "Brain Death" 
Along with developments in resuscitation and artificial ventilation 
during the fifties, progress was made in utilizing the EEG to identify 
part i cul ar patterns of rhythms on the graph with di sorders. The "fl at" 
electroencephalograph, indicating an absence of cortical electrical 
potential under normal amplification, was linked to various transitory 
conditions in normal patients and neurological and psychiatric patients 
(Adams, 1957). However, a sustained "flat" EEG was considered to be 
i ndi cati ve of a ki nd of "corti ca 1 death". The conditi ons under whi ch a 
"flat" EEG could not be taken as evidence of "cerebral death", e.g., 
barbiturate influence, hypothermia, were discovered as persons in such 
states recovered completely after a sustained period of flat recordings 
during the 50's. There still remained considerable confusion regarding 
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when a flat EEG was a valid prognosis of imminent death and when it was 
not (Tentler, 1957; Bental and Leibowitz, 1961). 
According to most of the neurological informants, European neurol-
ogists, specifically P. Mollaret, ~1. Jouvet and H. Fischgold, and 
P. Mathis originally, explicated the role of the EEG in diagnosing 
specific kinds of coma in 1959. Mollaret gave the name "coma depasse" 
to the phenomenon often witnessed in intensive care wards. Most of the 
early discussion of the use of EEG to diagnose coma and other neurologi-
cal conditions was published as various National Electroencephalographic 
Society proceedings in the international journal, Electroencephalography 
and Clinical Neurophysicology (hereafter, for obvious reasons, abbre-
vi ated ECN). 
Legal Ambiguities and the Definition of Death 
Besides the medical developments which began to shake the founda-
tions of the traditional concept of death, questions arose in the early 
'50s in legal arenas. Specifically, questions were raised regarding 
the execution of wills and estates of two joint tenants whose respective 
time of death was at issue. In both cases discussed here, one of two 
persons died at the scene of the accident, and the other was in coma for 
some days afterward and never again regained consciousness. The ques-
tion for the courts was whether or not both persons could be considered 
to have died at the same time. In Thomas v. Anderson,l 1950, the court 
stated: "death occurs precisely when 1 ife ceases and does not occur 
until the heart stops breathing and respiration ends. Death is not a 
continuing event and is an event that takes place at a precise time" 
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(Capron and Kass, 1972: 93, n. 23). In this statement, the court empha-
sized a conception of death as an event and not a process. They did 
not acknowledge, as some "brain death" advocators in recent years have, 
that there may be different levels of death (e.g., "social" death, 
"metabol ic or cellular" death) and that systems and organs of the body 
die at different times. In 1950, before the use of defibrillators and 
respi rators, nearly everyone died "all at once". 
In 1958, a childless couple (the Smiths) who had no other benefac-
tors other than each other, were involved in a serious accident in 
which Nr. Smith died at the scene. Nrs. Smith remained unconscious for 
17 days before she died2 and Nr. Smith's lawyer attempted to convince 
the court by petitioning, 
That as a matter of modern me.dical science, your peti-
tioner ... will offer the Court competent proof that the 
(Smiths) lost their power to will at the same instant and 
that their demise as earthly human beings occurred at the 
same time in said automobile accident, neither of them 
ever regaining any consciousness whatsoever. 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas would not overturn dismissal of his 
petition and refused to acknowledge any sense of death other than that 
defined in Black's Law Dictionary. "Death is the cessation of life; the 
ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the cir-
culation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions 
consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc." The court 
held " ... that one breathing, though unconscious, is not dead." In 
the opinion of the court, Nrs. Smith did not die at the same time that 
her husband died (Capron and Kass, 1972; Halley and Harvey, 1968). 
These court decisions and the legal definition of death in Black's 
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Law Dictionary formed the legal barrier to physicians' use of a defini-
tion of death as dependent on brain function in the late 60's and 70's. 
American EEG Research and Redefining Death 
American neurologists and electroencephalographers, principally 
Robert Schwab of Harvard ~1edical School, and Daniel Silverman, Graduate 
Hospital, University of Pennsylvania,3 responded to Fischgold and Mathis 
and Mollaret's research in the early '60s and began to collect the data 
that provided the basis for the Harvard Committee's 1968 recommenda-
tions and the major reports and studies conducted under the auspices of 
the American EEG Society and the National Institute of Neurological 
Disease and Stroke (NINDS). 
Schwab had watched patients whose brains he suspected were 
destroyed lie attached to unsophisticated mechanical respirators for 
days on end, and was rather disturbed by the useless prolongation of 
these 1 i ves. As head of the EEG department at t~assachusetts General 
Hospital in Boston, he began to collect EEG tracings of some of these 
patients and compared them with autopsy and other pathological findings 
in the late '50s, obtaining the first evidence of what was later called 
"respirator brain" -- a state of necrolysis or liquefaction of brain 
tissue noted during autopsy of patients who had been supported on 
respirators for a considerable period of time after the death of the 
brain. 
At the American Electroencephalographic Society's annual meeting 
in 1962, Schwab (and Silverman) presented papers summarizing their 
findings. Schwab and his collaborators posed the definition of death 
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problem for the first time in America in the form those arguing for the 
definition as a solution to the problem of useless prolongation of irre-
versible coma would use again and again in the late '60s and early '70s. 
He expl icitly titled the paper, "EEG as an aid in determining death in 
the presence of cardiac activity (ethical, legal and medical aspects)", 
and began, 
The new cardiac stimulation, other techniques, and compact 
respirators have made it increasingly possible to revive the 
apparently dead. Fortunate cases recover both respi ratory and 
higher central nervous system function as well as normal car-
diac activity. This communication is not involved with these 
patients. The unfortunate situations, where the anoxia was so 
long that destruction to the respiratory centers and higher 
nervous system occurred, but where cardiac function was restored, 
are the subject of this report. In these cases, a human heart-
lung preparation results that may be viable for many days. For 
hundreds of years death was determined by the absence of a heart 
beat. Therefore, the presence of a pulse, blood pressure, and 
audible heart beat makes it necessary to establish another 
indication of death ... on such cases the prolongation of 
cardiac circulation serves no purpose, is a tremendous financial 
and emotional stress to the relatives, and a severe demand on 
hospital personnel and equipment. (Schwab, 1963: 15) 
He went on to list the neurological and EEG criteria for declaring 
death which were decided upon after several cases of establishing death 
in Massachusetts General, presumably by the Neurology department (and 
perhaps some other departments) and the EEG Lab. It was this research 
and data which formed the basis for the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee's 
Report in 1968; Schwab was a member of the committee. One informant who 
had worked very closely with Schwab at Massachusetts General stated 
Schwab never got the credi t due hi m for thi s groundwork. 
One of Schwab's colleagues at Massachusetts General with sensi-
bilities similar to Schwab's, Hannibal Hamlin,wrote the first widely 
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cited article explicating the general artificial life maintenance 
problem and suggesting use of the EEG in declaring death; "Life or 
Death by EEG" was published in JAMA in 1964. The essay was presented 
first at the 1964 AMA convention, and elicited strong reactions from 
physicians and press alike. Quoting Pindar's Third Pythian Ode and 
discussing the cultural meaning of the heart and blood (among other 
things), Haml i n argued "The sancti ty of human 1 i fe is not generated by 
cardiac signs of its presence or absence when the brain is already 
dead ... Certainly the human spirit that emerges in man's unique 
individuality is the product of his brain, not his heart" (p. 113). 
Early Cadaver Organ Transplantation 
During the first half of the '60s, kidney transplantations from 
cadavers were performed in Europe and at Peter Bent Brigham Hospital 
in Boston, along with Massachusetts General, part of the Harvard Medi-
cal School. Peter Bent Brigham surgeon, Joseph Murray, who was also a 
member of the Harvard Committee, performed the first successful 
abdominal kidney transplant from a living twin donor in 1954 (Moore, 
1972) and was also the first to perform a successful cadaver transplant 
with the use of artificial cardio-pulmonary support on patients whose 
brains had been destroyed from oxygen deprivation. 
However, the first real stimulus toward the redefinition of death 
really came later with the development of cadaver transplant technology 
and immunology. In other words, it seems that the presence of "human 
lung preparations" was not enough to pressure medicine and law into 
acting to resolve problems, but the development of another new medical 
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technology, transplantation, was. 
The first case in which a physician was challenged for using brain 
criteria for declaring the death of a prospective kidney donor took 
place in England in .1963 ("The Moment of Death", 1963: 95). The case, 
Potter, was the first of several to come in the late '60s and '70s 
regarding potential heart donors. In Potter, a man had been hit on the 
head in a brawl, taken to the hospital where he stopped breathing, and 
was placed on a respirator. With the consent of the victim's wife, he 
was then prepared for the removal of one of his kidneys. After the 
operation, the victim was disconnected from the respirator and did not 
breathe spontaneously. A medical witness said that he had virtually 
died when he first stopped breathing, though legally it would be more 
correct to say that he had died 24 hours later, after the operation. A 
neurosurgeon testified that removal of the kidney in no way contributed 
to his death, but that cranial injuries incurred during the brawl 
had (Ibid.). 
It is important to understand that kidneys which are continually 
oxygenated with blood circulated with the use of a respirator make for 
more successful transplants; that is the reason for keeping persons who 
are otherwise dead on a respirator. The physicians who disconnected 
the respirator after the kidneys were removed did not obtain or cite 
evidence that Potter was actually dead according to brain criteria 
(Ramsey, 1970: 71). The muddle over "virtual" and "legal" death and 
the lack of a reliable basis on which the declaration of death was made 
he 1 ped to bri ng the quest i on, "When is a person dead?" into the center 
of medical-ethical concerns in Europe and England. 
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The Ciba Symposium: Ethics in Medical Progress 
In March, 1966, 21 physicians, five lawyers, one theologian and 
one science'writer convened in London to participate in a Ciba Founda-
tion Symposium entitled Ethics in Medical Progress: With Special 
Reference to Transplantation. Attending the first well-known inter-
disciplinary symposium touching on the topic of death definition were 
Harvard's Murray, T. E. Starzl, C. E. Wasmuth, G. E. Schreiner (from 
the U.S.) and other prominent transplant surgeons and medico-legal 
experts from Britain and Europe. In addition to discussing the medical 
and ethical problems of transplantation, issues of informed consent in 
human experimentation and the allocation of scarce resources (trans-
plant organs, hemodialysis) were also raised. 
Many of the assumptions and emphases made in this symposium for 
the first time (to my knowledge) were echoed again and again two to 
eight years later. For some reason, the symposium provided a ground-
work and conceptual base for the technical and medical concerns, but 
the several trenchant philosophical and ethical concerns raised seemed 
to go almost unnoticed for several years. For instance, Starzl, Univer-
sity of Colorado's well-known transplant pioneer, posed the question: 
Such a practice [establishing 'Brain' death for 'storing' 
the kidneys in situ, i.e., in the corpse while the kidneys 
are well-oxygenated] is advantageous for the recipient, who 
can thus be assured of receiving a better kidney, but does 
this pragmatic consideration justify a legal redefinition of 
death, and if so, upon the basis of what infallible evidence? 
(Wolstenholme and O'Conner, 1966:67) 
Embodied in his question were relatively implicit mentions of 1) the 
tension between recipient benefit and potential danger to the donor; 
2) the question of whether or not any practical consideration should 
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be the basis for a redefinition of death and 3) some recognition of the 
confusions and lack of medical consensus with regard to the procedures 
of declaring death. The first and last of these concerns were echoed 
again and again in the periodical literature for the next eight years. 
The second has had a different sort of career as a more subtle consid-
eration for a country and profession with a highly operant technological 
imperative (see Chapter 9). The ethical notion that a profound cultural 
notion should be redefined without regard at all to pragmatic considera-
tions, such as transplantation, or even without regard for the family 
of the irreversibly comatose or for the other patients who could use 
them, has been expressed only a very few times in the literature 
analyzed for this study. 
Other matters discussed during this symposium were: 
a) the value of the flat EEG as a criterion with respect to other 
clinical criteria for determining death, such as the complete absence 
of spontaneous respiration, complete absence of reflexes, complete bilat-
eral mydriasis (excessive pupil dilation), and falling blood pressure; 
b) the necessity of dissociating the transplant team from donor 
care; 
c) the use of angiography to show interrupted blood flow to the 
brain as a better sign of death than the EEG; 
d) what kind of issue, e.g., theological, ethical, medical, legal, 
the definition of death is; 
e) the disparity between medical and legal definitions of death; 
f) the confusion surrounding the issue which might give rise to 
doubts about medical ethics and transplantation among the lay public; and 
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g) a conceptual distinction which has a rather interesting history 
and did not catch on in the literature until rather later, namely that 
the question of when to discontinue extraordinary measures to keep a 
person alive is different from and should not be confused with the ques-
tion of at what point a man is dead. Perhaps a major question for this 
study, and one which may not be answered satisfactorily, is why, given 
that the Ciba symposium is widely cited, did these same issues need to 
be stated again and again in the literature written primarily from 
1967 to 1974? 
The Ciba symposium was the first major statement of the need for 
a redefinition of death with respect to facilitating organ transplant-
ation and of the major problems and confusions which arise given that 
need. Ways of expressing the problem at times suggest a very early, 
perhaps immature, conception of the ethics involved. For instance, 
one of the participants stated, "I would like to tell you what we con-
sider as death when we have potential donors who have severe cranio-
cerebral injuries" (Wolstenholme and O'Conner, 1966: 69, emphasis 
added). This statement illustrates an instance of heartily defining 
death for an avowed purpose. It would be shocking to find a similar 
statement after 1972, after most of the ethical criticisms had been 
made and the legal dangers had been specified. 
The Definition of Death and Euthanasia 
In 1967, there were two major problems focusing a need for 
updating the definition of death -- transplantation and the problem 
addressed by Schwab and Hamlin, the need to cease the useless 
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prolongation of dying. At this early point in the redefining process, 
persons with irreversible coma or brain death were considered to be more 
"hopeless" than actually "dead" except by a few persons. It was as if 
one couldn't quite go that far and deny that a beating heart meant life. 
Even Hamlin, who, I believe, actually considered the bodies which he 
descri bed as "heart-l ung preparations" to be dead, stated "resuscitati ve 
devices can maintain the look of life in the face of death" ( p. 113) 
and" ... some of the nobil ity in death would be preserved where it 
has frequently been forfeited through our slavish and superstitious 
refusal to acknowledge that St. Peter is at the Gate of Charon at the 
Crossing" (p. 114), when he might have gone further and said "that they 
can maintain the look of life upon the face of death" or that the Gate 
had been entered or the Ri ver Lethe actually crossed (Ramsey. 
1970: 86). 
Hamlin and others have frequently described that kind of dying as 
ignoble. Hence the advocacy for "death with dignity". It takes two 
slight conceptual slips to change the meaning from "cease useless 
prolongation", or "allow a person to die", to "withdraw treatment" to 
euthanasia. For the eight years following the publication of Hamlin's 
article, the issues of the definition of death, withdrawing treatment 
and euthanasia were thickly intertwined. Persons who were actually 
dead according to the new criteria were continually referred to as 
"virtually dead", "irreversibly comatose", or, in other words, "not 
quite dead", making it easy enough to confuse the definition of death 
with euthanasia, and several early articles published in 1967 and 1968 
did just that. 
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Three frequently cited articles from that period illustrate some 
of the confus ions. Argui ng for a "defi niti on of death based on twen-
t ieth century medi ca 1 facts", psychi atri st Frank Ayd holds: "when the 
circumstances justify it, the law should recognize that a physician 
should be permitted to discontinue extraordinary means of sustaining 
life when clinical death is imminent and inevitable" (1967: 83). 
Since all death is inevitable and one should be able to live until 
death is literally upon one and not merely "imminent" or in the offing, 
suggesting that physicians direct the course of one's dying in this 
way is to suggest that physicians "hasten" death or commit euthanasia, 
rather than simply adhere to a new definition. 
Law professor George Fletcher, arguing that turning off a respira-
tor is an omission and not an act of homicide, argues similarly: 
The proposals for vesting physicians with greater flex-
ibility in caring for terminal patients are of two strands. 
The first is a movement toward instituting voluntary euthana-
sia, which would permit the medically supervised killing of 
patients who consent to death. These proposals warrant 
continued discussion and criticism, but they apply only in 
cases of patients still conscious and able to consent to 
their own demise. Separate problems adhere to the cases of 
doomed, unconscious patients who may be kept alive by mechan-
ical means. In the latter area, the movement for reform 
has stimulated the pursuit of a definition of death that 
would permit physicians to do what they will with the bodies 
of hopeless, "legally dead" patients. (1967: 1000-1001, 
emphasis added), 
Surely, the fated, hopeless, or doomed patient, even kept alive 
by mechanical means, is not the same as a dead patient; and surely, 
physicians may not do what they will, either to obtain organs for 
someone else or to cease treating a person because his case is "fated", 
"doomed", "terminal" or "hopeless". Neither Fletcher, Ayd nor Haml in 
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is arguing that such patients are actually dead, but rather that they 
may be declared or considered dead on the basis of a new definition 
of death. 
In 1968, anesthesiologist Vincent Collins distinguished between 
letting a patient die and euthanasia, arguing that the latter is 
essentially murder, whatever the intent. In this chain of articles, 
Ayd and Fletcher citing Hamlin and Collins quoting Fletcher, all authors 
are concerned with the quality of life and the dignity of their dying 
patients. However, Collins comes closest to stating the relationship 
between the definition problem and the "withdrawing treatment" issue 
as a matter of not opposing death, or of allowing to die. 
If after some time all measures are obviously not effective 
and are not reversing the dying process then the measures are 
failing ... To persist may produce the appearance of life, 
but this is most often technical or mechanical life ... It is the 
physician's obligation to cease efforts early when they are 
determined to be ineffective in the total remanimaltion process 
and objectives. The patient should then be allowed to die. He 
has this right; he should not be cheated of a peaceful death 
when the physician is powerless to restore consciousness. A 
vegetating patient, hopeless and unresponsive, and showing no 
spontaneous activity, should be allowed to die peacefully. 
Physicians should make the dying process dignified. (1968: 391) 
At any rate, at this stage, death, "hopeless state", "imminent 
death", "virtual death", "doomed" were all muddled together in most 
discussions on the topic (Ramsey, 197Q: 77). Clarification was 
urgently needed, and it seems that few authors, if any, noted David 
Daube's comment at the 1966 Ciba Symposium that the question, When is 
a person dead? is conceptually and analytically distinct from, "When 
should treatment be withdrawn? 
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Modern Concern Over Premature Burial 
Confusions between "hopeless" and "imminent death" and "death", 
as well as the suspicion that the major motivation behind the redefini-
tion effort was to obtain organs for other people, caused the lay person 
just concern. Add to this obvious concern a few cases reported in the 
mass media which depict recovery from "brain death", and public confu-
sion becomes a problem for the professionals. 
The January 15, 1968 issue of Newsweek reported that a leading 
Russian theoretical physicist suffered extensive brain damage in a car 
accident. According to medical opinion, he was not likely to live and 
would be badly brain-damaged if he did. After a coma of sixty days 
duration, he regained consciousness and resumed his position as head of 
his department of theoretical physics. 
In addition, Science News, in 1969, reported a case in which a boy 
had been brought to a hospital in Israel with severe brain damage and 
who met the five criteria for "brain death" set down by the Council 
for the International Organization of Medical Science. The physicians 
in charge did not give up and kept the boy on drugs and a respirator. 
The boy recovered to normal health. 
And on television in the spring of 1970, the "Bold Ones" televised 
a drama depicting the recovery of a man with severe brain damage, a 
"fl at EEG" and all the rest of the makings of "brai n death". The 
young man miraculously "conquered" the state of brain death -- obvi-
ously a "reversibly ill person, mistakenly thought .dead" (Lossing, 
1970, emphasis added). 
The message seems quite clear: the redefinition of death is so 
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much hocus-pocus, fraught with indeterminacy and error, a mere means to 
an end (ending one's life for someone else's benefit), and has little 
in common with the 01 d and sure ways of determining death. The fact 
is, of course, that when accepted criteria are met, humans do not 
"miraculously" or otherwise recover from such a state. However, the 
fear remains that there may be mistakes -- that in the haste to obtain 
organs or get rid of burdens, people will be mistakenly declared dead 
and either will be killed or buried alive. 
In 1968, a Kansas City physician published a paper addressing the 
issue of premature burial and public fear (Arnold, 1967). In "Public 
Attitudes and the Diagnosis of Death", Arnold discussed the history of 
attitudes toward premature burial, current attitudes toward the new 
definition of death and the increasing need for public forums on the 
issues involved in transplantation and death determination. 
The "Replaceable Muscle" 
The event which, according to many authors, consummated concern 
over the definition of death was the first heart transplant conducted 
by Christian Barnard in December, 1967. Nothing quite points up the 
need for a new interpretation more vividly than the total usurpation 
of an old interpretation. The seat of life, personality, love, let 
alone the object of a great deal of cultural concern for ages, had, as 
Ramsey put it, become a replaceable muscle. 
the first thoughts that the lay public had: 
We can imagine some of 
Did they kill one person 
by removing her heart in order to prolong or aid the life of another 
person? How could anyone call a person with a heart still beating, 
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dead? And, at any rate, the heart transplants of 1967/1968 (cf. Fox 
and Swazey, 1974; Ramsey, 1970) brought many other questions to the 
fore as physicians and othe·r professionals stumbled through various 
procedures and legalities (see below discussion of Tucker v. Lower and 
the California statute). 
Obviously needed were some authorized guidelines which represented 
a wide degree of consensus based on empirical findings regarding the 
death of the brain and the death of the rest of the human organism. 
The medical professional also needed legal assistance in order to avoid 
the trouble of situations such as Potter. Legitimation less formal 
than legal precedent or statute came in 1968 in the form of interna-
tional committee, symposium and medical school faculty recommendations 
for guidelines. These reports and documents specifying medical policy 
represented the consensus of selected and highly regarded physicians 
and lawyers. In 1967 and 1968 several symposia on the meaning of death 
and problems in recent medical advances were held and published 
(cf. World Medical Journal, 14 (5), 1967; North Carolina Medical Jour-
nal, November, 1967; Villanova Law Review, 13 (4), 1968). 
In the summer of 1968, two statements, now widely accepted on the 
definition of death and procedures for determining death,appeared. One 
came from the World Medical Assembly meeting in Sydney, Australia. The 
Declaration of Sydney affirmed that death is not an event, but a pro-
cess in which the death of the brain is the most important point, and 
offered several suggestions regarding procedures for determining when 
that point has occurred. The Harvard Ad Hoc Committee to Examine the 
Definition of Brain Death (Harvard Committee) published their statement 
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"A Definition of Irreversible Coma" in August, 1968. The major American 
statement of medi cal pol i cy, hereafter referred to as the Harvard Report, 
addressed both the problems of futile prolongation of life and trans-
plantation, as did the Declaration of Sydney. 
The Harvard Committee 
Early in 1968, a committee composed of nine physicians, one lawyer 
with a specialty in legal medicine, one medical historian and one 
theologian/ethicist, all from Harvard University, began meeting to 
discuss the problem of death definition. All members of the committee, 
and especially those in the neurological sciences, are nationally and 
internationally known members of their respective disciplines. The 
committee members are/were titled professors and chairmen of their 
departments. During the several interviews and discussions I had with 
physicians, three were constantly referred to as either the fathers or 
grandfathers of American neurology or the neurosciences -- Raymond D. 
Adams, Derek Denny-Brown and William Sweet. Among them, as well, were 
the surgeons who had conducted the first kidney transplants. In short, 
this was a blue-ribbon, high status and clout-bearing committee, and 
their work became an internationally respected statement of guide-
lines -- the Harvard Report. The following discussion of the committee, 
its development and politics, is based entirely on interviews with seven 
of the thirteen members. 4 
The committee was organized because of a sense of urgency felt by 
members of the staff of Massachusetts General Hospital who everyday 
faced the problems of irreversible coma and artificial life maintenance. 
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Among those most concerned were Schwab (discussed previously), Adams 
and Beecher, each long interested in the problem of defining death in 
terms of brain function. Another sense of urgency was felt by those 
members of the committee engaged in kidney transplantation at Peter 
Bent Brighman Hospital. Neither Massachusetts General nor the Brighman 
conducted heart transplantation, though much of the experimental work 
on which heart transplantation was based -- kidney transplantation 
was conducted at these hospitals. One surgeon informant confided 
"Boston knew better (than to conduct heart transplants1, knew that the 
effort was doomed to hopeless failure". 
At first the committee consisted of Beecher, Adams, Schwab and 
William Curran, the medico-legal expert in the group, and later the 
committee was dominated by the original four. Beecher was the. one 
who had originally gone to the dean of the medical school and suggested 
that a committee be formed to examine the definition and to make badly 
needed recommendations. It was Beecher who issued his own invitations 
to j oi n; in many respects, the committee was Beecher's "baby". Schwab 
felt that enough empirical data had been gathered to take a strong 
position on the issue, and it was thought that a position taken by a 
group of Harvard faculty (primarily medical faculty) would be a 
respected document, not only in our own country but throughout the world. 
Henry Beecher 
If one were to interpret the Harvard Medical School's contribution 
to the redefinition in terms of a central figure or a "great man", 
Henry Beecher would immediately come to mind. 5 Beecher (who died in 
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1976) was a strong-willed, determined person who was among the very 
first to stimulate public and professional concern over ethical issues 
in medicine. In a paper published in NEJM in 1966 (and subsequently 
relayed by wire services in newspapers allover the country), Beecher 
was the first to "blow the lid off" the morally objectionable treat-
ment of human subjects in experimental medical procedures. In the 
furor that followed the publication of "Ethics and Clinical Research", 
Beecher was ostracized by members of his own profession. He was 
destroying the profess i on by "spi 11 i ng the beans". Even a good fri end 
of his (the editor of a medical journal) suggested that persons would 
rather receive care from a certain physician (whom Beecher had des-
cribed in his article as having infected children with hepatitis for 
experimental purposes) than from a zealot (referring to Beecher, of 
course), Beecher was quite alone at that time in his public state-
ment. According to one i·nformant, it was Beecher's strength and vi si on 
which later directed the Harvard Report. 
Beecher's article on human experimentation was one of the primary 
stimulants to the organization of a conference on the "Ethical Aspects 
of Experimentation with Human Subjects" by the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences (AAAS) and its president at the time, Harvard law 
professor Paul Freund (Daedalus, 8( 2), 1969). The conference took 
place as a continuing seminar over two years with meetings in November, 
1967 and September, 1968. Beecher presented papers in both meetings, 
one. of which, entitled '.'.EthicalProblems Created by the Hopelessly 
Unconscious Patient", was subsequently published in NEJM (1969). The 
other paper, "Scarce Resources and Medical Advancement" was published 
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in the 1969 Daedalus volume. 
Beecher had been concerned about the "respi rator problem" 1 ong 
before the Harvard Committee was formed. He had been engaged in 
research on consciousness and pain throughout his career and, according 
to one informant, had a close colleague who was kept at "functional 
cadaver status" at Massachusetts General. Both factors seem to have 
contributed to his involvement with the issue. 
The "Ethical Problems ... " paper was one of the first statements 
to specify the economic, ethical and social problems raised for others 
when patients are kept at "functional cadaver status". Beecher's 
bearing on the issue was taken clearly from a "social need", or "common 
good", perspective. Redefining death would make organs available for 
transplantation and would make other scarce resources, such as money 
and medical equipment, available to those in need. However, in the 
article, Beecher also warned ".. a new definition of death, when 
there are those who have a vested interest in it, could lead to public 
questioning and doubt and an unfortunate blurring of the line between 
this and euthanasia" (p. 1429). 
For all the pOints raised, the paper is riddled with confusions, 
some of which appeared later in the Harvard Report and some of which 
were criticized by Rutstein (1969) and Jonas (1969) during the AAAS 
symposium (1972). For example, throughout the paper, Beecher refers to 
the "respi rator problem" cases as "hopelessly unconscious", "hopelessly 
injured or damaged" and "hopelessly brain-damaged" -- phrases which 
would raise doubts in the reader as to whether Beecher is talking about 
a terminal cancer patient (dying, and not dead), an injured auto 
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accident victim with brain-damage, a comatose person who just might be 
another Rip Van Winkle, the death of an organ, the process of dying 
or just plain death. Beecher, however, was very concerned that trans-
plantation not be added to the list of ethically questionable procedures 
in recent medical experimentation and thought that many of the potential 
ethical problems could be thwarted with a careful examination of the 
definition of brain death. 
Although Beecher had said that this was an issue that required 
the contribution of lawyers, theologians and philosophers, as well as 
physicians, how interdisciplinary in function was his committee? I had 
been told by another informant not associated with the committee that 
Beecher so dominated the group that it was interdisciplinary and 
cooperative in name only. According to him, Beecher had waited until 
the summer to write the Report and wrote it himself while others were 
away, precluding contributions and feedback from the other members. 
While Beecher was certainly an overbearing person, or so I've heard, 
at least one member of the committee gave Beecher considerable credit 
for circulating drafts and prompting his secretary to pursue members 
for thei,r comments and criticisms. The report definitely went through 
changes, presumably because of criticisms and comments. It is also the 
case that two members of the committee, who were not physicians and 
who were located on the Cambridge campus, were on leave in the spring 
and summer. And, meetings were sometimes held at places and times that 
were convenient for physicians at Massachusetts General or the Brighman, 
but not as convenient for those on the Cambridge campus. I would con-
clude that the report represents the opinions, values and knowledge of 
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representatives of several medical areas and a lawyer who had worked 
closely with the medical school on other occasions. The Report does 
not represent the thinking and knowledge of one man nor does it really 
represent the thoughts of the extra-medical members of the committee 
other than Curran. 
With his ethical sensitivity and courage, and with no little 
po 1 iti ca 1 savvy, Beecher organi zed the committee and the Report. He 
was not the only contributor, but he was the moving and moral 
force behind the single most important medical contribution to the 
redefining process. The following is a summary of the contents of the 
Report. 
The Harvard Report - "A Definition of Irreversible Coma" 
As reasons for defining irreversible coma as a new criterion for 
death, the report included: 1) the respirator problem and the burden 
result ing therefrom "on pat i ents who suffer permanent loss of i nte 11 ect, 
on their families, on the hospitals, and on those in need of hospital 
beds already occupied by these comatose patients" and 2) the fact that 
"obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy 
in obtaining organs for transplantation" (p. 337). 
Acknowledging that more than medical problems are at issue, the 
committee hoped that the Report would provide a beginning toward better 
understanding of the legal, moral, ethical and religious issues. Their 
task, however, was to determine the characteristics of a permanently 
nonfunctioning brain. 
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The criteria: 
1) Unreceptivity or unresponsitivity - total unawareness to 
externally applied stimuli and inner need and complete 
unresponsiveness ... Even the most intensely painful stimuli 
evoked no vocal or other response, not even a groan, withdrawal 
of a limb, or quickening of respiration. 
2) No Movements or Breathing - Observations covering a period 
of at least one hour by physicians is adequate to satisfy the 
criteria of no spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous 
respiration or response to stimuli such as pain, touch, sound, or 
1 i ght. 
3) No reflexes - Irreversible coma with abolution of central 
nervous system activity is evidenced in part by the absence of 
el i citab 1 e refl exes... The pupil wi 11 be fi xed and dil ated and 
will not respond to a direct source of bright light ... Ocular 
movement (to head turning and to irrigation of the ears with ice 
water) and blinking are absent. There is no evidence of postural 
activity (decerebrate or other). Swallowing, yawning, vocaliza-
tion are in abeyance. Corneal and pharyngeal reflexes are 
absent. 
4) Flat electroencephalogram - Of great confirmatory value 
is the flat or isoelectric EEG. We must assume that the elec-
trodes have been properly applied, that the apparatus is 
functioning normally, and that the personnel in charge is 
competent. . . 
All the above tests shall be repeated at least 24 hours later with 
no change. The validity of such data as indications of irrevers-
ible cerebral damage depends on the exclusion of two conditions: 
hypothermia (temperature below 90F (32.2C)) or central nervous 
system depressants, such as barbiturates). (pp. 337-338) 
The committee went on to advise that the determination of death be made 
only by a physician and that death should be declared before the res-
pirator is turned off. "The decision to do this and the responsibility 
for it are to be taken by the physician-in-charge, in consultation with 
one or more physicians who have been directly involved in the case. It 
is unsound and undesirable to force the family to make the decision" 
(p. 338). 
The Report reviewed some of the legal issues, citing Thomas v. 
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Anderson, Smith v. Smith and the definition of death in Black's Law 
Dictionary. Curran (the author of this section) recommends that there 
be no statutory change in the law "since the law treats this question 
essentially as one of fact to be determined by physicians" (p. 339). 
The only circumstances at that time under which Curran would welcome 
a statute were: the presence of great controversy Dr when physicians 
cannot agree on the new criteria. The Report then discussed some of 
the statements made by Pope Pius XII on his position regarding the use 
and maintenance of extraordinary means. 
The Harvard group did not recommend the European criteria dis-
cussed during the Ciba Symposium -- neither heavy reliance on the EEG 
and fall ing blood pressure nor cerebral angiography, the injection of a 
contrast dye into the arteries to provide an indication of cerebral 
blood flow. The secondary status attributed the EEG in the Report is 
surprising both in terms of Schwab's and other research on the EEG's 
use in diagnosing coma and in the way the Report was subsequently 
interpreted in the literature and the popular press: brain death = 
flat EEG. Electroencepalography has been viewed with disdain by some 
physicians because of the distance of the procedure from ordinary 
"pure" clinical neurological assessment. Perhaps the presence of some 
of the most prominent "old school" neurologists on the committee 
discouraged a lack of primary reliance on the EEG. 
The Report has been criticized for being too conservative both 
in terms of "overlong" time interval required for reapplying the 
criteria (24 hours) and in terms of the fact that the criteria refer 
to the functioning of the whole brain and not simply the cerebrum or 
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neocortex. In other words, the Report is no help in alleviating the 
agony of many cases similar to Karen Quinlan's. At the time of the 
1966 American Neurological Association meeting, Schwab stated that his 
emphasis on lower brain function (as opposed to higher brain function) 
was a safeguard: if the lower brain centers are destroyed, it can be 
assumed that the higher centers are also dead (Alderete et al., 
1968: 20).6 As 1 ate as 1975, a co 11 eague of Schwab's and Adams' told me 
that he did not feel that a determination of "neocortical death" --
death of the higher centers of the brain only, with spinal reflexes and 
respiration still intact -- could be made reliably and certainly. 
Perhaps this first statement of medical policy is appropriately 
conservative. 
Another recommendation contained in the report and of some concern 
is that the decision to discontinue treatment when a patient fulfills 
the criteria should be the physician's and not the family's. Such a 
policy seems to ignore the fact that physicians face less risk if the 
decision is the family's and not their own. There are also those who 
argue that deci.sion is not the physician's to make. The committee's 
decision to state their policy in that manner was based on their 
experience with the practice of handling such cases at Massachusetts 
General (Informant notes). 
Before the Report, the practice of handling cases of "brain death" 
at Massachusetts General went something like the following: The 
physician would go to the family and say that in her opinion, there 
was no hope, and it was up to the family to decide whether or not they 
wanted to continue artificial support. She would give the family some 
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time to adjust to the news and approach them again, saying that there 
had been no change nor was there likely to be any change, again 
emphasizing that the decision to discontinue treatment was theirs. In 
effect, the physician would lead the family through a learning and 
accepting process -- a process which took about three days. The staff 
became concerned that they weren't doing much for the patient, the 
community or the family and that, in addition, they left the family 
with the guilt for making the final decision regarding the death of 
their loved one. They thought that if there were medical agreement 
that the patient was dead, then the family should be told the patient 
is dead. Thus the committee decided against "the self-protective 
placing of the decision in the hands of families - when there wasn't 
any decision-making which they would do which could do the patient any 
good" (Informant notes). 
At this point in the process of redefining death, 1968, however, 
it wasn't clear that "brain death", "irreversible coma", "virtual 
death" or "hopelessly unconscious" meant death in the sense to which 
most persons are accustomed. And the Report did not clearly state 
that its recommendation concerned the assessment of death. It would 
seem that there are many cases (not death) in which declining further 
treatment or withdrawing treatment is properly and most ethically a 
matter for the patient and/or the family to decide -- not the 
physician. 
Several ethical and conceptual critiques were levelled at the 
Report by ethicists and philosophers, although only a couple were pub-
lished before 1970 (cf. Rutstein, 1969 and Jonas, 1969). Hans Jonas, 
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Alvin Johnson Professor of Philsophy at the New School of Social 
Research, criticized both arguments put forth by Beecher during the 
AAAS symposium and the Report in a paper he delivered as a participant 
in the same symposium, "PhHosopbic:al Reflections on Human Experimenta-
tion". In response to a statement made by Beecher ("A strong case can 
be made that society can ill afford to discard the tissues and organs 
of the hopelessly unconscious patient; they are greatly needed for 
study and experimental trial to help those who can be salvaged"), Jonas 
argued that discarding implies proprietary rights and no one can 
discard what doesn't belong to him: "Does society then own my body?" 
(p. 227). As for the Harvard Report, Jonas had no objection to a 
definition of irreversible coma which allows the cessation of artifi-
cially supported life functions in order to let a person die all the 
way. However, to keep persons from dying all the way and to use the 
redefinition for transplantation " ... oversteps what the definition 
can warrant" (p, 244 )... Jonas' essay contai ns the fi rst arguments 
"against the stream", i.e., the needs of society for the integrity of 
the individual person's dying. 
Without knowing the exact borderline between life and death, we 
cannot use the definition for anything other than allowing a person to 
die and, for that instance, knowing that he is in irreversible coma is 
enough, according to Jonas. 
For the second purpose (transplantation) we must know the 
borderline; and to use any definition short of the maximal 
for penetrating on a possibly penultimate state what only 
the ultimate state can permit is to arrogate a knowledge 
which, I think, we cannot possible have ... When only \ 
permanent coma can be gained with the artificial sustaihing 
of functions, by all means, turn off the respirator, the 
stimulator, any sustaining artifice, and let the patient die; 
but let him die all the way. Do not, instead, arrest the 
process and start using him as a mine while, with your own 
help and cunning, he is still kept this side of what may in 
truth be the final life. Who is to say that a shock, a 
final trauma, is not administered to a sensitivity diffusely 
situated elsewhere than in the brain and still vulnerable to 
suffering? a sensibility that we our selves have been keeping 
alive? No fiat of definition can settle this question. 
(Jonas, 1969:244) 
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In all the 1 iterature, it is difficult to find a more passionate protec" 
tor of the individual and the sanctity of his body than Jonas. And 
there are not many who are more fervent advocates of the rights of 
others than Beecher. It is this tension -- the tension between the 
individual's right to an uninterfered-with dying and the rights of the 
family, the community and other patients, or the "common good" -- which 
is the major fulcrum of the definition of death debate. Jonas' critique 
was one of the first of several to come which generally questioned the 
appropriateness of redefining death and specifically questioned the 
morality of redefining death in order to facilitate organ transplants. 
Although criticized almost as soon as it was published, the Harvard 
Report was e~ily and widely accepted both in the U.S. and abroad. It 
is still, in 1979, the primary reference document of medical policy for 
determining death in terms of brain function. Even given the problems, 
it was a document of medical legitimation and consensus regarding the 
redefinition of death. Interestingly, when Beecher approached the 
editor of the New England Journal for publication of the report, he was 
told that it was "too controversial". JAMA was a second choice. 
73 
1968 
In many respects, 1968 was the watershed year for the redefinition 
debate, as it was for many other issues and events in our society. The 
year of heart transplantation, 1968,is the year which marked the heart's 
change of status from the seat of life and personality to a replaceable 
muscle and which marked the need for some other locus of death for the 
heart donor. The process of redefining death became more complex as 
technical and legal difficulties arose, and conceptual and ethical 
problems became more apparent. 
Flat EEG or Electrocerebral Silence? 
By 1968, at least three terms were used interchangeably to refer 
to what people thought was one criterion for brain death: "flat EEG", 
"isoe.lectric EEG" and "electrocerebral silence". Regardless of the 
secondary status accorded the flat EEG in the Harvard Report, there 
was some acceptance of the flat EEG as the primary criterion for deter-
mining death. There were problems: In 1966 a case in which a woman 
with a "flat EEG" had eventually recovered with only a mild organic 
brain syndrome had been reported (Levin and Kinnell, 1966). In 1968, 
Jum Kimura and his colleagues from the University of Iowa r~edical 
School published an article in which they distinguished between the 
flat EEG and the isoelectric EEG, between a very low amount of cerebral 
activity at normal machine amplification and no activity at all at 
maximum amplification. They suggested the record taken on the woman 
who recovered was at normal amplification rather than maximum amplifi-
cation and that resuscitation was probably begun immediately, thereby 
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assuring some circulation to the brain. They conclude, happily for us 
all, that "From a technical point of view, therefore, it is important 
to utilize the highest amplification technically possible for at least 
part of a record suspected of being isoelectric" (p. 511). 
A year earlier, in 1967, the president of the American Electro-
encephalographic Society appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to gather 
information regarding current procedures in utilizing the EEG as one 
criterion for determining death (Silverman et al., 1968). On the 
committee were Daniel Silverman, Robert Schwab (both early pioneers in 
determining death by electroencephalography), Michael Saunders and 
well-known Columbia neurologist, Richard Masland. They gathered infor-
mation on such technical matters as the maximum gain setting used in 
obtaining records, the length of the record and interelectrode dis-
tances and resistances. In their report, published in JAMA one month 
after the Harvard Report, the committee recommended that the term 
"electrocerebral silence" (ECS) be used and specified guidelines for 
assessing electrocerebral silence. It was Daniel Silverman who organ-
ized another collaborative study, after his death sponsored by the 
National Institute of .Neurological Diseases and Stroke (NINDS). The 
NINDS research has included the gathering of data on methods for deter-
mining death from hospitals throughout the United States. 
Medico-Legal Collaboration 
As the new definition began to be used more frequently in both 
heart and kidney transplant situations in 1968, it became clear to some 
observers that a conflict between legal and medical definitions of death 
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was imminent. In fact, it was. In 1968, in Virginia, the first trans-
plant case (Tucker v. Lower) in which physicians were accused of causing 
death by removing the heart of the donor occurred, although the case did 
not come to trial until 1972. Two widely cited authors, law professor 
William Harvey and physician-lawyer M. Martin Halley, jointly published 
two articles in 1968 and 1969 discussing the conflict, describing 
relevant legal precedent and recommending the interdisciplinary collab-
oration of physicians and lawyers in resolving the issues. 7 Halley and 
Harvey also recommended a uniform law defining death in terms of brain 
function. They proposed a straightforward definition, straightforward 
especially in light of the wording of the first statute redefining 
death, which was enacted in Halley and Harvey's home state, Kansas, two 
years later. 
Death is the irreversible cessation of all of the following. 
(1) total cerebral function, (2) spontaneous function of 
the respiratory system, and (3) spontaneous function of the 
circulatory system (1968:105). 
The UAGA 
Transplantation became the subject of many a law review article as 
law students (the primary contributors and editors of University Law 
Reviews) took interest in the topic and its legal complexities. And 
most discussions of transplantation contained a paragraph or two on 
the redefinition of death. In 1965, the Commission on Uniform State 
Laws appointed a committee to design a uniform statute which would 
provide each state with a basis for legislation regarding transplanta-
tion (Moore, 1972:226). On July 30, 1968, three years later, the 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was approved at the National 
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Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Law professor 
Blythe Stason chaired the committee and twin brothers, Alfred and Blair 
Sadler, physician and lawyer, respectively, were consultants (Sadler, 
Sadl er and Stason, 1968). 
The act concerns the negotiation of organ exchange with respect to 
both living and cadaver donors; among them: the respective authorities 
of individuals, minors, and next of kin to donate organs, the conflict 
of interest between donor and next of kin, permissible donees and donee 
obligations, the mechanism of the gift and the protection of physicians 
and others from liability. The commissioners concluded that the defini-
tion of death was a matter for medical determination and decided that 
incltlding a definition in the Act would be unwise (1968:2504) .. Kansas 
and Maryland were the first two states to adopt the act late in 1968. 
Interestingly, Kansas and Maryland were the first two states to legis-
late a redefinition of death as well, in 1970 and 1972, respectively. 
Enter Ethics and the Hastings Center 
By early 1969, the redefinition of death was discussed primarily in 
the medical and legal arenas. Physicians were concerned primarily with 
the problem of irreversible coma and mitigating the financial and 
emotional burdens of family and community, with allowing patients to 
die with some measure of dignity and with obtaining organs for trans-
plantation. Lawyers were concerned, for the most part, with protecting 
physicians and updating legal meanings of death in light of new medical 
advances. Authors in both disciplines frequently mentioned the need 
for theological or moral consideration of the issues and advocated 
77 
interdisciplinary collaboration, although not many actually ventured 
into the ethical realm. At this point, hardly anyone other than Jonas 
had challenged the need for the appropriateness of redefining death, 
though there were notable ethically-oriented discussions published by 
physicians Gunnar, Biorck, Beecher, Hamlin and Collins (only one of 
whom, Hamlin, is in the neurological sciences). In 1969, however, 
ethicist Paul Ramsey addressed the issue in the Lyman Beecher Lectures 
at Yale, and the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences 
(The Hastings Center) was organized. 
"On Updating Procedures for Stating That a Man Had Died" 
The Yale University Lyman Beecher lectures, a yearly event since 
1882, have been devoted to subjects in theology and designed to be 
interfaculty in nature. The lectures in 1969, on medical ethics, were 
sponsored by the Yale School of Medicine and the Yale Divinity School. 
Eminent Christian ethicist and Yale alumnus, Paul Ramsey of Princeton 
University, was the lecturer. For four nights, Ramsey lectured and 
discussed the issues with physicians and theologians. 8 
In 1968, Ramsey was awarded the first grant in medical ethics 
offered by the Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation and became Visiting Profes-
sor of Genetic Ethics at the Medical School of Georgetown University. 
While in Washington, he conducted most of the research for the Yale 
lectures. They were published in 1970 by the Yale University Press and 
entitled The Patient as Person. It is the second chapter of this book 
which concerns us, perhaps the single most influential, clarifying and 
systematized discussion of the redefinition debate ("On Updating 
Procedures for Stat i ng That a Man Has Di ed") . Whi 1 e at Georgetown, 
Ramsey met and discussed his work and this particular chapter with 
Leon Kass, M.D., then biochemist at NIH and later a prominent member 
of the Hastings Center and Kennedy Institute for Bioethics (Ramsey, 
1970:xix-xxii) . 
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Ramsey's piercing analysis of the issue resolves much of the con-
fusion of multiple terms, conceptual overinclusion and inappropriate-
ness and the general muddledness of the discussions on death definition 
published through 1969. As a reader trying to make sense of these 
documents myself, I would go so far as to say that Ramsey's working of 
the issue is a downright aesthetically pleasurable experience. His 
analysis was not final, in that one could say: so the issue stands; 
but it provided a greatly needed ethical and conceptual clarification 
from which further clarification might proceed and against which the 
conceptual evolution of the notion of redefining death could continue. 
The following is a summary of his major points. 
life: 
Not surprisingly, Ramsey begins the chapter with the meaning of 
Life means the functioning of the integrated being or physio-
logical organism as in some sense a whole. Death means the 
cessation of this functioning. This in turn depends on the 
integrated functioning of certain great organ systems. (p. 59) 
Death does not mean the death of the brain, for Ramsey -- the brain is 
not the "captain" of the three integrated physiological systems whose 
simultaneous functioning constitutes life. The brain is of no higher 
status in what constitutes life or death than the heart or lungs. In 
this chapter there is no indication that Ramsey sets the "higher" 
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functions apart from other bodily functions, no effort to claim that 
these "higher" functions are the sine .9.l@.. non of personhood. 
Ramsey next distinguishes between the concept of death and the 
procedures for telling that it has occurred, a distinction which, once 
made, has several implications. 
To enter this discussion it is essential to separate the 
concept of death from the problem of determining the 
moment of death. It is also essential to separate the 
concept of death from the problem of establishing the 
procedures for stating or pronouncing death on the basis 
of anyone concept. We should not confuse the definition 
of what death is with the problematics of whether there 
is a moment when death occurs. Neither should we confuse 
the definition of what death is with a discussion of the 
methods by which it shall be determined that death has 
occurred. (p. 63) 
Once the distinction is made, it becomes obvious that one can change 
while the other does not. In other words, updating criteria does not 
necessarily mean updating the definition of the concept of death -- the 
title of Ramsey's chapter implies as much. The distinction also leads 
one to infer that differential expertise is at issue, that perhaps 
physicians could be relegated the responsibility for updating criteria 
and others, perhaps phil osophers, theo 1 ogi ans, 1 awyers or the 1 ay 
public, should have something to do with establishing meanings and 
definitions. Veatch (1976) raised this same point with regard to the 
Harvard Committee. He asked if the Committee intended to examine the 
definit i on of brai n death, then phys i ci ans were overrepresented on the 
Committee! and if they were intending to offer guidelines and procedures 
for declaring death instead, then what were an ethicist and historian 
doing on the Committee? 
In perhaps his greatest contribution in the chapter, Ramsey 
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clarifies the kind of intrusion into the meaning of death respirator 
technology is. Respirators both obscure signs of death and produce 
false signs of life, notably, the still-beating heart. Ramsey suggests 
that all the discussion on redefinition is an attempt to dismiss or get 
behind the intrusion of the respirator. Oifficulty arises in distin-
guishing the dead from the still living when artificial systems drive 
the lungs which, in turn, pump the heart, giving "the look of life". 
The trick is to find a way to see behind the look of life 
upon the face of death and to learn to tell the difference 
between a patient who may have only 'technical life' sus-
tained in him and a patient whose death may as yet be only 
'virtual', 'suspended' or still successfully held at bay 
even if imminent. (p. 78) 
The difficulty is also having to dismiss that primary and culturally 
validated sign of life, the still-beating heart: 
The decisive question raised is whether doctors should 
continue to regard signs of "spontaneous" heart life as 
evidence that the patient still lives when these signs are 
still present only because lung life is artificially being 
maintained by respirators that (it can be determined) have 
lost their aim or hope of ever restoring spontaneous 
breathing. Must they wait until the last flicker of a 
failing heart whose dying is being artificially prolonged 
as surely as is the breathing? To the contrary, ought we 
not to say that the seemingly natural heartbeat is also 
being maintained only with the help of artificial pro-
cedures? (p. 83) 
If one holds to a conception of life as the integrated functioning of 
the three systems in the whole organism, one is less likely to hesi.tate 
to conclude that the still "spontaneously" beating heart is actually 
dead. However, if one holds to an "ensemble of parts" conception of 
death in which death is a process of dying by stages and in parts (body 
parts), one would perhaps be more likely to say that the heart still 
lives. And, as Ramsey and others would argue, we are talking about the 
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death of the human organism in these discussions -- not the death of 
either the heart or the brain. 
Ramsey next takes on the respirator in an insightful analysis of 
how a technology can be befuddling. He cites Harvard Law Professor 
Paul Freund's statement that the Harvard Report seems to be "a set of 
guidelines on how to use a respirator". 
It is the respirator that, one step away, is being rebutted 
by these tests, and not brain tests elevated or truly 
spontaneous heart life downgraded in the procedures by which 
we should tell that a man has died ... It [guidelines for 
brain death] is a way to use a respirator-so as to get behind 
its artificial process to discern an unburied body. 
(pp. 93-94, my emphasis) 
Ramsey's is the first mention of the fact that the still beating 
heart in a patient whose brain is dead is not a "still-beating heart" 
in any of the old senses that we are used to, and that guidelines for 
declaring death based on brain criteria are ways to dismiss a respira-
tor or ways to get behind the artificial show of life. He makes it 
very clear that the quotations that surround the phrases "spontaneously 
beating heart", the "life" of patients maintained on a respirator, 
should be dropped (p. 84). We are simply being fooled by a machine. 
Another conceptual service Ramsey executed for the redefining 
process was to reiterate and elaborate Daube's distinction between the 
questions "When is a person dead?" and "When should a person be allowed 
to die?" Death should not be confused with stopping extraordinary 
means. Ramsey additionally suggests that perhaps heart transplant 
specialists hve residues of guilt after removing a truly spontaneously 
beating heart in order to provide its owner with another, more func-
tional heart. Perhaps physicians fear that they are killing the 
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patient in making room for the better heart (pp. 100-101). 
Death shoul d not be confused with "organ donor eli gi bi 1 ity" 
(p. 101). Referring to the Declaration of Sydney and the UAGA, Ramsey 
asks: 
If in the practical order we need to separate between the 
physician who is responsible for the care of a prospective 
donor, and the physician who is responsible for a prospec-
tive recipient, we do not need in the intellectual order 
to keep the question of the redefinition of death equally 
discrete from the use of organs for transplantation. . . 
If no person's death should for this purpose be hastened, 
the the definition of death should not for this purpose 
be updated, or the procedures for stating that a man has 
died be revised as a means for affording easier access to 
organs. (p. 103) 
Of course, Beecher, as an advocate of updating death in order to obtain 
scarce resources, provided Ramsey as well as Jonas with an example of 
updating death for an avowed purpose. Ramsey joined Jonas in asserting 
the dying patient's right to die all the way. According to Ramsey and 
Jonas one does not update either the procedures or the definition of 
death in order to obtain organs, beds for others or in order to 
relieve either the family or the community of its emotional or finan-
cial burdens. 
Part of Ramsey's service in executing this incisive ethical and 
conceptual analysis of the issue was in collecting and organizing points 
made by others briefly in other publications, drawing out their concep-
tual and ethical implications and stating them more elaborately. 
Ethical considerations and conceptual clarity now joined the humane 
concern for obtaining organs for dying patients as elements of deep 
concern in the redefining process. 
---
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The Hastings Research Group on Death and Dying 
Later in 1969, a major step toward interdisciplinary collaboration 
and ethical contribution on the redefinition issue was advanced by the 
founding of the Institute of Ethics, Society and the Life Sciences in 
Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, hereafter, for obvious reasons, referred 
to as the Hastings Center. The Center is a nonprofit research and 
teaching organization devoted to sustained interdisciplinary and 
professional investigation and analysis of the social and ethical 
impact of biomedical advances and technology. 
In the early days of its inception, Daniel Callahan, Director of 
the Center, contacted Paul Ramsey and asked him to join. Ramsey sug-
gested Leon Kass, with whom he had discussed his research at Georgetown, 
and Kass joined Callahan and Willard Gaylin to organize the Center. 
It was decided that each of the three would lead a Task Force on 
behavior control, population and death and dying. Kass chaired the 
death and dying Task Force (later called the Research Group on Death 
and Dying) and suggested that the Group take the redefinition issues 
as its first project (Informant notes). The Research Group grew until 
it included Eric Cassell, M.D. as co-chairman; ~larc Lappe, Ph.D.; Henry 
Beecher, ~I.D.; Daniel Callahan, M.D.; Renee Fox, Ph.D.; ~lichael Horo-
witz, LLB; Irving Ladimer, SJD; Robert Jay Lifton, M.D.; Robert 
Stevenson, Ph.D.; and Robert Veatch, Ph.D. (Institute of Society, 
Ethics and the Life Sciences, 1972:fn). Subsequently, Hans Jonas, Alex 
Capron and Elizabeth Kubler-Ross joined the Group. Out of this 
organization came some of the most significant papers on the definition 
of death in the literature. 
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The Center opened its offices in 1970 and working papers on death 
and dying were presented by Kubler-Ross, May, Morison and Beecher at a 
symposium sponsored by the Center at the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science meeting in Chicago (Kass, 1970). Two of the 
most well-known and frequently cited papers in the redefinition 
literature -- a debate concerning whether death is a process or an 
event -- were presented by Morison and Kass and later published in 
Science. Beecher presented a paper in which he responded to Jonas' and 
Ramsey's criticisms of his position on defining death, transplantation 
and scarce medical resources. Robert Veatch (student of both Ralph 
Potter of the Harvard Divinity School and the Harvard Committee and 
Renee Fox, now of the University of Pennsylvania and the Hastings 
Research Group, and on this author's dissertation committee), who had 
been with the Center since its inception, had the opportunity of 
trying to persuade Beecher of the ethical necessity of separating the 
definition of death from pragmatic concerns. I gather that a good, 
heated conceptual round was had by all. 
I have been thoroughly impressed with the joys of intellectual 
discourse reported to me by members of this group in interviews -- it 
must have been an intriguing and passionate enterprise. Some of the 
most exciting and most passionate occupations persons can engage in 
are of this kind, and the participants in this study who belonged to 
this group would seem to agree. 
As far as I can tell from interview notes, the following are some 
of the group's dynamics, first the tension of personality and concep-
tual differences. Beecher and Ramsey were both rather dominating 
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personalities (Ramsey still is) -- one a Boston Brahmin and the other 
a Southerner -- who took opposing alignments to the issue. I was told 
that they had conducted informal debates of considerable standing and 
reputation within the group. 
Jonas, Kass and Ramsey took a non-utilitarian and conservative 
approach to the issue and Beecher and Morison were somewhat more bold 
and utilitarian. Veatch was in neither camp, quite. Kass, Morison and 
Beecher were physicians, although by the time I embarked on this 
venture, they were involved in less medical and more cultural and 
ethical occupations. Veatch, Jonas and Ramsey are social ethicist, 
philosopher and Christian ethicist, respectively. These were key 
members of the group who both published articles and were included in 
the study. It became clear that a few others in the Group who had 
not written articles were essential to the discourses which provided 
the basis for their group publications. 
One informant suggested that the cohesive factor in the group was 
"the willingness to work from very theoretical levels to very practical 
policy levels and to be open to debate with people with whom they don't 
agree. " I would add to that a cultural and/or philosophical orient-
ation to the issues. Aside from those rather inclusive commonalities, 
the group seemed to function well in terms of their differences. "If 
we find any particular orientation we recruit the opposite." 
Most members thought the discussions influential and beneficial 
for the most part. Their work was characterized by intellectual 
sharing and the efforts of "creative" conceptualizing, often against 
one another. "The Research Group has a much greater influence than its 
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publication. There's a molding of a thought process which goes on 
there", as one informant put it. This intense working and thinking 
experience was not only productive (in terms of actual creative works), 
but also was socially bonding -- rather strong social relationships 
were formed. All informants expressed some version of the exciting 
intellectual climate at the Center during those years, 1969-1973. 
The Morison-Kass Debate: Death as Process or Event? 
In a somewhat poetic dialogue at the AAAS meeting in Chicago in 
1970, Kass and Morison took opposing sides on one of the subtle 
differentiating issues underlying the redefinition discussion whether 
death is a process or discrete event. One of the significant steps in 
the clarification of the definition of death debate is the unveiling 
and elaboration of this distinction. And it is a distinction of no 
small consequence, as we shall see. 
Morison (1971) stated his case, that the notion of death as an 
event is an example of what Whitehead has called "the fallacy of mis-
placed concreteness", or of what others (e.g., Berger and Luckmann, 
1967) have called "reification". He argued that life in an organism 
is a totality of complex interactions within the organism and between 
the organism and the environment, and that "the life of a complex 
vertebrate like man is not a clearly defined entity with sharp 
discontinuities at both ends" (p. 96). Taking that position, Morison 
came to the conclusion that at some point in the process of dying, one 
may assess the relative worth and death of the dying person. "Just as 
we recognize that an individual human life is not infinite in duration, 
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we should now face the fact that its value varies with time and circum-
stance" (p. 697). And 1 i ke some others who journey the conceptual 
path from death as process to the re 1 ati ve val ue of di fferent 1 i ves 
to the various social costs of the maintenance of those lives, Morison 
courageously forwards the notion that death perhaps ought to be 
hastened in some circumstances. "There is simply no hiding place. 
we must shoulder the responsibil ity of deciding to act in such a way as 
to hasten the declining trajectories of some lives, while doing our 
best to slow down the decline of others" (p. 697). 
Responding to Morison with as much passion, Kass (1971) argued 
that "attempts to blur the distinction between a man alive and a man 
dead are both unsound and dangerous" (p. 698). He called Morison to 
task on: 1) confusing the question of the definition of death with 
the question of when life is worth preservering and 2) asserting that 
defining death is a matter of the useful and the good rather than the 
true. Integral to Kass' arguments is the concept of "the organism as 
a whole", derived in part from Jonas', Whitehead's and, possibly, 
Ramsey's concepts of organi sm. "Why is the concept of the organi sm as 
a whole so difficult to grasp? Is it because we have lost or discarded, 
in our reductionist biology, all notions of organism, of whole?" 
(p. 700). And, like Jonas, and Ramsey, Kass argued that the dying 
person should be allowed to die: 
It is one thing to take one's bearings from the patient and 
his interests and attitudes, to protect his dignity and his 
right to a good death against the onslaught of machinery and 
institutionalized loneliness; it is quite a different thing 
to take one's bearings from the interests of, or costs and 
benefits to, relatives or society ... Life is incommensurable 
with the cost of maintaining it ... (p. 701) 
88 
In these two publications alone, appearing in 1971, are some of 
the basic conceptual and ethical tensions underlying the redefinition 
debate. Under the guise of a seemingly neutral academic question (Is 
death a process or event?), lies the tension between advocacy of the 
quality of life and death defined in terms of the social good and advo-
cacy of something like the integrity (but not quite the sanctity) of a 
person's dying and death defined in terms of considerations which bear 
on the dying person only. These were the first of four important 
publications which derived from work and associations at the Hastings 
Center. 
The First Statutory Definition of Death - Kansas, 1970 
Of particular interest in the course of designing this study was 
the history or story of the first statutory definition of death which 
provided the model for several others. It seemed curious that Kansas, 
of all states, was the first to enact policy on this issue. The follow-
ing discussions derive entirely from documents (and letters) given to 
me for my use and interview notes with the two authors of the statute, 
one legislator and several members of the faculty at the University of 
Kansas Medical Center. 
Against the advice of the Harvard Report and the Commissioners who 
authored the UAGA, the state of Kansas enacted the first statutory 
definition of death in 1970. Since Kansas was the first state to adopt 
the UAGA, they were somewhat more ready than other states which had 
previously no heart or cadaver kidney transplant programs to begin work 
on these developments. Associate Dean of the University of Kansas 
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Medical Center, Russell Mills, contacted his brother, lawyer-physician 
Don Harper Mills of Los Angeles. He mentioned that the Medical Center 
was organizing a committee to discuss some of the legal and ethical 
issues involved as a prelude to their developing the transplant pro-
grams and asked his brother what legal advice he could offer. The 
Medical Center intended to act so that legal problems of the sort that 
had developed in other centers, notably Virginia, would be resolved 
before the transplantation efforts began. Then Associate Dean of 
Clinical Affairs, Dr. Jack Walker (also the major of a small community 
outside Kansas City), the Medical Center's "politician-in"residence", 
and Russell Mills decided that this would be the Medical School's best 
tactic (Informant notes). 
Don Harper Mills wrote back, "It is important to arrive at a prac-
tical usable definition not only for the guidance of the transplant 
team, but also for evidentiary purposes in court in prosecutions for 
criminal homicide and civil wrongful death" (I~ills, 1968), Physician 
liability was of special concern since most donors were likely to be 
trauma victims. Young persons with brains destroyed by accident, crime 
or trauma have organs, and especially hearts, in the best condition. 
He asked that the Medical Center contact the transplant centers that 
were then operating to ask their advice and advised the Center to 
conduct legal research into state definitions and legal precedents 
concerning death -- especially the decision which had been mentioned 
by Halley and Harvey in their 1968 JAMA publication, United Trust v. 
Pyke. In that case, death had been defined as " ... the cessation of 
all vital functions without possibility of resuscitation" 
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(Taylor, 1971 :296). Mills also suggested, "It may be necessary for the 
legislature to create a statutory definition of death ... " (Mills,1968). 
Legal problems had arisen in a transplant center in Houston. The 
Center consulted with a "group from Houston" and invited a Houston 
hospital administrator to visit. The t~edical Center Committee was 
advised to get their legal affairs in order, to avoid law suits. Addi-
tionally, Mills gave his opinion to the Committee that the Pyke case 
and the definition used therein was "a rigid preclusion to obtaining 
organs for transplantation". Moreover, a well-known cardio-vascular 
surgeon on the Committee flatly stated that he would not participate 
in any transplantation unless he were protected "statutorily". Physi-
cians thus became convinced that a statute was necessary to protect them. 
In a letter to JAMA, one of the principal draftsmen of the bill, 
physician-lawyer Loren Taylor, stated that the dilemma the Center faced 
consisted partially of the "cudgel wielded by the insurers of the sur-
geons by threats of cancellation of professional liability insurance" 
(Taylor, 1971 :296). According to Taylor, it was this threat, the fear 
and desirability surrounding the practice of organ transplantation and 
the Pyke decision which" ... resulted in the Medical Center asking 
for the development of legislation which would apparently protect the 
transplanters, if not from malpractice charges, at least from the 
supposed lesser evil of a murder charge or wrongful death charge" (p.296). 
The Center's Committee first consisted of an eye surgeon (Jared 
Grantham), internists, a renal surgeon, a cardio-vascular surgeon 
(William Reid), an anesthesiologist (Taylor), and a neurosurgeon 
(Charles Brackett Walker) and others, and then enlarged to include 
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members of the clergy and legislature. Jack Walker contacted persons 
in the legislature, particularly Glee Smith -- then president pro-tem 
of the senate and the Kansas Commissioner on Uniform Laws who had 
worked on the UAGA. Smith was most active in getting the UAGA passed 
quickly in Kansas. 
According to one informant, Walker had decided that perhaps the 
best way to include a death statute in the Kansas laws was to attach 
it as an addendum to the UAGA. Smith wanted the UAGA left in its 
origianl, "clean" form. A separate death statute became a compromise: 
If Walker would take the statute out of the UAGA, Smith would support 
the separate bill in the senate. According to another informant, 
however, the 1 egi sl ature (incl uding Smith) was "thoroughly unimpressed 
with the need for a statute", and was not sure that Mills' interpre-
tation of Pyke was correct. The definition mentioned by the Kansas 
Supreme Court could be interpreted as not legally binding. At least 
one person was of the opinion that Mills had done a disservice to the 
Center in having interpreted the court's definition as legally binding. 
"Nobody (else) thinks United Trust v. Pyke was a problem" (Informant 
notes) . 
Mills had come only to the first conference the Committee held to 
offer his views and a tentative version of a statute. He then left 
never to be heard from by the Committee again (Informant notes). 
Later, after some Committee deliberation, Loren Taylor wrote the 
statute. There is some controversy over who the primary or secondary 
author of the statute as it appeared in its final form was, but it 
seems to this author that, from copies of the outline and tentative 
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statute that Mills brought to Kansas with him (which are in my posses-
sion), portions of the final statute were in his original proposal and 
that other portions had been reworked and added by Taylor. Both men 
have degrees in law and medicine; however, Mills is primarily in the 
field of medical jurisprudence and Taylor has been a practicing anes-
thesiologist. 
For some reason, given that the legislature and Smith were not 
impressed with the need for a statute, the passing of the bill occurred 
"without groundswell either way". The Medical Center Committee had, 
throughout, maintained a low profile and one informant acknowledged a 
"subtle process of propaganda was going on in the state". The Commit-
tee encouraged the hospital chaplain to discuss the matter with other 
chaplains and enlist their support. When asked how the people of 
Kansas had responded to the bill, one informant suggested that the 
emotional impact of the heart transplantation efforts allover the 
world had been tremendous. "It was like going to the moon - an unbe-
lievable thing - so amazing and exciting. The people of Kansas wanted 
to be in the forefront ... the giving of new hearts - the public 
bought that very qui ckly - and they wanted to have Kansas be fi rst." 
The informant acknowledged that Kansas is a conservative state, but 
also noted that Kansas had been ahead of the rest of the nation in 
legalizing and performing abortions, and that the Medical Center was 
practically the only medical school in the midwest performing abortions. 
These inconsistencies -- that one informant said that the bill was 
passed under relative cover, or at least under low profile, and another 
would say that the public wholeheartedly welcomed this issue and 
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implying almost that heart transplantation is the raison d'etre of the 
statute -- are taken directly from telephone interviews, and seem to 
represent disparate views regarding the need for and legitimacy of the 
first statute. Some were primarily interested in facilitating kidney 
transplantation which had not yet been performed at the Medical Center, 
others were interested in hopping on the international heart transplant 
bandwagon and in gleaning the prestige, excitement and commitment to, 
as Ramsey put it, "a most extraordinary therapy" (Ramsey, 1970:99). 
Given that at least one state (New York) has had trouble passing a 
similar bill when the issue was widely publicized, I suspect that the 
issue was passed with a low profile. The statute seems to have been a 
mere means to an end to some people and, as such, relatively insignifi-
cant. As one stated, "During the year, we had so many thousands of 
pieces of legislation that to recall specifics on one relatively minor 
piece like this is difficult". 
As it turned out, Kansas never developed a heart transplant pro-
gram and never used the statute for that purpose. And only two inform-
ants (neither of whom live there) seemed to be aware of the furor it 
caused elsewhere or of the strong criticisms launched against it 
(cf. Kennedy, 1971; Capron and Kass, 1972). One wonders to what extent 
the Kansas "group" was aware of the role their statute pl ayed in the 
debate on the definition of death, which had just really begun when 
most of their work on the statute was executed. 
The statute as it was adopted (Kan. Stat. Ann. §77-202 (Cum. Supp. 
1973)) reads as follows: 
Definition of death. A person will be considered medically 
and legally dead, if, in the opinion of a physician, based 
on ordinary standards of medical practice, there, is the 
absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, 
because of the disease or condition which caused, directly 
or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the 
passage of time since these fun'ctions ceased, attempts at 
resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, 
death shall have occurred at the time these functions 
ceased; or 
A person will be considered medically and legally 
dead if, in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary 
standards of medical practice, there is the absence of 
spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary 
standards of medical practice, during reasonable attempts 
to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or 
respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain 
function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation 
or supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will have 
occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. 
Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of 
supporting respiratory and circulatory function are 
terminated and before any vital organ is removed for 
purposes of transplantation. 
These alternative definitions of'death are to be 
utilized for all purposes in this state, including the 
trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
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The first published comments on the statute appeared in the New 
England Journal of Medicine written by William Curran of the Harvard 
Committee and NEJM's regular medico-legal columnist, British Law 
Professor Ian Kennedy, and none other than Don Harper r~ills, in 1971. 
Curran regarded the "first legislative definition of death in the 
hi story of our nati on and of the Common Law worl d" as useful and ski 11-
fully drafted as it stands, a turn from his position as legal author 
of the Harvard Report in which he recommended no change in the law. 
In his criticism of the statute, the first in the literature 
(1971), Kennedy argued that the Kansas statute, asa model for other 
states "is an unfortunate development" in that 1) it was drafted with 
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only transplantation in mind when the real problem occurs with terminal 
and comatose patients and 2) in that the definitionimpl ies two types 
of death -- content which can only confuse the publ ic. "The Act in its 
present form does not serve to assure the person who may fear that 
during his last hours on earth, his doctors will be less concerned with 
his condition than with the person earmarked to receive one of his 
vital organs" (p. 71). Kennedy noted that the statute makes no mention 
of requiring two physicians to clear death, a recommendation made by 
every major professional body. Moreover, the statute contains no provi-
sion for separating the role of the physician caring for the donor and 
that of the physician caring for the recipient. The statute is simply 
a disaster as far as Kennedy is concerned. 
The three articles in NEJM form a chain with Kennedy writing in 
some, though not major, response to Curran's earlier article and Mills 
writing an explicit response to Kennedy's article immediately following 
in the same issue. Mills' article commends the statute (not altogether 
a surprise), although hardly anyone knew that Mills had been as influ-
ential as he had been about what had happened in Kansas and how the 
issue was conceptualized there. And Mills did not mention his contri-
bution in the article, "The Kansas Statute: Bold and Innovative". 
In his letter to his brother (in my possession), Mills did not 
emphasize transplantation to the exclusion of all other reasons for 
redefining death -- in fact, he stated that the Kansas Medical Center's 
decision to act had to be made in the public interest. He also stated 
in the letter, as in the article, that the statute should be designed 
to apply to the problems of: the time of death; the issue of when to 
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stop resuscitation; and the termination of artificial maintenance 
(Mills, 1968; 1971). "It may also be assumed that those in the legis-
1 ature were wi se enough to expect benefi ts for everyone, not just for 
doctors" . 
Thus, two medical jurisprudence experts with positions on the 
editorial staff of the two most respected medical journals of general 
circulation published in this country, Curran and Mills, definitely 
favored the statute. Kennedy, a Briton who at the time was professor 
of law at UCLA, provided the only dissenting voice. It is interesting 
to note that Kennedy's occupational areas are medical jurisprudence and 
legal philosophy. Those with a philosophical eye have been generally 
critical of the statute (see the discussion of the Capron-Kass critique 
of the statute below). 
Maryland Takes the Second Step - 1972 
The Maryland legislature passed a statute defining death nearly 
identical to the Kansas statute early in 1972. Kansas and Maryland 
had been the first two states to adopt the UAGA, and they were the 
first two states to define death statutorily. I assume the motivations 
in both states were primarily to "add" to the UAGA the needed gui de-
lines for determining death in transplant situations. 
Be that as it may, the history and politics of the Maryland stat-
ute are substantively different from those noted above. Passage of 
the bill was facilitated by the presence of a physician in the legis-
lature, Johns Hopkins renal internist, Torrey Brown. Another delegate, 
Wallace Hutton, introduced and sponsored the bill. 
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In his general law practice, Hutton frequently handled wills with 
specifications for the donation of body parts and noted that more often 
than not, the deceased's wishes were not fulfilled. For Hutton, the 
whole enterprise -- donating organs and actually having someone in need 
receiving them -- "became rather meaningless because nothing was going 
to come out of it". As a practicing nephrologist, Brown was also con-
cerned with organ transplantation. Neither consulted with Loren Taylor, 
Mills or anyone else from Kansas -- they simply copied the Kansas 
statute. 
The bi 11 was supported by several phys i ci ans, among them promi nent 
Johns Hopkins neurosurgeon, A. Earl Walker. (Walker also influenced 
legislation in New Mexico and directed the NINDS collaborative study 
on brain death discussed below.) A few Maryland delegates opposed the 
bill, nicknaming it "the ghoul bill", arguing that it was "anti-
Catholic". They even obtained a TV spot to discuss the implications 
(body-snatchi ng) of the "ghoul bi 11 ", but thei r efforts had 1 ittl e 
effect. The Catholic Church in the area supported the bill and no one 
else seemed to take them seriously. Otherwise, the bill passed in 
Maryland without much incident. 
From Whole Brain to Neocortical Death 
One of the most frequently mentioned reasons for redefining death 
is that we should view life in terms of what it means to be a person, 
rather than in terms of what it means to be a physiological organism. 
This is the central theme of the debate over "the quality of life" vs. 
"the sanctity of life". "Unburied corpses" (Ramsey) or "heart-lung 
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preparations" (Hamlin) which "function" with the aid of a mechanical 
respirator are not what we are used to thinking of as persons, although, 
as Jonas might insist, many of these bodies look suspiciously like the 
persons we love or once loved. In the discussion of what it is that 
constitutes personhood, there is considerable agreement that mere 
physiological function does not a person make -- hence, at least part of 
the reason for redefining death in terms of the brain instead of in 
terms of the cardio-respiratory system. In the early seventies, sev-
eral authors (cf. Shalit, 1970; Brierley, 1971; Rizzo, 1973; Korien, 
1973; Fletcher, 1974; and Veatch, 1974) suggested that neurological 
reflexes governed by the lower brain and spinal cord do not make a 
person, either; the Harvard criteria included such reflexes and are 
"whole brain" criteria. As early as 1970, an Israeli neurosurgeon 
suggested that " ... the definition of brain death should perhaps be 
applied to the death of the cerebrum rather than to the whole central 
nervous system" (Shalit, 1970:747). 
The distinction between cerebral, or neocortical, death and whole 
brain death was made as early as 1928 when Sugar and Gerard determined 
that different parts of the brain were differentially responsive to 
lack of oxygen and died at different times. At the 1968 American 
Neurological Association meeting in which Alderete, Schwab and Richard-
son presented data collected at Harvard, the issue was raised again. 
The major medical statement advocating the distinction came in 
1971 in Lancet, written by Scottish neurologist, J. B. Brierley. In 
the article, Brierley reported the clinical histories of two patients 
who breathed spontaneously and who had isoelectric EEG's for five 
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months following cardiac arrest. The cerebrum was destroyed, Brierley 
stated, but one patient's pupils responded to stimuli; the other patient 
responded to a loud voice by opening his eyes toward the end of the 
five months of coma. He advocated a high reliance on the EEG to deter-
mine cerebral death (just about the only method for assessing cerebral 
function) and suggested confirming the diagnosis with the neurological 
examination of a biopsy taken from a portion of the cerebrum. In 
discussing the Harvard whole brain criteria, he stated: 
In essence, it seems that a person who resumes spontaneous 
respiration after cardiac arrest, yet exhibits an isoelec-
tric EEG, is to be regarded as 'alive', while another 
surviving the same accident, also with an isoelectric EEG 
but whose cardiac function depends upon mechanical venti-
lation, may be regarded as 'dead'. Clearly this distinction 
between 'alive' and 'dead' attaches cardinal importance to 
the function of the respiration and none to those higher 
functions of the nervous system that demarcate man from the 
lower primates and all other vertebrates and invertebrates 
(p. 13). 
Part of our hesitance to consider persons who breathe spontaneously 
dead or to consider Karen Quinlan dead, comes deeply from our notions 
of what it means to be asleep, of the possibility that one might be a 
Rip Van Winkle and wake from a coma of long duration. Some probably 
comes simply from the repugnance of suffocating a breathing "person", 
or taking other definitive action to bring about the complete stoppage 
of his/her breathing. Withdrawing treatment and mechanical ventilation 
is one thing, after a person has been declared dead on the basis of 
accurate, conservative criteria -- having to smother (either through 
medication or physical action) what we suspect may still be in some 
sense alive, is another. At this point, our society seems not quite 
prepared for the latter. 
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A rather terse criticism of the notion of neocortical death and 
some of Brierley's assumptions came from the Ad Hoc Committee on Organ 
Transplantation of the Netherlands Red Cross Society in a letter to 
Lancet (1971) written by Anne Rot and Adrienne Van Till (the only two 
women, who, to my knowledge, have published on the topic). They argued 
that physicians do not agree that severe brain damage, irreversible 
coma and cortical death are the same as the total absence of the brain's 
functional capacities. They expressed the fear that such an assumption 
would lead to there being separate criteria for different states of 
death; such a practice is "clearly illogical, unethical and unjust" 
(p. 1099). And even the Harvard Report had done a disservice in citing 
"emotional, practical, socio-economic and transplantationa1 reasons", 
other than "purely biological reasons" for declaring irreversible coma. 
"We believe irreversible coma and cortical death are grounds for 
stopping treatment and letting the patient die: this is legally and 
ethically permissible even if the comatose patient is still breathing 
spontaneously ... A living body turns into a corpse by biological rea-
sons only - not by declarations, or the signing of certificates" 
(p. 1100, emphasis added). 
A Neurologist Challenges the Redefinition of Death 
A prominent neurologist, James Toole, published an article in 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine in 1971 challenging the unques-
tioning acceptance of the need for a redefinition of death. While he 
acknowledges the reasons which have stimulated a change in the meaning 
of death, Toole stated that he has 
... been worried that unanticipated disastrous consequences 
could follow general acceptance of the concept of brain death. 
For example, most physicians (to say nothing of the nurse and 
layman) cannot make the diagnosis of brain death with confi-
dence. Even the electroencephalographer is competent only to 
render his opinion about the conditions of brain waves, not 
of the brain itself, for he makes no direct observation of 
the patient (pp. 599-600). 
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Toole explicitly voiced the discomfort neurologists whom I interviewed 
felt regarding the use of a technology which mediates the data they 
would like to observe first-hand. An electroencephalograph is some-
what removed from direct clinical observation. Toole goes on to say 
that near exclusive reliance on the neurologist's or neurosurgeon's 
diagnosis in these matters " .... would place the decision-making 
responsibility upon specialists who only reluctantly accept it" 
(p. 600). Toole was the only author I read who mentioned that the 
brain stem may be dead while the cerebrum is still alive (p. 601), a 
rather claustrophobic condition, known as the "locked-in syndrome". 
He is sensitive to some of the objections to the "societal good" line 
of thinking also expressed by persons like Jonas, Kass and Ramsey. 
We have also seen patients comatose for months or years, 
requiring constant nursing care, expensive support systems, 
occupying scarce hospital beds, and draining the family 
emotionally and financially while the despairing physician 
prolongs this useless life hoping for miraculous recovery. 
Wouldn't it serve a greater good to certify such patients 
dead before this happens? Such logic contains several 
hiDden dangers. 
One of the dangers he mentioned was overthrowing the patient-centered 
care long the ethic of physicians for the benefit of family and society 
or another patient. Toole also noted a danger voiced frequently by 
conservative ethicists: If we get onto the conceptual and pragmatic 
slide in which we define human life as that which is not merely 
vegetative 1 ife, then when do we stop sl iding? 
Then what of the senile who populate our rest homes and 
mental institutions? Such patients are also a drain on the 
family and society. They too have a hopeless prognosis and 
have suffered death of portions of their brains. Change 
the legal definition of death a bit more and they too will 
be dead! ... What harm could come of terminating the lives 
of patients whose brains are almost dead and whose prognosis 
is seemingly hopeless? As the German people discovered 
thirty years ago, it would lead to social disaster if we 
were to accept the proposition that some lives are worth 
less than others, and that the treatment of some patients 
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is too arduous or too expensive (pp. 603-604). 
As he explains, the Germans underwent an evolution of attitude in 
which hopelessness and disability became overburdening. The persons 
with such diseases then became worthless; and then, following that 
presumption came another -- such persons lives should be terminated 
for the societal good. "The physician's major concern became the 
family and society, and social tragedy was inevitable ... In our 
society I hear rumblings which suggest that a similar change in social 
attitudes may be evolving at a critical speed" (p. 604). Of the few 
physicians participating in this study who might be considered to 
approach the topic from a bioethical point of view, Toole is the only 
one to warn his readers so passionately. At this time in the develop-
ment of the issue, no other hesitance was expressed (to my knowledge), 
excepting that of Jonas and Ramsey. 
The Hastings Critigue of the Kansas Statute 
As one informant implied, by mid 1972 it was clear that statutes 
defining death would be passed, and that Kansas had provided the model. 
Some at Hastings thought that if there were going to be such laws, then 
there should be better ones. In probably its most influential paper, 
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the Hastings Center Research Group, with members Alex Capron and Leon 
Kass as its principal authors, published a thick critique of the Kansas 
statute and offered a statutory proposal in the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review. Capron is on the faculty there. 
Kass and Calahan had met Capron at a conference on genetics and 
society and invited him to join the Hastings Task Force on genetics. 
When the Death and Dying Group (actually a much smaller group than that 
cited previously, worked on this project) began to discuss the defini-
tion of death and publ ic pol icy, Capron was asked to make a presentation 
of the policy issues. At that time, he was the only one convinced that 
a change in law, a statutory change in particular, was necessary. 
Capron gradually convinced the Group that more statutes would be 
enacted and that the Kansas statute would be the model used until 
another one was formulated. Also at this time, a case (Tucker v. 
Lower) came to trtal in Virginia in which transplant surgeons were 
accused of wrongful, death in removing the heart of a donor whose brain 
was damaged in a fall. Virginia was likely to enact a statute based 
on the case to avoid such problems in the future, and this event 
clinched Capron's argument (Informant notes). 
The article treats the issue with the conceptual, cultural and 
philosophical sensitivity and clarity characteristic of the publica-
tions written by others in the Research Group. Jonas, Ramsey, Veatch, 
Kass, Morison and even Beecher seem present in the article. 
Addressing the issue of public involvement, its substance and 
means of action, and the question of whether one of those means might 
take the form of legislation, the authors ask to what extent is the 
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issue of death definition a medical issue? Arguing that the matter is 
partially philosophical, they state, "The formulation of a concept of 
death is neither simply a technical matter nor one susceptible of 
empirical verification" (p. 94). Involvement in the issue means having 
to come to terms with the meaning of "living", "organism", and "human", 
among other fundamental issues, as well as determining which physio-
logical functions are salient characteristics" of human life (p. 94). 
They argue consistently that the issue is of public concern and should 
be open to public debate. The public's confusion centers on the 
1) change of vital signs which traditionally have been "knowable" by 
laypersons, and which are now knowable only to a special group of 
persons, in some cases physicians, and 2) the "avowed purpose" behind 
the change -- transplantation. "Even if the medical profession takes 
the lead -- as indeed it has in promoting new criteria of death, 
members of the public should at least have the opportunity to review, 
and either to affirm or reject the standards by which they are to be 
pronounced dead" (p. 95). Having reviewed the avenues of public 
involvement and efficacy, the authors chose legislation as the most 
effective avenue. 
Then "what can and should be legislated"? The authors distinguish 
among four levels of "definitions" any of which, in principle, might be 
the subject of legislation: 
1) "the basic concept or idea ... fundamentally a philosophical 
matter; 
2) "the general physiological standards" for recognizing death 
(the choice of which involves philosophical issues as well as 
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some medical-technical ones); 
3) operational criteria -- further define what is meant by the 
general physiological standards; and 
4) specific tests and procedures -- see if the criteria are 
fu]fi 11 ed. 
In doing so, they present the first widely-read systematization of the 
conceptual complexity of defining death. (The same delineation of the 
concept was made in another of the Research Group's publications, a 
criticism of the Harvard Report, published somewhat earlier in 1972 and 
discussed below.) Excluding the two extremes, the most general and the 
most specific, the question then becomes at which of the two mid-levels 
does the conceptualization of a statute begin? Operational criteria 
may change, and law is nearly always too fixed to allow for the change 
of scientific development; the level chosen is "general physiological 
s tanda rds" . 
The authors then enumerate general conceptual principles which 
must be followed in formulating the statute. These are the important 
underpinnings of a policy statement of such general and profound con-
cern. The definition must concern the death of a human being, not 
cells or organs (not even brains) or the ". cessation of his role 
as a fully functioning member of his family or community" (p. 105). 
Ramsey's distinctions between the questions of when a person is dead 
and when a person should be allowed to die and between concept or 
definition of death and criteria, find their way into the text, as well 
as specification that there be no special definition of death for 
prospective donors and a nod to the notion expressed by Kass in the 
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process-event debate that some persons are not more dead or differently 
dead than others. They insist on keeping the transplant issue entirely 
separate from the question "what is death?". Capron and Kass offer a 
statutory proposal which reads as follows: 
A person will be considered dead if in the announced oplnlon 
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice, he has experienced an irreversible cessation of 
spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the 
event that artificial means of support preclude a determina-
tion that these functions have ceased, a person will be 
considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, 
based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has 
experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain 
functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the 
re 1 evant funct ions ceased (p. 111). 
The proposed statute refers to the singular death of a person and 
can be applied uniformly to all persons. It specifies the occasions 
under which either spontaneous circulatory or respiratory functions on 
the one hand or brain functions on the other (as the general physio-
logical standards) are to be applied rather than leaves the decision 
of which to use to a particular physician's discretion. It does not 
specify a kind of "brain death" but rather states that death may be 
determined with reference to "brain" standards, if use of the other 
traditional standards is precluded or "hidden" by artificial means. 
The statute applies to the cessation of the function of the whole 
brain. The proposal, unlike the Kansas statute, does not refer to 
one's being "medically and legally dead" " ... thus avoiding redun-
dancy and, more importantly, the mistaken implication that the "medical" 
and "legal" definitions could differ" (p. 115). The proposal does not 
require that the declaration of death be made before support is 
discontinued or that the donee care and donor care be separated or that 
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two physicians make the determination. These requirements, according 
to the authors, have no place in a statute which defines death -- the 
first because the time of death is stated generally and the second two 
because the provision refers to death defined for the purpose of pro-
curing organs. 
The proposal was not offered as the final solution to the prob-
lems, "but as a catalyst for what we hope will be a robust and 
well-informed public debate over a new 'definition'" (p. 118). The 
authors left aside the even more difficult problems concerning the 
conditions under which medical treatment may be terminated. The 
question "When to allow to die?" requires separate attention and 
resolution. Though published in 1972, the proposal was not adopted 
by any state until 1975, though four more states enacted statutes. 
The Hastings Critique of the Harvard Report 
Also in 1972, and somewhat earlier than the Capron and Kass 
proposal, the Research Group published a critique of the Harvard 
Report, "Refinements in Criteria for the Determination of Death: An 
Appraisal", in JAMA. Conspicuously present in the Group was Henry 
Beecher, the primary author of the Harvard Report. The Hastings paper 
was written, according to one informant, "to mitigate the bad effects 
of the Harvard Report, whi ch was cons i dered "muddy and ill iterate" . 
It was felt that a group of relatively prominent persons would be more 
influential writing a critique of the Harvard Report than an individual 
perhaps because the Report was the work of a prominent group of Harvard 
faculty. 
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In some ways the Kansas statute critique and the Harvard Report 
critique are similar in that both point to the conceptual complexities 
involved in questions such as when or what is death, the problems 
involved in conceptualizing death as an event or process, or the mean-
ing of living human organism. In this publication, the Research 
Group specified the formal characteristics or sets of criteria or 
procedures: 
1. The criteria should be clear and distinct and the opera-
tional tests ... should yield vivid and unambiguous 
results. Tests for presence or absence are to be 
referred to tests for gradations of function. 
2. The tests themselves must be simple, both easily and 
conveniently performed and interpreted by an ordinary 
physician (or nurse) and should depend as little as 
possible on the use of elaborate equipment and machinery 
and the determination of death should not require special 
consultation with specialized practitioners. 
3. The procedure should include an evaluation of the 
permanence and irreversibility of the absence of other 
conditions that may be mistaken for death, e.g., hypo-
thermia, drug intoxication. 
4. The determination of death should not rely exclusively 
on a single criterion or on the assessment of a single 
funct ion . . 
5. The criteria should not underline, but should be com-
patible with the continued use of the traditional 
criteria ... The revised criteria should be seen as 
providing an alternative means for recognizing the same 
phenomena of death. 
6. The alternative criteria, when used, should determine the 
physician's actions in the same ways as the traditional 
criteria; that is, all individuals who fulfill either set 
of criteria should be declared dead by the physician as 
soon as he discovers that they have been fulfi 11 ed. 
7. Criteria and procedures should be easily communicable --
both to relatives and other laymen as well as to other 
physicians. They should provide the basis for uniform 
practice .... The criteria and procedures should be 
acceptable as appropriate by the general public, so as 
to provi de the ope rat iona 1 basi s for hand1 i ng the 
numerous social matters which depend upon whether a 
person is dead or alive, and so as to preserve the public 
trust in the ability of the medical profession to deter-
mine that death has occurred. 
8. The reasonableness and adequacy of the criteria and pro-
cedures should be vindicated by experience in their use 
and by autopsy findings. (p. 49) 
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The authors regard the Harvard criteria as having met the formal 
specifications listed above. However, the authors also noted that the 
Report has generated concern and confusion regarding multiple terms of 
death, the relation between the definition and transplantation, the 
appropri a·teness of the physi ci an's role in changi ng a defi niti on of 
death and fears concerning further updatings of the criteria. In 
conclusion, the authors express hesitancy about "neocortical death" 
or death of only the cerebral cortex, the function of which can only 
be determined by EEG. In such cases, a patient breathes spontaneously 
and has intact lower brain and spinal reflexes -- as does Karen Quin-
lan. But the authors insist that "It is inconceivable that society or 
the medical profession would allow the preparation of such persons for 
burial" (p. 53). They recommend instead that physicians stick to the 
more comprehensive, clinical, "whole brain" criteria specified in the 
Harvard Report. 
The article was published in JAMA, but that was the Groups' second 
choice. They went first to NEJM, but were turned down because editors 
said "It added nothing new" (Informant notes). One. wonders how anyone 
reading the Hastings critique could help recognizing a comprehensive 
and critical reconceptualization and clarification of the original 
report. But so go editorial politics. 
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Tucker v. Lower 
This case from Richmond, VirginialO , probably the most important 
to date, illustrates the confusion and indeterminacy of determining 
death in transplant situations (for other examples, cf. Ramsey, 
1970:70-78 and Veatch, 1972). The case involved a black laborer, Bruce 
Tucker, whose heart and kidneys were removed after he suffered irrever-
sible brain damage from a fall and the transplant team at the ~ledical 
College of Virginia in Richmond (Veatch, 1972). Among the team members 
was a transplant physician, Lower, who had worked with Schumway in the 
late '50s and early '60s performing heart transplants on animals, and 
who later came to join Dr. Hume at the r~edical College of Virginia. 
Dr. Hume had been involved in the first kidney transplant in Boston 
and had become director of one of the most active transplant centers 
in the world, the Medical College of Virginia (Moore, 1972). 
On May 24, 1968 -- in the midst of the heart transplant furor 
Tucker was found, taken to the hospital and subsequently placed on a 
respirator because of breathing difficulty. He had severe brain 
damage. The state medical examiner, Dr. Abdullah Fatteh, advised 
Dr. Hume that permission should be obtained from Tucker's family before 
Tucker's organs were removed. One team member notified the police and 
asked them to get in touch with the family (Converse, 1975). 
At 11 :45, the attending physician stated that "prognosis for 
recovery is nil and death is imminent" (Veatch, 1972:10). Over an hour 
later the staff neurologist was called in for his opinion; on the basis 
of one 25 minute EEG tracing, he concluded that there was no evidence 
of life or cortical activity (Veatch, 1972). (The Harvard Report 
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recommends that the entire battery of clinical procedures be repeated 
in 24 hours before the patient is declared dead, but, at that time, the 
Report was not yet published.) 
At 2 p.m., the police notified the surgeons that they had been 
unable to reach the next of ki.n and Tucker was taken to the operating 
room to prepare for transplantation. At 3:30 the respirator was turned 
off, and three minutes later an incision was made in the recipient's 
body; two minutes after that, with the respirator already turned off, 
Tucker was pronounced dead. An hour later his heart and kidneys were 
removed (Veatch, 1972). 
Interestingly, Tucker's wallet h~d contained his brother's busi-
ness card with his place of business clearly marked -- located within 
15 blocks of the hospital (Veatch, 1972). Even more interesting, a 
close friend of Tucker's roamed the corridors of the hospital complex 
looking for Tucker and inquired at three of the hospital's information 
desks of his whereabouts, with no success (Converse, 1975). 
Tucker's brother charged that the transplant team was engaged in 
a "systematic and nefarious scheme to use Bruce Tucker's heart and 
hastened his death by shutting off the mechanical means of support" 
(Veatch, 1972:10). The suit also .held that the transplant was 
executed without reasonable attempt to notify the victim's relatives 
or obtain permission for use of his organs. ~ toto, $1,000,000 in 
damages were sought; Tucker's brother was represented by State Senator 
Lawrence Wilder (Converse, 1975). 
Coincidentally, four years later when the trial began, a conference 
of approximately 150 transplant surgeons was being held a few blocks 
112 
from the courthouse. Richmond circuit court Justice A. Christian 
Compton had decided at first that he would insist on the traditional 
definition of death. He argued that the issue was appropriate for 
legislation, not the courts. The issue of consent was not raised, 
surprisingly, because of a legal technicality. Converse concludes that 
the testimony "must have softened" his views, because Compton later 
charged the jury: 
... you shall determine the time of death in this case by 
using the following definition of the nature of death. 
Death is the cessation of life. It is the ceasing to exist. 
Under the law, death is not continuing, but occurs at a 
precise time .... In determining ... you may consider 
the following elements ... (among them) the time of 
complete and irretrievable loss of all function of the 
brain. (Converse, p. 424, quoting from the court's report 
in Tucker's Administrator v. Lower) 
Those giving testimony for the defendants comprise an impressive 
list. William Sweet, chairman of Harvard's department of neurosurgery 
and member of the Harvard Committee, testified that he agreed with the 
staff neurologist's conclusion that Tucker was dead, and added that 
brain criteria were acceptable criteria at the time for determining 
death (Fatteh, 1973:33). The surprise witness was Joseph Fletcher, 
well-known theologian and euthanasia advocate. Fletcher (associated 
with the Hastings Center and long an opponent of Ramsey's in published 
debates on issues in medical ethics) was Visiting Professor of Medical 
Ethics at the University of Virginia at the time. Converse (1975) 
considers Fletcher the most influential witness, and I would tend to 
agree that he probably was. His grounds for testifying were challenged 
by Wilder, Tucker's lawyer, because he was not a physician -- an inter-
esting statement of the presumed inappropriateness of ethical discourse 
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and competence in this matter. The theologian prevailed. (On this 
topic, Fletcher is known for his efforts to establish criteria for 
humanhood (1974), such as minimal intelligence, self-awareness, and 
others. Moreover, he advocates defining death in terms of cerebral 
or neocortical, rather than whole brain, function) 
The jury found in favor of the physician. Compton's instructions 
became a legal landmark, though not, strictly speaking, a binding 
precedent in the death debate. 
Robert Veatch, of the Hastings Group on Death and Dying, criti-
cized the handling of Tucker's death and the transplant situation, and 
cha 11 enged the wi despread assumpti on that Tucker v. Lower was a "brai n 
death" case (1972). 
In order to accept the jury's decision in this case and 
accept it as demonstrating that the physicians were 
justified in the use of brain evidence of death, one would 
have to accept four highly questionable premises. The 
first is that the jury did indeed base its decision on a 
brain-oriented concept of death. Second that a man is 
really dead when he no longer has any capacity for brain 
activity. The third is that it was reasonable under 1968 
conditions to conclude that the patient had irreversibly 
lost the capacity for brain activity based on one EEG 
reading without repetition. Such a conclusion is prema-
ture even for the scientific evidence which exists today, 
some four years later. Finally, one would have to accept 
that individual medical professionals should be vested 
with the authority to change public policy on an area as 
fundamental as life and death. This no one should be 
willing to tolerate. (Veatch, 1972:13) 
Whose Issue is the Definition of Death? 
By the end of 1972, several professional groups were grappling for 
control of the issue. Most physicians had thought all along that the 
issue was most properly relegated to them, and they continued to do so. 
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The legal, lay or ethical communities, in other words, had little of 
any real substance to bring to the topic. After all, medicine had 
always had its own ethical standards and the law had always left the 
matter of death to physicians. Death, at least since modern times, was 
not something the lay public declared or determined anyway, no matter 
how salient the issue to everyone's existence. 
Theologians, ethicists and philosophers, on the other hand, argued: 
1) That redefining death entails coming to terms with the meanings of 
"organism", "life", "personhood" and 2) that physicians are neither 
competent nor especially trained to dominate the issue. Redefining 
death is not simply a matter of science and technics or, as philosopher 
Dallas High argued, "Death is not straightforwardly cashable in empir-
ical terms or in empirical criteria" (1972:454). In their pUblica-
tions, the Hastings Group in particular asserted that the issue should 
be broadened to include the public. Veatch especially questioned 
whether notions of medical, and indeed professional expertise in 
general, were appropriate for this issue of obviously public concern. 
Lawyers supported the physician's conclusion that the issue was 
primarily a medical one, but insisted that there was a significant 
danger of physician liability in transplant situations if the law were 
not updated to fit the new neurological criteria. Many advocated 
legislation. - Philosophical and ethical concerns were raised by some. 
But regardless of the lack of consensus among those who considered 
themselves to be responsible for defining the issue, public policy 
continued to be enacted. 
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Virginia Responds With a Statute 
Approximately eight months after the Tucker decision, a definition 
of death was set on legislative course in Virginia (Compton, 1974:535). 
The primary stimulus for the bill was the Tucker case and lawyers 
representing both the defendents and plaintiff in the case were involved 
in the executive process of stimulating and getting the bill passed 
(Informant notes; Compton, 1975). The bi 11' s patron was a surgeon, 
Wi 11 i am Ferguson Rei d, who represented Ri chmond in the state's congress. 
Reid himself did not do much more than introduce the bill; two assis-
tant attorneys general and counsel for the defense in Tucker, Theodore 
Markow and Bill Crews, did most of the drafting and "pushing" work, 
according to informants. 
Tucker did not form a precedent, and rather than have the issue 
be decided anew each time it arose, Crews decided that a statute was 
needed in order to protect physicians. Crews and Markow talked with 
physicians at the Medical College of Virginia and leaders of the 
medical community looked over the existing death statutes, and were 
not satisfied with the Kansas and Maryland statutes. They did consult 
with Loren Taylor, one of the draftsmen of the Kansas statute. HOWe 
ever, there was no clamor by physicians after Tucker and physicians 
were "lukewarm at best", "less than enthused, almost negative" regard-
ing the bill. Hume originally opposed the bill on the basis that he 
thought that it would be too restrictive to physicians; however, Crews 
talked with him at length and presumably convinced him of the need for 
it. By the time the bill was introduced by Crews' good friend, Dr. 
Reid, there was little opposition and little support, but it hobbled 
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through, nonetheless. 
The stimulus for the bill came from the legal community of Rich-
mond, not the medical community -- interesting, since the Medical 
College of Virginia, in Richmond, had one of the most active transplant 
programs in the country. One would think the medical community would 
express some concern over the legal facilitation of transplantation 
and protection of their surgeons. 
Crews drafted the bill; he and Markow "agonized over it, draft 
after draft", and spent more time than usual on this particular bill. 
They felt that if there was any little thing wrong with it, the bill 
would be killed immediately. " ... but more importantly, we were 
dealing with people's lives" a rare statement of concern about what 
introducing such a bill means. 
The Virginia statute differs in some significant respects from the 
Kansas and Maryland statutes: 
When person deemed medically and legally dead - A person shall 
be medically and legally dead if, (a) in the opinion of a 
physician duly authorized to practice medicine in this State, 
based on the ordinary standards of medical practice, there 
is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous 
cardiac functions and, because of the disease or condition 
which directly or indirectly caused these functions to cease, 
or because of the passage of time since these functions 
ceased, attempts at resuscitation would not, in the opinion 
of such physician, be successful in restoring spontaneous 
life-sustaining functions, and, in such event, death shall 
be deemed to have occurred at the time these functions 
ceased; or (b) in the opinion of a consulting physician, who 
shall be duly licensed and a specialist in the field of 
neuro~ ogy, neurosurgery, or e 1 ectroencepha 1 ography, when based' 
on the ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the 
absence of spontaneous brain functions and spontaneous res-
p~ratory functions and, in the opinion of the attending physi-
Clan and such consulting physician, based on the ordinary 
standards of medical practice and considering the absence 
of the aforesaid spontaneous brain functions and spontaneous 
respi ratory functions and the patient's medi ca 1 record, fur-
ther attempts to resuscitate or continued supportive 
maintenance would not be successful in restoring such 
spontaneous functions, and, in such event, death shall be 
deemed to have occurred at the time when these conditions 
first coincide. Death, as defined in subsection (b) hereof, 
shall be pronounced by the attending physician and recorded 
in the patient's medical records and attested by the afore-
said consulting physician. (See Compton, p. 533, Va. Code 
Ann. §32-364.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 1973)) 
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For one thing, the statute is all of a piece, and not composed of 
two paragraphs physically implying two alternative kinds of death. 
The statute dictates that death as determined by the absence of brain 
functions and respiratory functions will be determined in conSUltation 
with a specialist in the neurological fields and the patient's attend-
ing physician. And, since the statute declares death in the second 
instance on the basis of absence of respiratory functions, a concept of 
neocortical death would be illegal in Virginia. Thus, the statute is 
binding in two important senses -- that there must be consultation with 
a neurological specialist and that a definition of death which speci-
fied cerebral death (with respiratory center intact) may at some future 
point be a more viable definition than it is at present. Perhaps the 
drafters thought that such specifications would ensure that patients 
whose death was obscured by artificial means would be declared dead 
properly -- according to neurological criteria which refer to the whole 
brain. According to Compton (1974) (the judge presiding in Tucker), 
the statute was designed to make no reference to transplantation. It 
seems (partly because he cites the article) the draftsmen took the 
Capron-Kass critique seriously. 
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Cerebral Angiography 
Some investigators, particularly those of the Swedish and German 
medical schools of thought on this issue, argue that cerebral angio-
graphy, a method for determining cerebral blood flow, would facilitate 
the accurate diagnosis of cerebral death (Shalit, 1970; Korien, 1973; 
Braunstein et al., 1973). Cerebral angiography is a method which 
entails injecting a radioisotope into an artery and noting by means of 
X-ray where the blood flows in the brain. The naive inquirer states, 
"But if that patient is maintained on a respirator, then of course the 
blood will circulate through the brain." Not so, as I was told. When 
the brain is traumatized or destroyed, the tissue becomes swollen, or 
edemous, and intracranial pressure becomes greater than arterial pres-
sure; blood is blocked by the pressure and does not flow through the 
brain. It has been known for some time that the brains of patients 
maintained on respirators were dark and liquid at autopsy -- somewhat 
like mushroom soup, as one hardened physician described it. Such 
brains are called "respirator" or "dark" brains. 
As stated above, the technique of cerebral angiography is thought 
to be risky, at least that is the sentiment of physicians here in the 
United States. Utilizing the technique, among other things, requires 
that the patient be moved where the equipment is located, something 
one would be hesitant to do with an already moribund patient (Braun-
stein et al.! 1973). Braunstein and Korien, in nuclear medicine and 
neurology, respectively, and New York University Hospital developed a 
safer (in using veins instead of arteries) bedside procedure for 
performing angiography in hopes of offsetting the major objections 
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to its use. 
However, in 1975 the National Institute of Neurological Diseases 
and Stroke published the results of a nationwide collaborative study on 
the determination of death (in which both Korien and Braunstein par-
ticipated) expressing hesitance about adding angiography to the list of 
methods for determining death. Coordinator of the study, A. Earl 
Walker, stated that the injection of the radioactive tracer is invasive 
and risky and the entire procedure less than 100% accurate. "We have 
no completely accurate and safe way to determine cerebral blood flow" 
(Walker, 1975:27). Walker does think that the criterion should be 
developed as a means for ruling out drug intoxication which electroen-
cephalography cannot distinguish from electrocerebral silence. For 
whatever other reasons, the method has not yet been well integrated 
with the procedures for tell ing that a man has. died. 
New Mexico Enacts a Statute 
Interest in a statutory definition of death began in New Mexico 
with the joint presence of a transplant program and prominent Johns 
Hopkins neurosurgeon and Coordinator of the NINDS nationwide study on 
cerebral death, A. Earl Walker, who became Visiting Professor of the 
Un i vers ity of New Mexi co School of ~1edi ci ne. Then Dean of the Medi ca 1 
School, Robert Stone, took advantage of Walker's presence to secure a 
statutory definition to insure their transplant program. In a letter 
to the President of the New Mexico Legislative Counsel, dated June, 
1972, Stone cites a recommendation made in Drug Research that each 
state establish a statutory definition of death, and states: 
I am in agreement with this conclusion and believe that we 
ought to work towards obtaining such a law in New Mexico in 
the upcoming sessions of our Legislature .... Here in 
New Mexico we are in a peculiarly fortunate position to 
take constructive action on this matter. For the past year 
and a half, Doctor A. Earl Walker, Emeritus Professor and 
Chairman of the Department of Neurosurgery at Johns Hopkins 
University School of Medicine, has been a Visiting Professor 
at the University of New Mexico School of Medicine. Doctor 
Walker undoubtedly will be available to help us directly 
and I believe we should move energetically .... I intend 
to write and talk with some members of the Legislature whom 
we know already will be returning to Santa Fe in order to 
enlist their support. 
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Walker became head of the Committee on Cerebral Death of the New 
Mexico Medical School to examine the issue, and was generally active 
in stimulating interest in and gathering support for a statutory 
definition. Walker had been a consultant on the Maryland bill as well. 
One legislator who became one of three sponsors of the bill and who was 
a member of the Mental Health Board of the Medical School (as one physi-
cian put it, "an intelligent man with no particular axe to grind") 
escorted the bill through the legislative process. Stone had approached 
one other legislator and told him that the Medical School faced poten-
tial problems with the UAGA and its transplantation research (Informant 
notes) . The major supporters of the bill were those involved with the 
Medical School, and the bill passed with little dialogue and virtually 
no opposition in either house. One informant blurted, "I hope you 
don't ask hard questions, Ma'am -- I'm just a cowboy!" The language of 
the bill was the responsibility of the state Legislative Council, and 
is nearly identical to the Kansas statute. 
1-2.2.2 Death defined. - A. For all medical, legal and statu-
tory purposes, death of a human being occurs when, and "death," 
"dead body," "dead person" or any other reference to human death 
means that: 
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(1) based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is 
the absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function 
and, because of the disease or condition which caused, dir-
ectly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of 
the passage of time since these functions ceased, there is no 
reasonable possibility of restoring respiratory or cardiac 
functions; in this event death occurs at the time respiratory 
or cardiac functions ceased; or 
(2) in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards 
of medical practice: 
(a) because of a known di sease or condi.t i on there is the 
absence of spontaneous brain function; and 
(b) after reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore 
spontaneous circulatory or respiratory functions in the absence 
of spontaneous brain function, it appears that further attempts 
at resuscitation and supportive maintenance have no reasonable 
possibility of restoring spontaneous brain function; in this 
event death will have occurred: Death is to be pronounced 
pursuant to this paragraph before artificial means of supporting 
respiratory or circulatory functions are terminated and before 
any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation in 
compliance with the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (12-11-6 to 
12-11-14). 
B. The alternative definitions of death in paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of subsection A of this section are to be utilized for all 
purposes in this state, including but not limited to civil and 
criminal actions, notwithstanding any other law to the contrary. 
(N. Mex. §1-2-2.2, Laws 1973, ch. 168) 
Among the four statutes passed from 1970-1973, Kansas and New 
Mexico had somewhat similar histories in that the State t~edical Schools 
stimulated interest in and organized support for the bill. Maryland 
and Virginia's statutes evolved primarily from within the legal com-
munity. All but Virginia's, according to informants, were instituted 
to facilitate transplantation; Virginia's is the only statute of the 
four which does not mention transplantation in the text. Virginia is 
also the only state in which a wrongful death case was brought to bear 
against a- transplant team in which the public interest was dramatically 
played out against the medical interest. 
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The Alaska Statute - What Happened? 
In 1974, Alaska passed a death statute quite unlike any of the 
previous statutes. However, I was unable to obtain any information 
pertaining to the history of the statute, even with repeated calls to 
the office of Alaska Senator Mike Gravell (who also attempted to obta"in 
information). Inability to report on the social works of the statute 
is partially due to the disappearance of bill sponsor Milo Fritz. The 
statute (§l ch. 8 SLA 1974) reads as follows: 
A person is considered medically and legally dead if, in the 
opinion of a medical doctor licensed or exempt from licens-
ing under AS 08.64, based on ordinary standards of medical 
practice, there is no spontaneous respiratory or cardiac 
function and there is no expectation of recovery of spon-
taneous respiratory or cardiac function or, in the case 
when respiratory and cardiac functions are maintained by 
artificial means, a person is considered medically and 
legally dead, if, in the opinion of a medical doctor licensed 
or exempt from licensing under AS 08.64, based on ordinary 
standards of medical practice, there is no spontaneous brain 
function. Death may be pronounced in this circumstance 
before artificial means of maintaining respiratory and car-
diac function are terminated. 
The phrase "medi ca lly and 1 ega lly dead" does not add to the stat-
ute's conceptual clarity, but aside from that, the statute is a bit 
more simple than the others. It almost seems as if the author of the 
statute had adopted some aspects of the Capron and Kass proposal, but I 
was not able to determine whether that was indeed the case. The 
statute also omits any mention of transplantation. 
Transplant Trouble and the Law in California 
In the fall of 1973, two lawyers for the defense in two criminal 
cases argued that the removal of the decedents' hearts for transplanta-
tion by Norman Shumway (who was the head of the only heart 
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transplantation program in the United States at Stanford University 
Medical Center) was the cause of death and not the negligent or criminal 
acts which provided Shumway with excellent donors -- a person shot in 
the head during a fight in Oakland and a young girl with extensive brain 
damage incurred in a car accident in Santa Rosa. 
Shumway had never before, and has never since, utilized criminal 
victims for transplantation (Medical World News, 3/22/74). In 1968, 
Stanford's Medical Director had signed an· agreement with the Santa 
Clara county coroner which stated that transplants would not be per-
formed in the county on homicides -- known or suspected. However, when 
Shumway heard of the Oakl and vi cHm' s candi dacy as a donor, he removed 
the victim's heart in Oakland (outside Santa Clara county limits) and 
flew the heart soaked in a brine solution to Palo Alto by helicopter. 
The county coroner, needless to say, did not appreciate Shumway's action 
to skirt their agreement (New York Times, 10/29/73). 
The Oakland defense was denied, but the judge in the Santa Rosa 
case reduced the cryarge brought against the driver from manslaughter to 
felonious drunken driving and ruled that it was the removal of the 
child's heart which caused her death. That opinion was later overturned 
(San Mateo Times, 5/6/74); but it had done its damage. According to 
one phys i ci an informant, "There was no reluctance of phys i ci ans to call 
people neurologically dead until (these cases) occurred ... " One of 
the informants received a letter from the Attorney General's office 
stating that physicians could be considered criminally involved in 
murder if they parti..cipated in transplantation. The challenges to the 
redefinition of death and the uncertainty of the new definition's 
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status " ... scared hell out of doctors and coroners" in California, 
according to another prominent surgeon, Folkert Belzer, then chief of 
the kidney transplant program at the University of California Medical 
Center at San Francisco (Capron, 1974). 
Considerable pressure to assure the public and phsyicians of the 
definition's legitimate legal status was put on transplant societies, 
individual transplant surgeons, concerned legislators and medical 
policy bodies. Belzer, Berne (chief surgeon of the kidney transplant 
program at the University of Southern California) and Shumway all noted 
dramatic decreases in organ donations immediately following the 
announcement of the legal cases. Belzer stated that, in his opinion, 
the decrease was due to the reluctance of the public and of physicians 
to get involved in donation or referral lest they be called to court 
U~edica1 World News, 3/22/74, p. 15). Each month that the issue 
remained unresolved lives might have been saved by organ transplanta-
tion but were lost. The California Medical Association, following the 
recommendation of the AMA, recommended that the state follow a simple 
legal route by leaving the issue to physicians and not the public or 
any public body such as the legislature (Medical World News, 3/22/74, 
p. 14). 
However, California's Attorney General, Eve11e Younger, thought 
otherwise and held the position that " ... whether or not legislation 
is needed ,is not negotiable ." (Abstract from the meeting of the 
Committee on the Definition of Death, Feb. 15, 1974). A statutory 
solution was the answer. Younger's representative on the Committee, 
Deputy Attorney General Joel Moskowitz, said to Capron, as he reports 
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in an article which appeared in 1974 in the New York Times, that the 
Committee's major premise is that "the definition of death is a matter 
for resolution by public bodies, and not merely by the medical profes-
si on. II 
Younger had organized a Task Force on the definition of death in 
1968, after he had witnessed the questions raised about the time of 
Robert Kennedy's death,as then District Attorney of Los Angeles. An 
informant told me that Kennedy had been briefly considered as an organ 
donor. (Kennedy had, of course, been shot in the head and had subse-
quently been maintained artificially.) Understandably, this situation 
threw the Los Angeles medical community and the coroners into a 
quandary. Younger had asked his friend and eminent cardiologist, 
George Griffith, who had attended Kennedy, to chair the Task Force. 
However, after election to his present post, interest in the issue 
wained until the 1973 court cases, when Younger again activated the 
Committee (Informant notes). 
As soon as the court cases hit the news, according to one inform-
ant, small groups in Los Angeles, San Francisco and at Stanford began 
talking about doing something and began to take action separately. 
The big leap forward came with Younger's push and the organization and 
centralization of his Committee. "It was exactly what we wanted, 
because, you know, in this business you have a lot of doctors who look 
like they're self-interested in publishing the thing; and even as it 
was, that was the case, but we had at least the rest of this committee 
and members to call on to testify." (The Committee included Griffith, 
Belzer, Berne, Don Harper Mills (!), physicians from allover the state, 
126 
lawyers, medical examiners, a news reporter and a legislator (California 
A.B. 3560, Fact Sheet, pp. 2-3). Organizations soon supported the move-
ment to adopt a legislative definition once it was legitimated by the 
Attorney General and his "blue-ribbon" committee. 
California legislator, Dixon Arnett, who had been Director of 
Community Relations at Stanford University when Shumway performed the 
first heart transplant there, was aware of the legal problems presented 
by the court cases and the uncertainty of the new definition. Before 
he heard of Younger's committee, he asked his staff to begin research-
ing the issue and possible solutions. After Younger called a news 
conference to announce the establishment of the Committee and its goals, 
Arnett contacted him and suggested that they join forces. Arnett 
formed the link the Committee needed with the legislature, and it was 
he who sponsored the bill and who worked very closely with the committee. 
Mills and Berne, both on the faculty of the University of Southern 
California, had discussed the matter and the formation of the Younger 
committee. Subsequently, Mills wrote to Younger and offered his 
expertise and experience with the Kansas statute, and Mills joined the 
Committee (Mills, 1974). At an earlier meeting, Moskowitz reviewed the 
Capron and Kass article and critique of the Kansas statute and intro-
duced a statutory proposal drawn up by another member of the Committee 
which was a nearly verbatim copy of the Capron and Kass version 
(Committee Abstract, Feb. 1974). The Committee considered using the 
proposal and corresponded with Capron. However, Mills thought that the 
Capron and Kass proposal, while eliminating much excess baggage in the 
Kansas statute, "still retains the appearance of different criteria for 
J-; 
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determining death based on the presence or absence of artificial main-
tenance (Mills, 1974a, p. 1226). Defining death was.something the 
lawyers for the California Medical Association would not buy, thinking 
that their clients' hands would be tied by the rigidity of a definition. 
The most active members of the Younger committee attempted to get around 
a definition and, on Mills' advice, oriented the statute to merely 
establish that brain death is legal (Informant notes). The California 
Health and Safety Code, Section 7155.5, had been amended to suggest that 
"a person may be pronounced dead if, based on usual and customary 
standards of medical practice, the person has suffered an irreversible 
cessation of spontaneous brain function." And the Committee decided 
that portion of the amendment was the most suitable wording for a 
statutory solution. Once in the legislature, the wording was changed 
from a merely "permissive authority" to an instruction that death shall 
be pronounced. The statute, Chap. 1524 of the 1974 session, reads as 
follows: 
A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by a 
physician that the person had suffered a total and irrever-
sible cessation of brain function. There shall be independent 
confirmation of the death by another physician. 
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from 
using other usual and customary procedures for determining 
death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing a person dead. 
When one informant (considered by another to be "our most constant, most 
vigilant, most accessible expert") was asked who was responsible for the 
language of the bill, he stated, "It was entirely Mills, absolutely ... 
the main character as far as I'm concerned was Don Harper Mills." Mills 
was interested in constructing a statutory solution which would just 
state a concept of brain death and omit attempts to define brain 
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death (Mills, 1974b). 
After a "long battle" with the California Medical Association, the 
bill went to the House with organized medical support. Having been 
told by Berne and Belzer that in the usual 90 days it takes for a bill 
to take effect, 30-50 kidney transplants would not be performed, Arnett 
took it to the legislature as an "urgency bill" which would become law 
as soon as the Governor signed it. The bill passed with a 2/3 quota in 
the House and Senate (as its urgency status required) and Governor 
Reagan signed the bill with some haste. One informant mentioned that 
Reagan's wife is the daughter of a nationally prominent neurosurgeon 
whom the Younger committee had contacted, and suggested that the con-
nection may have contributed to the bill's speedy enactment. 
There was some opposition. Two persons opposed the bill because 
they each had a relative in the hospital whom they expected to die and 
couldn't face their families if they voted for the bill. (They must 
have had some lingering doubt that brain death is death and not a kind 
of euthanasia or kill ing.) There was a general "worrying" with the 
issue and some mumblings such as; "If we've gotten along without one 
for all this time .... " One legislator gave a speech on the floor 
arguing that the bill presented the first step toward legalizing 
euthanasia and there was some attempt to attach Catholic disapproval to 
it. However, after the bill was passed, when asked when the soul 
leaves the body, one high Catholic official stated, "After the second 
physician writes on the card that the brain is dead" (Informant notes). 
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The AMA Stand on the Issue as of 1974 
The Connecticut delegation at the American Medical Association 
House of Delegates annual meeting in June, 1973, asked that the House 
of Delegates urge a moratorium on state statutory definitions of death, 
and suggested that in their stead "a guiding and consensual principle" 
be drawn up by the Judicial Council of the AMA which could clear up the 
muddle regarding the definition (Report of the JUdicial Council of the 
AMA, 1973). The Report of the Judicial Council states that several 
critiques of statutory definitions have appeared in the literature 
(among the references are the Kennedy and Capron and Kass articles). 
The Judicial Council recommends that the House of Delegates "adopt the 
position, that, at the present, statutory definition of death is 
neither desirable or necessary" and they recommend "that State Medical 
Associations urge their respective legislatures to postpone enactment 
of legislation defining death by state, ... " (A, p. 2) Describ-
ing statutory solutions as "inflexible and even repressive", the 
Council recommended a general guiding principle which reads as follows: 
"Death shall be determined by the cl inical judgment of the physician 
using the necessary available and currently accepted criteria". This 
policy was reaffirmed in December, 1974 (cf. AMA Resolution 18, 1974). 
The ABA Recommends a Statute 
At about the time California was fixing its statutory statement of 
death, the Law and Medicine Committee of the American Bar Association, 
chaired by McCarthy De~1ere, adopted a definition strikingly like the 
California statute designed by Mills. Mills was on DeMere's committee, 
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and one might conclude that he had been instrumental in shaping the 
ABA definition as well. The definition and a dedication which accom-
panies the 1974 ABA report, "Death -- A Current Definition", read as 
follows: 
For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible 
cessation of brain function, according to usual and customary 
standards of medical practice, shall be considered dead. 
Dedication 
Universally to the well being of people who will benefit 
from organ transplants in the best cellular condition and to 
those for whose well being it is to cease all artificial life 
supports after a human body is dead. 
Thus the proposal was made for the purposes of obtaining organs 
for transplantation and withdrawing life support systems, as was the 
Harvard Report. Compare the California statute: 
A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by 
a physician that the person has suffered a total and irrever-
sible cessation of brain function. There shall be independent 
confirmation of the death by another physician. 
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from 
using other usual and customary procedures for determining 
death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing a person dead. 
(Emphasis added) 
The NINDS Collaborative Study: The State of the Art 
of Diagnosing Brain Death in 1975 
In 1972, the National Institute for Neurological Diseases and 
Stroke undertook a study to examine criteria for brain death determina-
tion and cerebral survival. To mY knowledge, the study was suggested 
by Daniel Silverman who died before this leg of the research was begun. 
Nine centers across the country participated and several of the partic-
ipants in this study were members of the NINDS research group. The 
first publications from this research appeared in 1975 (cf. Medical 
World News, 1/27/75; Walker and Molinari, 1975). 
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After 503 patients were selected for study who met the following 
conditions: no respiration and unresponsiveness, several conclusions 
were drawn. The first of these is that the Harvard criteria (which 
include the absence of spinal reflexes) are too restrictive "for 
routine usage" (Walker and Molinar, 1975:11). The 24 hour period is 
frequently too long and only cephalic reflexes need be used, according 
to the directors of the study. With the original criteria, apnea and 
unresponsiveness, the authors added absence of cephalic reflexes, a 
flat EEG and pupil dilation for 100% accuracy in diagnosing the death 
of the brain. The diagnosis of a dead brain can be made in an hour 
but may require repeated examinations over six, 12 or even 24 hours 
before a final diagnosis can be made. The first two criteria enable 
physicians to make a prognosis of impending death (but not a dead 
brain) with 91% accuracy (~ledica1 World News, 1/27/75). One of the 
greatest problems is ruling out drug intoxication. "Apparently, modest 
amounts of drugs will modify the reaction to cerebral insult, and may 
be completely unsuspected, particularly in the case of the comatose 
patient who is brought in off the street" (I'lasland, in Walker and 
Molinary, 1975). Richard Masland, also involved in the studY to some 
extent, and at the time at NIH, pointed out several weaknesses in the 
study which I think it necessary to include: 
However, there are several important weaknesses of 
methodology that I think need to be highlighted .. The 
first is that in very few instances did they do their 
first EEG within the initial 6 hours following the cessa-
tion of respiration. Furthermore, there was a 
considerable number of patients who were originally referred 
to the study, but who, for some reason or another, were not 
included in the data. 
The possi bil ity exi sts, then, that there may have been 
patients who had a brief period of electrocerebral silence 
and fulfilled the other criteria of brain death during the 
first 6 hours following respiratory arrest, but who recov-
ered and who were not included in this series. 
The second weakness of the study is that it was not 
inherent in the protocol that all patients must be kept in 
the respirator until circulatory failure occurred. There 
were, I think, 140 of the 504 cases who were signed out as 
"brain death." That is to say, the respirator was turned 
off on the thesis that the brain w.as dead. Dr. Molinari's 
report indicates that the pathology has not proven useful 
in determining whether those patients were or were not 
actually dead. So, the study had a deficiency in that the 
determination of death was partly established on the 
criteria which the study was supposed to establish. 
(Masland, in Walker and Molinar, 1975:13). 
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As a lay person, it is curious and somewhat unsettling to read 
Masland's critique. One wants to insist that there be 100% accuracy 
and no doubt whatsoever in using these criteria and that respirators. 
not be turned off until the most rigid criteria are met. Masland 
continues: 
For myself, I have come to several conclusions from 
this study. One is that methods must be included for veri-
fying that drug intoxication is not a clouding element in 
the picture. The second is that the pressure for organ 
transplant increases our hazards very materially because 
of the pressure for haste, and that there is no substitute 
for a reasonable period of time for observation in order 
to be certain that one is not being confounded by an 
unexpected issue (p. 14). 
Another neurologist, Fred Plum, goes on to say, in the discussion 
following Walker and Molinar's presentation, that he, like Masland, 
sees no choice other than to treat patients in whom any doubt of diag-
nosis exists. I should say. The detailed report of the study vias due 
to be published in monograph form in the spring of 1979. 
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These are the major events, persons, committees and issues consti-
tuting the redefinition of death through 1974. An update (Epilogue) 
appears in the concluding chapter. The present chapter is intended for 
use as a reference for the remaining discussions. 
i , 
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Endnotes 
lThomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App. 2d37l, 215 P.2d 478 (1950). 
2Smith v. Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 587, 317 S.W. 2d 275, 279 (1958). 
3At the time I began to collect my data, both Schwab and Silverman 
were deceased. All the information presented about them was obtained 
from informants who had worked closely with them. 
4The members of the committee who cooperated with this study are 
Beecher, Curran, Denny-Brown, Farnsworth, ~lendelsohn, t~urray and Potter. 
Schwab was deceased. I also interviewed committee associates Francis 
Moore and E. P. Richardson, both of Harvard Medical School. 
51n this study respondents from all disciplines chose Beecher far 
more often than any other person. 
6There is a phenomenon known as the "locked-in syndrome", in which 
the cerebrum 1s intact and the reticular formation and other parts of 
the lower brain are destroyed. 
7lnterestingly, in their article published in JAMA (1968), Halley 
and Harvey, like so many other authors, quoted Pope Pius XII, or, I 
should say, misquoted the Pope. Their mistranslation, which causes a 
severe misreading of the Pope, was caught in 1975 by European lawyer, 
Adrienne Van Till-d'Aulnis de Bourouill. In this frequently cited 
article by Halley and Harvey the translation of the Pope reads, "Human 
life continues for as long as its vital functions, distinguished from 
the simple life of the organs, manifest themselves without the help of 
artificial process." As Van Till points out, the French reads, 
" ... que la vie humaine continue aussi longtemps que ses fonctions 
vitales - a la difference de la simple vie des organes - se manifestent 
spontanement au meme a 1 'aide de procedes artificiels" (emphasis mine). 
The translation should read " ... that human life continues for as 
long as its vital functions manifest themselves spontaneously or even 
with the help of artificial processes" (Van Till, 1975:138). Hardly a 
small and inconsequential difference! 
8Among the respondents and participants were both Henry Beecher 
and Ralph Potter, professor of social ethics from Harvard and a member 
of the Harvard Committee. Also among the parti ci pants was Jay Katz, 
professor of law and psychiatry at Yale (Ramsey, 1970:xix-xxii). 
9United Trust v. Pyke, 199 Kan 1, 4, 427 P.2d, 67, 71. 
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10 Tucker v. Lower, No. 2831; L. & Eq. Ct. of Richmond, 1972. 
llCapron (1979) is of the opinion that the California statute still 
uses two unrelated standards, as does the Kansas statute. Mills argues 
that the Capron-Kass statute does the same thing. I agree with Capron. 
CHAPTER 4: 
THE CULTURAL DEFINERS: WHO THEY ARE 
This chapter is devoted to placing the cultural definers, i.e. 
assessing their occupational, organizational, cultural and geographical 
locales, in order to lay a groundwork for later discussion of the roles 
these different factors play in the social organization of the sample 
and in the conceptual approaches taken to the topic. The information 
derives from responses to the questionnaire. 
Work and Discipline 
Of 75 respondents, 39 (52%) are physicians, 21 (28%) are in law 
or law and medicine, and 15 (20%) are ethicists -- philosophers, theo-
logians and clergy. Orienting a rather loose definition of inter-
discip1inarity with the following criteria: 
1. academic or professional degrees in two or more disciplines; 
2. current occupational commitment substantially different from 
original professional/academic training, 
fourteen respondents (19%) are interdisciplinarians. Of these, five 
were originally trained in either medicine or theology and now have 
occupational commitments in bioethics areas. 
Most definers are associated with colleges or universities, only 
11 (15%) are not. Thirty six percent of the sample are academic 
professors, 33% are medical or clinical professors and 16% are 
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administrators or were students at the time they wrote their articles. 
Of 52 members of various faculties, at least 24 hold such distin-
guished positions as named professors, chairmen of departments and 
chiefs of wards and laboratories. Examples of such luminaries include 
internist Gunnar Biorck of Sweden, who holds positions as Scientific 
Counsellor to the Royal Board of Health and as the phYSician to the 
King of Sweden, and internist J. Russell Elkington, who was for many 
years editor-in-chief of the Annals of Internal Medicine. Medicolegal 
experts William Curran and Don Harper Mills write regular columns in 
JAMA and the New England Journal of Medicine, respectively. These 
three medical journals are among the largest and most respected of 
those published in the United States. The respondents are not just 
professionals and academics, but a blue-ribbon list of men (there are 
no women) many of whom are nationally prominent in their areas of 
expertise -- the kinds of persons one might expect to be chosen, or to 
offer their services, for defining an issue of considerable conse-
quence. 
The definers represent many areas of knowledge. Of the physi-
cians, 64% work in the neurological sciences, i.e. neurology, neuro-
surgery, or electroencephalography. Mostofthe physicians in the sample 
who write articles on the definition and criteria of death are those who 
have the most experience with, and knowledge of, brain function and 
pathology. Some respondents (18%) are internists and again some have 
specialties in cardiology and nephrology. Surgeons comprise 7% of the 
medical definers, and of these, surprisingly, only one has been involved 
in transplantation. Anesthesiologists also comprise 7% of the physicians. 
The rest include one psychiatrist, one medical philosopher, one 
physician in nuclear medicine and two medical students. 
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Since the question "When is a person dead?" emerges in several 
contexts, e.g. in transplantation, stopping treatment or "pulling the 
plug" and resuscitation, it is surprising that there are so few trans-
plant surgeons and cardiologists in the author sample. Transplant 
surgeons might not appear as often in the death definition literature 
as in the transplantation literature, since several seem to regard 
the former topic as subsidiary to the latter. Cardiologists and 
emergency physicians are continually faced withdeclsions regarding 
when one may stop resuscitating. Why so few of them among the authors? 
One cardiologist informant, a prominent figure in cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation and emergency coronary care (CPR-ECC), mentioned his 
surprise that so few of his colleagues were on the author list. After 
talking with him, I added three additional prominent CPR-ECC physicians 
to the list before mailing the questionnaires, and they were recognized 
by only few informants, mostly internists. Perhaps the reason that 
they do not appear in the "brain death" 1 iterature and are not 
recognized by this group is because they seem to be concerned with 
national and community education regarding CPR-ECC. Perhaps their 
concerns lie in the pragmatics of heart, kidney and intensive care 
in the doing and vigilance; they leave the legitimating and consensus 
work to others. 
Of those in law and medical law, 33% are law professors and half 
of the professors also provide counsel for physicians. Twenty-four 
percent are private practitioners, several of whom are specialists in 
medical jurisprudence. The list also includes one judge and one 
legislator, as well as four students. 
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Among the 15 ethicists, one third mentioned theology as an area 
of primary concern, most of whom are also members of the clergy. Four 
are professors of ethics and two are professors of philosophy. Others 
mentioned combinations of ethical or bioethica1 analysis, and philosophy 
and/or theology as major work areas. Over half of the ethicists work 
in the interdisciplinary area of Christian social ethics, a pragmatic 
as well as theoretical area of knowledge devoted to the study of action 
with respect to the social order (Potter, 1975). Medicine and society, 
and medical ethics are areas of scholarship to wh.ich most of them 
contribute frequently. 
Certain work experinces cut across disciplines to some extent, 
namely working in some aspects of organ transplantation or with the dying. 
One third of the respondents stated that they had been involved in 
transplantation, but only three mentioned direct care for the donor or 
donee in the transplant exchange or transplantation surgery. Others 
were neurologists asked to make determinations of death on prospective 
donors according to the new neurological criteria, and anesthesiologists 
assisting in the surgery. Besides physicians, a few lawyers and 
ethicists acted as legal and more advisors to transplant programs. 
Almost half of the entire sample had worked .with some aspect of 
care of the dying besides transplantation. Slightly more than half of 
these also had occupational involvement with transplantation. Almost 
all of the physicians had worked with dying persons. About one third 
of the ethicists had been engaged in pastoral care of the dying or 
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counseling the dying and their families. 
Origin of Involvement with Redefining Death 
How did the authors become involved with the issue of death 
definition? - a question of considerable interest since there is no 
recognized training for cultural defining. or even. more specifically. 
for redefining death, although there are traditional occupational and 
experiential avenues which are more likely than others to lead to this 
particular cultural task. The question is of substantial interest to 
those concerned with how cultural tasks become relegated to or are 
assumed by particular members of society. In this chapter, only the 
respondents' answers to the question are addressed. The larger question 
of the cultural assumptions which govern the allocation of cultural 
tasks will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
Most respondents, 83%, stated that their involvement with the 
subject arose in the context of their work. with 44% additionally men-
tioning that they were invited to participate on a committee or in a 
symposium examining the topic, 24% adding that personal interest in the 
topic was an important original factor, and 10% acknowledging that they 
were asked to counsel a dying patient and/or her family. For most 
respondents the topic was indigenous to their occupational concerns. 
As a physician I have been diagnosing death and 
certifying deaths since 1940. As an anesthesiologist 
I have been managing cardiac arrest and resuscitating 
coma patients since 1942. This has been a 
responsibility of anesthesiologists in modern 
practices. (MD) 
As a medical student at the George Washington 
University (I was involved) in the care of a child with 
brain death at the Children's Hospital. (MD) 
My involvement stemmed from the trial of a law suit, 
over which I presided as the trial judge. (dO)" 
As a medical examiner, I authorized the removal of the 
heart from a victim of head injury, for the purpose of 
a heart transplant. (MD-JD) 
I serve as a moral consultant to many Catholic hospitals 
in the area. Questions on calling code and life-death 
decision making led to mY reflections and the article. 
This in turn led to many appearances on committees and 
sympos i urns. ( ETH ) 
We investigated criteria of brain death at the Bonn 
University Dept. of Surgery and joined with Neurologists, 
Radiologists, Neurosurgeons to define criteria of death 
for intensive care unit patients and for organ 
transplantation. (MD) 
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An ethicist said that the issue arose in the context of his teaching, 
"in the sense that Euthanasia was a topic in my course. The definition 
issue arose only with the Harvard Report coincident with my research ... 
and 1 ectures ... " andht~ s.tatement serves as a rather 
typical example of the ways most ethicists entered the redefinition 
debate. Most became involved with the topic as one other subject 
matter to which they might apply their skills and methods, usually in 
conjunction with other subjects which fall under the heading of morals 
and medicine or bioethics. Ethicists and theologians had been primarily 
involved in studying other related topics such as population, human 
experimentation, technology and human values, expertise and decision-
making. Several mentioned that their major occupation, ethical analysis, 
is a method which can be applied to various ethical dilemmas, the re-
definition of death among others. For example, as one ethicist put it, 
" ... I really backed into this whole death area. In general, my real 
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interest is in theories of expertise and I think the definition of 
death has absolutely muddled that issue (expertise)." 
Obviously, topics such as the care of the dying, ethuanasia, 
transplantation and abortion are, for ethicists and lawyers conceptually 
closer, and for physicians, pragmatically closer, to the definition 
of death topic than others. Persons might come to the topic through 
an intellectual or professional obligation to examine closely related 
areas. Almost half of the respondents had been involved in public dis-
cussions on other death and dying topics (e.g. in descending order of 
frequency, euthanasia, care of the dying, suicide), and 53% had been 
involved with other bioethics topics (e.g. in descending order of fre-
quency, abortion, human experimentation, scarce medical resources, 
health care delivery, etc.). Perhaps the fact that it is indeed 
difficult to discuss the issue of death definition without discussing 
transplantation and euthanasia, and vice-versa, is a major factor in 
many respondents" involvement with the subject, a factor which might be 
referred to as conceptual proximity. In addition to ethicists, others 
who had interest in the ethics or legalities of transplantation, 
informed consent or human experimentation could easily arrive at the 
topic of death definition. Physicians whose special areas are the 
neurological sciences could come to the topic by virtue of their 
expertise and interest or by their position in a hospital setting, i.e. 
as the physician in charge of patients who made the best transplanta-
tion donors, patients with "brain death". Anesthesiologists and 
cardiologists come to the issue by frequently being confronted with the 
question when is death, i.e. when is further artificial ventillation 
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and resuscitation unnecessary, that is, pragmatic proximity. 
In one sense, the ethicist and lawyer have more choice in be-
coming involved with the issue than physicians. As one law professor 
stated: 
The topic was a personal interest in that I thought 
it raised fascinating intellectual problems which 
had been neglected by lawyers. (JD) 
Physicians, on the other hand, faced with the brute factors of death 
situations - unburied corpses, patients with cardiac arrest, severely 
brain-damaged patients whose organs might save other lives - must 
come in contact with the issue and resolve it in one way or other. 
Those who mentioned that personal interest had been a source of 
involvement, whether mentioned alone or along with work, counseling 
or invitations to committees/symposia, comprise only 34% of the 
respondents. The relatively low percentage of interest expressed may 
be due to the fact that many persons view work and personal interest 
as inseparable or that work initiated the involvement, and interest 
followed. At any rate, of those who did mentioned personal interest, 
a few added relevant past experiences which had contributed to their 
interest and commitment. 
As an observer of "the Medical Case" (The United States 
v. Brandt et al.) held before the American Military 
Tribunal at Nurenberg in 1946-1947, I had a real interest 
in these discussions. (ETH) 
Exposed to triage evaluation of wartime military 
medicine - 1942-5- then civilian practice - all out 
efforts to support functioning existence of moribund 
patients by artificial tactics and with fatal outcome 
certainly encountered repeatedly; slavish obeisance to 
'sanctity' of life and 'dignity' of death instead of 
'love or reverence' and 'nobility' respectively. (MD) 
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Still others, though very few, mentioned that their involvement in the 
issue was related to closer personal relationships. 
Dr. X ... has been for years a very close personal friend; 
and he was a former student of mine. It was from that 
personal and intellectual relationship that I was able 
to work with him on the articles which we wrote and 
published. (JD). 
As a member of a Law Review, I was assigned to write an 
article ... My wife, who is a registered nurse, had told 
me of the differences between the medical and legal 
definitions of death. This topic was of great interest 
to both mYself and the director of the Law Review. (JD) 
Several respondents who contributed to University Law Reviews as 
student members of the editorial staff and other student authors 
stated that they had had an opportunity or requirement to write a 
paper and chose this topic. Interest and opportunity were the major 
factors leading to their involvement. 
Having been asked to participate in a symposium or committee 
provided the initial context for 47% of the authors' involvement with 
the issue. As mentioned in the previous section, Ramsey, Jonas, Capron 
and Potter, and to some extent Curran (asked to join, respectively, the 
Lyman Beecher lectures, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
symposium, the Hastings Death and Dying Research Group, and the 
Harvard Ad Hoc Committee) fall into this group. Most persons in the 
sampl e who are or were associated with the Hastings Death and Dying 
Research Group joined through invitation, and only a few (e.g. Beecher, 
Ramsey and Kass) had had pri or experience with the issue of "brain 
death". Few respondents (7%) came to the topic only by virtue of 
invitation to join a committee or conference. The rest of the persons 
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who had been invited to join a committee or symposium were also occu-
pationally or personally comitted to the issue. 
Organizational Affiliation 
Another indication of one's social location is the organizations 
in which one is most active. Although a quarter of all respondents 
(28%) stated that they were most active in specific professional organ-
izations such as the American Academy of Neurology or the American 
College of Legal Medicine or the American Society of Christian Ethics. 
Only a few (11%) were most active in general professional organizations 
such as the American Medical Association or the American Bar Association, 
and 12% were most active in both general and specifc professional organi-
zations. Other mentioned activity in local, state and national bar 
associ ati ons and medi ca 1 soci eti es, some addi ti onally menti oni ng speci fi c 
professional organizations. Bioethics organizations such as the Hastings 
Center or the Society for Health and HUman Values, sometimes along with a 
specific or general professional organization was mentioned by 9%. 
Although only a few respondents indicated that they were most 
active in bioethics organizations, 28% of the respondents belong to 
organizations which deal specifically with death and dying or other 
bioethical issues. In order of frequency of mentions they are: 
1) The Hastings Center in New York; 2) the Kennedy Institute of Bio-
ethics at Georgetown University and the Society of Health and Human 
Values in Philadelphia. Other organizations mentioned are the 
Euthanasia Education Council in New York City, and the Thanatology 
Foundation at Columbia University. Several members of the Hastings 
Center in the sample are in prominent positions as staff-members, 
fellows of the Center, or members of the board of directors. 
Academic Affiliation and Geographical Locale 
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In assessing the respondent's academic affiliation, I am concerned 
with both the university from which a respondent obtained his terminal 
degree, and the university in which he taught at the time of writing 
his article. The latter will be discussed along with geographical 
locale. 
The colleges and universities where respondents obtained their 
graduate degrees are too numerous for a complete mention. Only those 
universities which awarded degrees to a minimum of two responents are 
included in Table 1. From the table, we can see that Ivy League 
universities are substantively represented in the definer group. 
Universities which employed definers at the time of publication 
of their articles are located most heavily in the Boston-Washington 
corridor. Ten respondents taught in Ivy universities in this area, six 
or more in universities in the metropolitan New York area, and another 
four in the Baltimore-Washington area. The second geographical area of 
concentration is the Midwest with 15 respondents employed at universities 
in that region, over half of whom are employed in Kansas and Indiana 
(four each). California universities contain five respondents and 
southern universities, seven. The most popular academic centers for the 
the definers are Boston, New York City, Baltimore-Washington, D.C., 
Kansas City, Indianapolis and Los Angeles. The geographical locations 
of the non-academic respondents follow the same geographical patterns. 
Table 1. Universities where respondents obtained their terminal 
degrees. 
University 
Harvard University 
Yale University 
Cornell University 
University of Pennsylvania 
New York University 
George Washington University 
Georgetown University 
Duke Uni vers i ty 
University of North Carolina 
University of Chicago 
Uni versity of Mi nnesota 
University of Kansas 
University of Southern California 
Foreign Universities 
No. of Respondents 
8 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
14 
147 
Cultural Location: Religion, Religiosity 
and Professional Generation 
Religion and Religiosity 
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In Table 2 we can see that over half of the definers (53%) are 
Protestant; 20% are Jewish and 19% are Catholic. About 4% are other 
faiths (Hindu and Islam) and an equal percentage are agnostic and 
aetheist. Table 2 reveals the distribution of respondents' religions 
with a breaksown by discipline. 
,"The respondents were sorted again on the relative importance of 
their religious affiliation. Twenty-nine percent said their religion 
was very important to them, and almost as many (26%) said that it was 
fairly important. Fewer (17%) assessed the importance of their 
religion to be at the mid point on the scale, and 24% judged their 
religion to be either hardly or not at all important. As a whole the 
definers are religious; over half of them stated that their religion 
was more important than not. Some refused to rank the importance of 
their religion and included a comment, e.g. "strong belief in God", 
philosophically important, clerically or theologically unimportant." 
More ethicists (76%) than lawyel's or physicians stated that 
their religion was either fairly or very important, as we would ex-
pect, given the number of theologians and clergy in the group, and 
among the ethicists there are no agnostics or aetheists. Physicians were 
next, with 62% of them consi dering rel i gi on rather important to them. 
Only one third of the lawyers, however, feit simiiariy about their 
religions. Noting the cooccurrences of religion by religiosity, more 
Catholics (85%) than either Protestants (59%) or Jews (29%) indicated 
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Table 2. Discipline by rangious affil iation in rounded percentages. 
Religious Affiliation 
Agnostic/ 
Discipline Ca tho 1 i c Protestant Jewish Other Atheist 
Physicians 23 44 20 8 5 
N=39 ( 9) (17 ) ( 8) ( 3) ( 2) 
Lawyers 10 6.6 19 0 5 
N=21 ( 2) (14 ) ( 4) ( 1 ) 
Ethicists 20 60 20 0 0 
N=15 ( 3) ( 9) ( 3) 
Total 19 53 20 4 4 
N=75 (14 ) (40) (15 ) (3) ( 3) 
150 
that their religion was important to them. 
Professional Generation 
Professional age (based on ,the date of the terminal degree) is 
more relevant and appropriate a variable in this study than chronologi-
cal age. Definers of the same professional generation may share some 
of the same values and interpretations of the redefinition of death, 
and may know one another better through professional associations. In 
just these ways professional generation may have a bearing on the social 
organization of the definers. It is not so important to know how old 
the definers are as it is to know when they went to school and joined 
their profession. Almost half are relatively "young," having terminated 
their study from 1960-1974, and 24% are older members of their profes-
sions, receiving their degrees before 1950, and 16% are in the middle 
of their careers. The ethicists and the physicians have been working 
in their areas longer than the lawyers, but all three disciplines have 
about the same percentage of "young" defi ners (about 25%). 
Discipline is the most telling of all. the variables disc~ssed, 
obviously associate.d with work experience, origin of involvement with 
the topic, and organizational affiliation. Knowing discipline, one 
could easily predict a definer's work experience, how he might come to 
the issue, or the professional organizations in which he is most active. 
Geographical locale, religiosity and professional age are only slightly 
associated with discipline in that a few more ethicists and physicians 
than lawyers live in the Boston-Washington corridor, consider their 
religion more important or are among the older definers. 
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In subsequent chapters, we will see that some of these variables 
interact with others as the focus changes from the definers' social 
organization to their conceptual approach. Throughout, however, 
discipline is the variable against which other assumes importance. 
CHAPTER 5 
COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES IN CULTURAL DEFINING 
Various communication activities and processes constitute the 
social process of redefining death. I have organized this study to as-
sess the definers' communication with one another, with policy-makers, 
and with the general pub 1 i c. Thei r i nterpersona 1 communi cati on and the 
interaction of policy-makers and definers are discussed in later chap-
ters. This chapter concerns the definers' use of various channels in 
discussing death definition: the professional journal; symposia and 
conferences; and the mass media. I have oriented the findings in terms 
of the interdisciplinarity/intradiscip1inarity of the activities andof 
the professional status (lay/professional) of the definer's reader-
ships/audiences. 
Redefining death is both an interdisciplinary issue and one which 
demands larger public debate. Not an infrequent situation, as go the cru-
ci a 1 20th century issues. And insofar as the topi c i ncl udes medi cal, 1 ega 1, 
and ethi cal components, one woul d expect some cross-di sci pl i nary pub 1 i shi ng 
and publ i c di s course, but how much? How often di d the persons res pons i b1 e 
for delineating andexplicating the issue address the lay public? Or, in 
otherwords, were the communication activities which underlie this com-
plex process of cultural definition integrated across disciplines wit~ 
in the professional domain or often extended toward the public domain? 
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In the treatment of the definers' use of professional journals 
below, the journals definers read, the incidence of cross-disciplinary 
publishing and the definers'conception of their readerships and 
objectives in publishing their articles are given. Also discussed are 
the definers' activity in other public discussions, such as conferences 
and symposia and discussions in the mass media -- all important aspects 
of the communication involved in cultural defining. 
The Professional Journal 
Reading 
Definers were asked which medical, legal, ethical or interdiscip-
linary journals they read in order to keep up with discussions on 
redefining death. Most said they read the general medical journals, 
such as the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 77%, 
The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), 68%, and the British 
journal, Lancet, 41%. Thirty-nine percent said they read the University 
Law Reviews and 29% read the bioethics journal, the Hastings Center 
Report. A technical medical journal which publishes international 
association proceedings, Electroencephalography and Clinical Neuro-
physiology (ECN) was utilized by 28%. Ethical and theological journals 
and Bar Association journals were read by only 19% and 17% respectively. 
Of course, the respondents may not have read their journals regularly, 
or even at all. I have taken their choices as indicative of what they 
would read, or of which journals they consider most important. 
Physicians said they read medical journals almost exclusively. 
Lawyers and lawyer-physicians indicated primarily their own journals 
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and the most well-known medical journals (JAMA, NEJM). Ethicists were 
the most widely read, with almost half mentioning University Law 
Reviews, JAMA and NEJM, and 73% mentioning the Hastings Center Report. 
Publications 
The list of journals which respondents said they read is rather 
shorter than the list of journals in which they published. The latter 
ranges from the fairly well known to the local and obscure. They 
published in the "big" journals and in specialty medical journals, such 
as Neurology and Pediatrics, in general medical jOijrnals, such as The 
American Family Physicians and Hospital Tribune, in local association, 
state and unviersity journals, and in interedisciplinary and theological 
journals of small circulation, such as Linacre Quarterly, Soundings, 
Tradition, and the Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation. 
How many authors published their articles in other disciplines' 
journals, perhaps to relay their disciplinary perspective on the issue 
to those of another disciplinary persuasion or to express their allign-
ment with another discipline's approach? For the most part, the 
definers published in their own journals, although 31% of the group as 
a whole published outside their disciplines. Table 3 shows the propor-
tion of each discipline publishing in their own, or another discipline's 
journals. The pattern found for journal reading holds for publication. 
Ethicists published, as well as said they read, most diversely. 
Lawyers published primarily in legal journals, but also published in 
medical journals. And physicians published in medical journals almost 
exclusively. 
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Table 3. Interdisciplinry publication: kind of journal in which 
article ·was published by discipline of author (in rounded 
percentages) . 
Kind of Journal 
Discipline Medi ca 1 Legal Interdisciplinary Ethical 
Physicians 87 8 5 0 
N=39* (34 ) ( 3) (2) 
Lawyers 38 62 0 0 
N=21 ( 8) ( 13) 
Ethicists 33 7 26 20 
N=13** ( 5) (1) (4) ( 3) 
Total 65 23 8 4 
N=73 (47) (17) (6) (3) 
* Not all respondents answered each question. Deviations from total (N= 
75) and disciplines (Physicians, N = 39; Lawyers, N = 21; Ethicists, N 
= 15) noted by specifying N who responded in each table. 
** Two articles written by ethicists appeared in books. 
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Interested in assessing some of the ways in which the authors 
may have determined to influence the redefining process in publishing 
their articles, I asked them a) how they conceptualized their reader-
ships, b) what their purposes were in publishing their articles, and 
c) what effects they wanted their articles to have. 
Audience 
Each respondent was asked to indicate the audience to whom his 
articles was primarily addressed: physicians, the allied medical 
professions, lawyers, ethicists, theologians, policy-makers, or the 
lay public. And again, a pattern of interdisciplinary and intradis-
cip1inary communication similar to that discussed above emerges. 
Physicians stated that they wrote primarily for physicians, and a few 
wrote to physicians and lawyers. If they intended to reach lawyers, 
and published almost exclusively in medical journals, they must have 
assumed that lawyers would use the medical journals. Lawyers stated 
their intended audience was lawyers and policy-makers primarily, and 
some had addressed physicians as well. Only one third of the ethi-
cists wrote for other ethicists. The rest stated that they addressed 
physicians, lawyers, policy-makers and the lay public. Perhaps 
ethicists couldn't assume that other participants in the process of 
redefining death would peruse their journals, so they placed their 
messages elsewhere. At any rate, in each case, the definer's inten-
tions were rather more inclusive than their journals' respective 
circulations. 
Publishing Intent 
Definers expressed various objectives in publishing their 
articles. Only a few authors (27%) stated their publishing intent 
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in terms of reaching a particular readership, either another discipline 
or readers from a particular locale: 
To stimulate thought on the problem in medical and 
1 ega 1 profess ions. (MO) 
To appraise physicians of the chasm between medical and 
legal definitions and determinants then existing - to 
make MOs aware of future prbb1ems which might arise, 
e.g. Quinlan case problems. (JD) 
To cause physicians to think of the legal problems 
involved. (JO) 
To inform members of the Kansas bar. (JO) 
General practitioners in the field of medicine seem to 
need a working definition in their small towns. (JO) 
To indicate the need for local consideration of (issues). 
(MO) 
To establish criteria for use in institutions, the 
general hospital. (MO) 
Most others described their objectiVes in terms of particular 
kinds of problems they intended to explicate. Among these, some (11%) 
were interested in drawing attention to the problems of prolonging life 
in persons whose brains had died or of transplantation, and suggesting 
the redefinition of death as a solution: 
To provide guidelines - ethical - moral - scientitic 
so that ineffective therapy could be discontinued in 
comatose patients. Not euthanasia, passive or other-
wise. (MO) 
To present data suggesting medical disunity about the 
concept of brain death and to call for a more universal 
acceptance of the entity. (MO) 
MY perception of an impending conflict between medical 
and legal ethics. (MO) 
Help solve a social, legal, medical, theological 
problem. (JO) 
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Others (17%), mostly physicians, wanted to introduce new methods 
for determining death or to redefine old ones: 
To popularize the concept that brain death can be 
determined in part by tests of brain circulation and/ 
or metabolism. (MO) 
To better define the Harvard criteria - to demonstate 
brain death with spinal reflexes present. (MO) 
To investigate EEG criteria. (MO) 
To stimulate a new approach to clinical death more in 
tune with contemporary knowledge. (ETH) 
Another 17%, ethicists and lawyers all, intended to delineate a 
specific disciplinary perspective on the issue, or to clarify specific 
disciplinary issues: 
To outline the philosophical and theological implications 
of decision-making in the health sciences. (ETH) 
To deal with the philosophical issues. (JO) 
Clarification of the ethical problems at stake. (ETH) 
To clarify the philosophical issues over the concept of 
death. (ETH) 
Myself to understand the Harvard Report and elucidate it 
accurately in comparison with supposed outdated deter-
miners of death. (ETH) 
Also interested in clarifying the muddles, some others (8%) 
levelled criticism at particular statements of policy or definition. 
Again the critics are primarily lawyers and ethicists. 
To clarify an important issue which seemed to me to be 
mishandled by the others who had dealt with it. (JO) 
Points out errors of court and MDs. (ETH) 
To draw attention to what I considered to be a bad 
piece of legislation and to discuss a problem in a 
journal with wide international circulation. (JD) 
To explain to myself, and others, who might be 
interested, why it may be fallacious to regard death 
as a definable thing. (ETH) 
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And, of course, there were those who wrote to encourage 1egis1a-
tion (about 10%): 
To encourage stability in this area of law.' (JD) 
I wanted to influence legislation to be adopted in 
other states. (JD) 
Not surprisingly, some gave the customary nominal and somewhat 
banal objectives: "to satisfy a requirement for a class," "to prepare 
a presentation at an invitational symposium," but,none stated what 
might be the obvious objective: "to further my career." All but these 
seemed interested in determining some aspects of the institutionaliza-
tion of the notion of "brain death" -- medical policy, legislative 
policy, or the conceptualization of the issue. 
Intended Effect 
In addition to their publishing objectives, I asked them whether 
they wrote their articles to 1) influence a certain readership, 2) affect 
social policy, or both. In asking this question and the latter, I 
wanted to ascertain just to what extent the authors saw themselves as 
active and moving agents in this process of cultural definition. By 
intending to influence certain readers, perhaps physicians or the 
"teacher's" teachers, authors could be intending to affect policy 
160 
indirectly. But, in that case, they had the option of checking both 
alternatives. My purpose was to assess their primary intent. Did 
they intend their articles to have a delimited effect, and only influ-
ence readers, or did they intend to directly influence policy, to 
have a far-reaching political effect? 
Among the 70 who responded to the question, 14% wanted only to 
affect social policy, 39% wanted only to influence a certain readership 
and 31% wanted to do both. Sixteen percent were not interested in 
doing either. 
Table 4 gives the breakdown by discipline on this item. All 
disciplines wanted to influence specific audiences more often than to 
affect social policy. Since they could have checked both and did not, 
I assume that many simply did not consider that their contributions, 
or perhaps even the issue were matters of social policy at all. Only 
a few authors wanted to just affedt social policy; most, who wanted to 
affect policy, wanted to influence their readerships as well. Other-
wise, differences among the disciplines were slight. 
From my knowledge of their articles and the information obtained 
from the interviews, I would say that lawyers and ethicists were 
clearly more "policy-minded" than physicians. Since many physicians 
opposed legislation, and many argued that the matter was entirely 
medical, perhaps to them, medical policy i£ social policy. 
Symposia, Conference and Panel Participation 
Aside from reading professional journals and publishing articles, 
about 73% of all respondents also participated in public discussions 
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Table 4. Desired effect of articles by discipline of author (in 
rounded percentages). 
Affect Influence 
Discipline Social Policy an Audience Both Neither 
Physicians 14 52 20 14 
N=35 ( 5) (18) (7) ( 5) 
Lawyers 5 19 57 19 
N=21 (1) ( 4) (12) ( 4) 
Ethicists 29 36 21 14 
N=14 ( 4) ( 5) ( 3) ( 2) 
Total 16 42 36 17 
N=70 (10) (27) (21 ) (" ) 
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such as symposia, panels and conferences on redefining death. Approxi-
mately equal proportions of all three disciples participated in such 
discussions. They were asked to indicate whether they had addressed 
audiences of their own professional persuasion, interdisciplinary 
audiences, or lay audiences in the discussions. And, of course, in 
addressing lay audiences, definers extended the discussion beyond 
the professional arenas. Table 5 gives the breakdown by discipline 
and indicates whether definers addressed only professional or inter-
disciplinary audience of lay and professional or interdisciplinary 
audiences. More ethicists than physicians or lawyers addressed lay 
audiences. 
Mass Media Discussions 
In giving their views in the mass media, definers assure that 
their messages are cast as broadly as possible, certainly beyond the 
professional domain. Although most discussions of the definition of 
death in the mass media have been relayed to the public via medical 
journalists and journalists who contacted definers, 43% of the 65 
authors who responded to the question had participated in some type 
of media discussion. Thus, many, though less than half, of the 
definers contributed to the redefining process in the arenas of public, 
as well as professional opinion. Nearly equal proportions of each 
discipline are represented. 
Television, newspapers, radio and magazines were used in decreasing 
frequency; several definers discussed the issue in more than one 
medi um. It makes a difference, of course, in terms of thei r 
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Table 5. Symposium, conferences and panel participation: audiences 
addressed by discipline (in rounded percentages). 
Lay and 
Profess i ona 1 Interdisciplinary Professional, 
Discipline DNA Only Only Interdisciplinary 
Physicians 28 16 19 38 
N=32 ( 9) (5) (6) ( 12) 
Lawyers 31 16 11 42 
N=19 ( 6) (3) (2) ( 8) 
Ethicists 21 0 7 71 
N=14 ( 3) (1) (10) 
Total 28 12 c 14 46 
N=65 ( 18) (8) (9) (30 ) 
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contribution to the domain of public opinion whether definers dis-
cussed the issue in the national or local media. Eleven definers 
appeared in the national and 24 in local media. From Table 6 it is 
apparent that more ethicists than either lawyers or physicians discussed 
their views on the topic in both the national and local media. 
The communication activities have been discussed in order of de-
creasing frequency. All definers published articles, and all but a 
few said they read some professional journal to keep up with the 
debate. Fewer (73%) respondents participated in symposia and con-
ferences on "brain death," and even fewer (less than 43%) discussed 
the issue in the media. (All but one of the latter were among the 
symposium participants.) 
In response to the two questions posed at the beginning of this 
chapter, I would say that the communication underlying the process of 
death definition is not integrated across disciplines or extended beyond 
the professional domain to the extent that perhaps it should be. A 
rather consistent pattern of inter- and intra-disciplinary and extra-
professional communication has emerged with respect to definers' 
disciplines. In both journal use and publication, a hierarchy of 
exclusion of other disciplines exists, with physicians at the top 
oriented almost entirely to members of their own professions; lawyers 
next, reading, and writing for, lawyers, policy-makers and physicians; 
and ethicists reading journals from each discipline and directing 
their articles to each discipline, policy-makers and the public. More-
over, in other discussions, either across or beyond the disciplines, 
ethicists addressed more different kinds of audiences. Ethicists seem 
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Table 6. Participation in discussions in local 
discipline (in rounded percentages). 
vs. national media by 
Discipline DNA Local National Both 
Phys i ci ans 55 27 9 9 
N=33 (18 ) ( 9) (3) ( 3) 
Lawyers 62 27 11 0 
N=20 ( l3) ( 6) (1) 
Ethicists 54 15 0 31 
N=13 (7) ( 2) (4) 
Total 57 26 6 11 
N=66 ( 38) (17) (4) (7) 
to have done most of the "work" to extend their views beyond their 
discipline and beyond the professional domain. These patterns are 
interpreted along with findings relating to social organization 
and conceptual approach below in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AMONG CULTURAL DEFINERS 
Cultural definers are not socially isolated individuals; they 
stand in various social relationships to one another -- interpersonal 
relationships as well as organizational and disciplinary affiliations. 
I have already discussed some foci of social organization, namely 
disciplinary affiliation, organizational membership, university and 
geographical locale. In this chapter, I will consider the interpersonal 
communication and other social relationships which authors have with 
one another in these and other social contexts, toward an analysis of 
the social organization among this group of respondents. Respondents 
were asked to check the names of other authors: 
1. whose names they recognized 
2. with whom they had had contact about the issue 
3. whom they considered to be important to their conceptualization 
of the issue of death definition 
4. whom they considered to be professional friends. 
It is these four kinds of relations, Recognition, Contact, Importance 
and Professional Friendship, I will be discussing. Each of these 
ti es has a structure. 
Recent sociological and anthropological literature has contained 
studies of the structure of relations among scientists, rural 
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sociologists (Crane, 1969, 1970, 1972; Lin, et ~., 1970; Griffith and 
Miller, 1970; Coleman et~., 1966; Brieger, 1976; White et~., 1976; 
Friedkin, 1978), psychotherapy seekers, intellectuals and community 
elites (Kadushin, 1966, 1968, 1974; Barton et~., 1973; Laumann 
et ~L., 1974; Laumann and Pappi, 1973), members of African and Sicilian 
towns and communities (Boissevain and Mitchell, 1973; Boissevain, 
1974), to name just a few. Such studies focus on the social organiza-
tion, or the structure of relations of a given population. The term 
"network" referring to the structure of relations in a given population -
has acquired considerable popularity as a useful concept or metaphor for 
discussing these structures (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Coleman et ~., 
1966; Kadushin, 1975; Alba and Kadushin, 1976; Brieger, 1976; White et 
~., 1976; Friedkin, 1978). Its use has roots in kinship studies, 
sociometry, studies of the flow of influence and of the diffusion of 
innovations and information. 
To my knowledge no studies have analyzed the structure of rela-
tions among persons from different disciplines who are engaged, some 
of the time, in defining cultural issues and related public policies 
of cross-disciplinary significance. The present respondents are not 
in the "business" of furthering a research area within a shared 
"paradigm" of relevant problem-solving, of using an innovation intro-
duced from outside their communities, or of providing the grease for 
the works of bureaucracies or particular communities. In other words, 
they are unlike members of other studied populations in that they are 
not quite sci enti sts engaged in speci a 1 ty research, adopters of 
innovations, intellectual~ororganization or community elites (though 
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they have some characteristics in common with scientists and intellec-
tuals}. Nonetheless, other network analysts and I share at least 
one goal -- the analysis of social structure among persons engaged in 
certain activities. However that goal is not an end in itself, but 
a means for understanding the social organization and patterns of 
communication underlying a particular kind of cultural change and 
institutionalization. 
Assumptions Concerning the Concepts of "'Network, " 
"Communication" and "Social Relationship" 
Although this chapter is intended as a discussion of findings 
rather than a treatise on network theory, some conceptual work needs to 
be undertaken in order to make proper sense of the data. 
"Network" 
With respect to the concept of "network", one assumption that I 
make is that the networks among the sample members for each category 
of relationship (Recognition, Contact, Importance and Friendship) are a 
means of describing the social relationships which held for the 
authors on the issue of death definition. The network is a kind of 
map of social relations -- it is not a structure one could located as 
such, or that one could say existed or exists in fact. "Network" is a 
construct for describing the social relationships authors say they 
had with one another while they were thinking and writing about "brain" 
death. The interpersonal networks discussed below are abstractions 
which hold only within well-drawn boundaries -- the boundaries of 
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discussions about death definition in professional journals. Change 
the focus of the relationships to genetic screening, myasthenia gravis, 
Christian ethics, torts or football, and each respondent would probably 
name different persons for each kind of relation. 
I find some conceptual problems generally present in the litera-
ture on networks of scientists and of elites and on diffusion and 
influence, and I will attempt to resolve these problems for the pur-
pose of this study. The problems seem to develop from three inter-
related conceptual confusions and ambiguities: 
1. a conceptual tendency to nominalize social processes 
such as communication and influence; 
2. the reduction of social relationships to particular ties, 
channels or links; 
3. confusion about the relationship.of communication and 
social relationship and a tendency to identify one with the 
other. 
In the following discussion, I am not so much concerned with pointing 
fingers at particular authors as I am concerned with explicating a way 
of speaking about networks, social relationship and communication which 
I find problematic and which characterizes the network literature. 
Social Networks and Communication: Structure and Process 
It seems relatively clear that "network" is a construct used to 
represent a social structure obtained with a sociometric investigative 
format. Most effort in network discussions goes toward assessing 
and delineating structure with little conceptual or empirical attention 
to processes or dynamics. What I would argue are indeed processes, 
i.e., communication and influence, are frequently conceptualized as 
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either contents or kinds of networks. Networks are described as 
"communi ca tion networks" or "i nterpersona 1 networks of communi cati on" 
or "networks of influence", and communication and influence are 
relegated to the status of kinds of flow or stuffs which rattle 
through the channels of a network. It is difficult to tell whether 
a phrase such as "interpersonal networks of communication" refers to 
a kind of relationship structure, e.g., one composed of channels or 
tracks, or assumes that a particular interpersonal network is 
characterized by "communication content" as opposed to some other sort 
of content. 
In their study of the diffusion of a new drug among physicians 
in three communities, Coleman, Katz and Menzel suggest, "It may be 
useful to think of the structure of social and professional relations 
among physicians in a community as a network of communication through 
which information, influence and innovation flow" (1966:69). The 
"flow" seems to have little to do with communication; communication 
is rather a kind of network or set of channels, through which other 
"stuffs" flow, e.g., information. For another example, take Kaplan, 
quoted in Brieger (1976:117) " ... the network of social relationships 
in which communication is embedded." Reducing communication to a kind 
of network or to a kind of content, such as information or rumor, and 
ignoring that communication and influence are processes is a conceptual 
error. 
The tendency to treat communication as a package, element or thing 
which is transmitted through a network or which, as such, characterizes 
a networ~ may be an offshoot of studies of innovation. and information 
172 
diffusion (cf. Rogers, 1970) in which things, such as innovations, 
are tracked through sets of "communication channels." Linguistically 
and conceptually (followingWhorf) it is much easier to nominalize 
processes or make processes into stuffs and structures than to conceptu-
alize process as process. The relationship of event, structure and 
form to process is a formidable, not to mention awesome, philosophical 
problem. 
Structure and process each are inextricably and dynamically 
related to the other. Social processes such as communication, 
influence and diffusion are structured/have structures, and every 
structure organization or network -- has its dynamics and processes. 
This chapter is an analysis of definer social organization, and I 
will be talking about the network Importance and Contact as "pictures" 
or representations of the social organization which derived from those 
two social processes. I can no better than others discuss process 
when discussing structure or organization. I have attempted to resol ve 
this problem by discussing the dynamics and processes of the insti-
tutionalization of the redefinition of death all in one chapter, 
Chapter 9. 
The Reduction of Social Relationships 
Another conceptual muddle in discussions of networks takes the 
form of identifying ties, or aspects of social relationships, with 
social relationships. Network analysis invariably entails the 
abstraction of particular types of social ties as a means of opera-
tionalizing the kinds of relatedness under investigation. And, 
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there is something reductionist about rendering social relationships 
into ties, network links, channels or choices. The reduction may be 
unavoidable. In most cases, we cannot hope to assess all aspects of 
anyone social relationship, nor would we want to; we focus on those 
aspects which are most relevant to our purposes. But I would argue 
that it is important that, after particular ties have been abstracted 
for analysis, it be noted that one is no longer talking about social 
relationships as such, but about particular aspects or components of 
them - lest we begin to treat and think of relationships as little 
more than simple linear channels, links or ties. I would not argue 
that I am getting at all the aspects or dimensions of respondent social 
relatedness in discussing either the four ties, disciplinarity, geo-
graphical locale or organizational membership. And unavoidably, I 
will be engaging in a bit of reductionism in discussing choices, ties, 
and networks in discussing the empirical findings. l 
Communication Channel or Social Relationship? 
There is a tendency to treat social relationships as channels of 
communication or the same as communication,a tendency toward conceptual 
error and reduction not unlike that discussed above. The identifica-
tion of communication channel or communication with social relationships 
is a problem in the theory of communication and deserves separate 
treatment. 
There is a sense in which communication as social process enters 
in some manner (e.g., via socialization, cultural transmission, the 
mechanics of organizations and institutions) into most kinds of social 
174 
relatedness at some point. As Birdwhistell has been known to argue: 
communication is the dynamic aspect of social structure. But we must 
be able to distinguish communication writ large (in the sense of having 
been integral at some pointtoall forms of social relatedness) from 
particular kinds of contact within relationships or contact which 
characterizes particular relationships. For instance, Contact and 
Importance, as ties, assume communication of sort on the issue of 
brain death in a way which Professional Friendship does not. 
Social relationships are not the same as communication or chan-
nels of communication, and different social relationships do not en-
tail communication in the same ways. All communication occurs with-
in social relationships of one form or another, but not all social 
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relationships entail communication (e.g., institutional memEerships). 
Social relationships, however, may be potential channels of communi-
cation or potentially characterized by communication, and one may say 
that particular relationships differ with respect to the likelihood of 
communication. That is at least one of the differences between the 
two social relationships, disciplinary affiliation and professional 
friendship. 
Obviously, these distinctions are rather slippery, and for the 
purposes of this study, I will attempt to stick to the following: 
Content in this study is simply discussions of the topic. The social 
processes are communication, and kinds of communication, influence and 
diffusion. Communication and influence are processes which are par-
tially represented by two ties utilized in this study, Contact and 
Importance, respectively, and will be discussed as ties and as 
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networks during most of this discussion of social organization. In 
this chapter, I will "stop" or freeze the processes, to get a sense 
of the structure. In Chapter 91 will discuss the dynamics and 
processes underlying the evolution and institutionalization of the 
concept. 
The Four Ties 
Recognition, Contact, Importance and Professional Friendship 
are not conceptually similar ties which cut through the population in 
four similar ways. In other words, I cannot simply say that this 
population is organized with respect to four ties and let it go at 
that, - without discussing what those ties mean-and how they are 
related. 2 
The four ties can be sorted around three different pegs: 
a) content boundedness, i.e., whether or not the tie is bound to the 
definition of death or not; b) whether a respondent's knowledge of 
another is through direct contact or publication; and c) the likelihood 
that a choice is reciprocated. Recognition and Friendship are not 
topic bound; respondents may have chosen on a basis of familarity in 
any bioethics, medical, legal or personal context. In order to make 
choices on either Recognition or Importance, a respondent need only 
have read an article or have seen a name in print a few times,- he may 
not have ever had direct contact with the person chosen. These ties 
are not likely to contain as many reciprocal choices as the other two, 
because, obviously some respondents are likely to be more "print 
notable" or "visible" than others, and a respondent's having seen 
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another's name in print provides no social basis for the latter's ever 
having seen the former's name in print. On the other hand, Contact 
and Friendship, ties entailing direct social contact (as opposed to 
familiarity only through publication) and at least mutual knowledge of, 
if not mutual regard, are more likely to be reciprocated than 
Recognition and Importance. 
Recognition 
Respondents were directed as follows: "If you recognize any of 
these names, please check ... " A check in this instance may mean that 
the author has seen the name in print, knows of the person, or has met 
the person, but would not check hi s name on any of the,other ties. 
The meaning of this tie is included in the meaning of the others, 
i.e., if a respondent checks a person on any other tie, he must also 
recognize his name. In a later section of this chapter, I distinguish 
between two senses of Recognition: that which means anytime a person 
was chosen once on any tie, referring to recognition as included in a 
choice on Contact, Importance and Friendship; and that which means 
"only recognizes", i.e., does not have any other ties with. "Recognition" 
refers to the former sense and "Recognition Only" to the latter. 
Recognition or Recognition Only may entail either mediated or direct 
knowledge of another. 
Contact 
Directions were: "If you contacted, i.e., either talked or 
corresponded with any of these people while you were formulating the 
ideas expressed in your article, please check ... " Contact, like 
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Importance, is bound to the topic of brain death. However, I seriously 
doubt that the specification "while you were formulating the ideas 
expressed in your article" was followed in every case or even often. 
Some respondents distinguished between contact before the article and 
contact after the article, and a few additionally mentioned that they 
were not sure when the contact was made. A choice on the tie can 
probably be taken to mean contact at any time on the subject. There 
is a small likelihood that a few respondents took the directions to 
mean "initiated contact". Contact means contact of any sort, -- by 
telephone, post, or person, on the topic. Contact implies direct 
social knowledge of the other person. 
Importance 
Directions were: "If any of these people were particularly 
important, e.g., helpful, provocative, influential, t~ you in terms of 
your interpretation of the issues involved in death definition and 
determination, please check ... " Importance is obviously content-
bound however, the respondent and important person may have never 
discussed brain death per ~, but may have discussed some other related 
issue -- perhaps e.g., the philosophy of organism. In addition, 
"Important" may refer to an attribution made in terms of either direct 
or mediated communication, i.e., in terms of collaboration, committee 
work, or publication. Some respondents named Aristotle, Tillich, 
Whitehead, Heidegger and Niebuhr, or their works, as important, and 
obviously not all of them have been available recently for an exchange 
of ideas. 
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I did not use the concept of influence (instead of importance) 
partially because I expected that professionals, and particularly 
prominent physicians, would acknowledge importance, broadly defined, 
more readily than they would influence. I asked directly, "who was 
important" rather than "who did you go to for advice" under the 
assumption that most people can name important and influential 
persons when asked and that in this study, asking directly would 
obtain more valid responses than asking obliquely. 
Another reason why I used importance rather than influence is 
that influence frequently implies power, persuasion or inducing 
compliance or a sameness or commonality of behavior or attitude. (e.g., 
if Sally influences her friends, and Sally wears ruby red lipstick, 
then the other girls will wear ruby red as well.) I wanted to tap 
cognitive importance or influence which a respondent could recognize 
as having affected his interpretation of the issues. 
Importance of this sort can result from a wide variety of subtle 
(cognitive and social) interactions and processes quite different from 
persuasion, power or inducing compliance or sameness. For instance, it 
is frequently against a different, even alien, conceptual apparatus 
that one sharpens and refines one's own. There is little doubt that 
an opposing viewpoint is often important, but not influential -- in 
the sense that one does not come away from it shaping one's arguments 
in the s tyl e of the oppos iti on. For exampl e, t~orison ("death as a 
process") and Kass ("death as an event") were important to one another 
while formulating their arguments j but I am quite sure that neither 
r 
: 
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would say that the other influenced him, i.e., swayed him or induced 
in him conceptual compliance. 
Cognitive importance may be an attribution based on.a skilled 
explication of points one had not quite yet formulated, a reinforce-
ment of one's own points, a mentioning of things one hadn't come to terms 
with before, or a particularly provocative use of a concept from a 
point of view which deeply conflicts with one's own. Specifying 
helpfulness, provocation and influence, in short, importance, covered 
the varieties of cognitive influence without excluding some, which, to 
a population such as this, may have made all the difference. 
In addition to cognitive importance, a respondent may consider 
an author importance by virtue of his cultural certification (Katz and 
Lazarsfeld, 1955) and respective authority, his association with a 
particular medical school faculty, his prominence in the field, etc. 
In such cases, one comes much closer to traditional notions of influ-
ence, power and "high" status. Many respondents probably were using 
criteria of cultural certification in making their attributions or 
of what I will hereafter call "status importance." 
One other sort of importance is relevant, that which might be 
called "interaction importance" and which refers to the importance 
particular personalities and their powerful or understated manners 
make, i.e., an intellectual or professional charisma. A respondent 
must have had direct contact with another respondent to have been 
"taken" in this sense; not so for cognitive or status importance. I 
have no objective means of distinguishing cognitive, status, and 
interaction importance (if distinctions could be made reliably by 
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respondents or even researchers} aside from information obtained in 
interviews. However, direct or mediated importance can be distinguished 
empirically by noting the coincidence of importance and contact or 
friendship. These considerations will be discussed in a later section. 
Professional Friendship 
Directions were: "If you consider any of these people to be 
professional friends, i.e., close colleagues or collaborators, please 
check ... " This tie, like contact, of course entails interpersonal 
knowledge of another author, rather than knowledge through publication 
or public appearance. And professional friendship, as defined above, 
need have nothing at all to do with the definition of death; a 
respondent could have chosen a person on the list, with whom he had 
never discussed this particular issue. This is the l~cast "cognitive" 
and most "social" of all the ties. It is also the tie most likely 
to have been interpreted differently from respondent to respondent. 
Respondent interpretations might vary from simply "good, old boy" 
to "fri end1y colleague" to "friendshi p whi ch transcends professi ona 1 
association." 
A point to consider in interpreting this tie is whether or not 
one might assume that professional friendship implies importance or a 
subtle influence through the more or less personally close sharing of 
cultural or professional values. It has been shown empirically that 
friends are more likely to influence one another than non-friends (Back, 
1952). In this case, I will trust the respondents' judgments. Since 
they were to judge each person with respect to each tie, they had to 
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consider whether or not a professional friend was also important in 
their formulation of their thesis. 
The Structure of Social Ties Among the Definers 
Without further conceptual ado, we turn to the findings. There 
is one important characteristic of the sociometric matrices which 
should be noted at the outset. In this study there are 74 choosers, 
or respondents, and an addition 363 persons whose names appeared in 
the questionnaire but who, for various reasons (e.g., they chose not 
to participate in the study, they were decreased, or they were import-
ant persons who did not fit the sample definitions) are not among the 
respondent sample. They are called non-respondents. Included among 
them are some of the most well known physicians in the neurosciences 
and other areas whose work initiated research and consideration of the 
redefinition of death, persons such as Robert Schwab, Henry Beecher 
(both members of the Harvard Committee, deceased), Daniel Silverman 
(the originator of the NINDS collaborative effort, deceased), Reginald 
Bickford (a well-known neurologist in this area, who would not parti-
cipate), most members of the Harvard committee, including internation-
ally known neurophysicians Raymond Adams, William Sweet, Derek Denny-
Brown and other well-known physicians Dana Farnsworth, Clifford Barger 
and others, who did not fit the sample definitions. 4 
Unlike most sociometric matrices, all matrices in this study 
are rectangular with 74 choosers and 110 possible choices. Network 
analyses of the choices of all ties has been performed on the basis 
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of choices given, not choices received. 5 And many respondents chose 
non-respondents, so the social organization of the respondents is 
based on choices to them as well as choices among the respondent 
group. 
This section includes a discussion of the overall network 
cohesion or connectedness among respondents on each tie, a division 
of the entire population (respondents and non-respondents) into 
elites (sociometric stars) and non-elites, and a description of the 
network structure of the four ties as obtained in the network analysis. 
Density and Connectedness 
Density is a measure of total cohesiveness of a sociometric 
population based on the proportion of actual choices made to all 
possible choices. 6 (Crane, 1972; Boissevain and Mitchell, 1973; 
Kadushin, 1975) The number of total possible ties can be obtained 
by multiplying the numbers of choosers by the number of possible 
choices - 1. Table 7 below gives the densities obtained on each type 
of tie and on all ties taken together. 
The meaning of these densities becomes clearer in comparison with 
the densities of other network populations in science, even though 
my results are not strictly comparable with those obtained in the 
studies of scientists mentioned below. Crane (1972) obtained measures 
of connectivity for researchers in mathematics and rural sociology 
on several types of ties, most of them much more restrictive than 
the ones used in this study (e.g., collaboration, thesis director, 
teacher-student relations). If we compare the density of all the ties 
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Table ?. Overa 11 network dens i ti e~ by type of ti e. 7 
Recognition Fri end- Recogni - Total 
only Contact Importance ship tion ties 
Densi ty or 
proportion 
of possible 
ties 
actually 
occurring .076 .039 .053 .029 .157 .187 
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she utilized taken together for each population with the density for 
the definers on total ties, even though the definers chose on ties as 
loose and unrestrictive as simple recognition, the densities Crane 
obtained are much higher than the one I obtained. Brieger (1976) 
assessed densities on "ever heard 'of,,8 and "mutal contact" for two 
groups of scientists,9 which can be compared to the densities obtained 
in this study for Recognition and Contact. Mullins and his cohorts 
(1977) report densities on "ever heard of" and "know well", ties 
roughly comparable to Recogn1tion and Professional Friendship. And 
finally, a multidisciplinary population of physical scientists in one 
elite American university was studied by Friedkin (1978). The only 
tie measured in his study, as far as I know, is "ongoing substantive 
discussion of scientific ideas". 
Table 8 shows the densities by the kind of tie for each popula-
tion of scientists and the definers. On all ties except Contact, the 
networks of cultural definers are much less dense than those of the 
science specialty researchers. The definers, however, are more inter-
connected than Friedkin's multidisciplinary physical scientists, all 
of whom work at the same university. One would imagine that highly 
specialized science researchers sharing paradigm and specialty would 
be more visible to one another and interactive than either of the 
interdisciplinary multiparadigmatic (Hagstrom, 1976) populations. 
And it seems that sharing a body of literature and a single topic is 
more socially bonding (for the definers) than sharing the same school 
and campus (the physical scientists). 
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Table 8. Network densities and connectivity for social ties by 
population studied. 
Population 
Rural Sociology 
Mathematicsa 
Neura 1 control of 
food and wa ter 
i ntakeb 
Australian antigen 
Reverse trans-
criptasec 
Phys i ca 1 
sCientistsd 
Cultural 
definers 
aCrane (1972:147-148) 
bBrieger (1976:122) 
Total 
ties 
.536 
.379 
.069 
.187 
cMull ins et a1. (1977:555) 
--
dFriedkin (1978:1447) 
Ever 
heard of 
(Recognize) 
.47 
.84 
.74 
.16 
Mutual 
contact 
(Contact) 
-... 
.07 
.04 
Know 
well 
(Friendship) N 
221 
102 
107 
.16 65 
.15 105 
128 
.03 74 
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If a looser measure of connectedness is considered simply the 
links either to or from respondents -- the definers are highly inter-
connected on two ties, Recognition Only and Importance. Using this 
same measure for all of the ties, all respondents but three are 
directly linked to at least some of the most well-known members of the 
population, and these three are no more than one link away from the 
central members. The definer group is interconnected, though sparsely 
so. 
Elites and Non-Elites 
By now, it is probably clear to the reader that the definer 
population is comprised of those who are highly visible and nationally-
known and those who are not as well-known -- students and others known 
in specialized or local contexts. An initial step toward determining 
the organization of the definers is to separate them into a binary 
grouping on this basis. The respondents themselves, however, determine 
who is well-known by their choices; in other words, the elite are 
defined as the "sociometric stars" or "centrals" -- those to whom most 
choices are directed. The elite are those respondents who received at 
least 11 choices on all ties combined and at least four on either Con-
tact, Importance or Friendship (Elite N = 24). The non-elite are the 
respondents who did not meet this criterion (Non-elite N = 51). In 
addition, there are those who, for whatever reasons, did not partici-
pate in this study who meet the elite criterion (extras -- non-
respondent elite). I will refer to the three groups as elites, non-
elites and extras. 
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Among the definers who participated in the study, the elite are 
highly visible and well-known, not only among the definers, but also 
within their disciplines, if not in other intellectual contexts. 
They are nationally known neurologists, lawyers, philosophers and 
ethicists. The non-elite, on the other hand, are known primarily 
within more specific geographical or disciplinary contexts. The elite 
are the older, more established members of the professions, with two-
thirds receiving their professional or academic degrees before 1950, 
whereas half of the non-elite received theirs after 1960. Of the 
elite, 42% are physicians, 33% are ethicists and 25% are lawyers. 
Considering the population as a whole, proportionately more ethicists 
(52%) are elite than either lawyers (28%) or physicians (26%). 
Over half (58%) of the elites live in the Boston-Washington 
corridor, whereas only 24% of non-elites do. Elites are more likely 
to have been involved in the Harvard Committee, the Hastings Center 
Research Group, the NINDS collaborative study committee, or the major 
symposia on death and closely related issues. The Boston-Washington 
corridor is the central location of the death definition effort, an 
area known to be conducive to policy-making and defining enterprises 
because of its geographical concentration, in-area mobility and 
intellectual and professional centers and facilities. However, the 
elite are not just persons who happened to be in the right place. In 
a very real sense, these men made the committees and contributed to the 
major steps in the evolution of the redefinition of death. 
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Who, according to these distinctions among elites, non-elites 
and extras gets'and gives the choices? We might expect that the elite 
and the extras would get most of the choices and that the elite would 
give few. On the other hand, we would expect the non-elite respond-
ents to give most of the choices and to choose the elite and the 
extras more often than they would choose within their own group. 
As a matter of fact, the elite and the extras received more than 
75% of all choices, but the elite made more than half of the choices, 
that is, a bit more than the non-el i te made. In other words, the 
elite respondents seem to know and know of more of their cohorts 
than the non-elite respondents. This is especially the case on Con-
tact and Friendship. On all ties except Friendship, the elite 
respondents received more choices than the extras. And, as previously 
discussed, Friendship is the tie which had nothing to do with the 
topic of death definition. 
As expected, the non-elite give more than half of all the choices 
on Importance and directed 77% of their choices toward the elite and 
the extras (rather than within their own group). And the elite chose 
within their group and the extras two to three times more often than 
they chose the non-elite. Interestingly, however, on Contact and 
Friendship (the "social" ties) the elite chose the non-elites slightly 
more often than the non-el ite chose themsel ves. Without the results 
of the network ana lys is, we can already di scern a "center-peri phery 
pattern" in the structure of the definers in which a central group 
of visibles or stars receives a high proportion of all choices both 
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from within its own group and from the larger group of less visibles. 
(Brieger, 1976: 128) Given the above, one would expect that the 
density within the elite group would be considerably higher than the 
density within the group as a whole. And a perusal of Table 9 shows 
that this is the case. Throughout the rest of the report "elite" 
refers only to the definer (respondent) elite. 
The Network Analysis 
After having split the group into elites and non-elites to 
discuss a binary basis of organization, I now turn to the results of 
the network analysis which splits the group again into several 
clusters on the basis of the similarity of each respondent's choice. 
Those who chose similarly are in the same cluster (the basic unit of 
organization within the networks). They did not necessarily choose 
each other, though they have in several cases. 
An important characteristic of the data is that the sociometric 
matrices are not square; there are more choices than there are 
choosers (respondents). In other words, the social organization 
portrayed in the networks is based on choices that respondents made 
to other respondents as well as to non-respondents. 
Recognition, defined for the network analysis as excluding 
choices on all other ties so that there is no overlap, has a structure 
consequently rather different from the others, and will be discussed 
after a comparison of the other three. Before their differences are 
given, first, their commonalities. 
Table 9. Densities within the elite and within the definer 
group on all ties 
Density 
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Recognition Contact Importance Friendship 
El ite 
All defi ners 
.440 
.157 
.197 
.039 
.152 
.053 
.127 
.029 
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All thre~ networks (see Fi gures 1-3) consi st of three dense, 
loosely interrelated cluster groupings which reflect particular discip-
linary affiliations, i.e., a set of ethics clusters, general medicine 
clusters and neurology clusters. Most lawyers are associated with 
either the general medical clusters or distinct medico-legal clusters. 
The cluster groupings in each network are composed of one or two large, 
major clusters and two to three small clusters, related to the major 
clusters. In all three networks, but particularly Friendship, the 
small or isolated clusters are made up of either collaborators or neigh-
bors. The "isolate" clusters, those containing persons who chose no 
one and frequently were not chosen, are not given in the sociograms. 
They are the largest clusters, composed of students and others who are 
the least known and the most peripheral to the redefining process. 
In each network the major ethics and neurology clusters are pri-
marily composed of definers who were on two major working (research 
and writing) committees -- the Hastings Research Group on Death and 
Dying and the NINDS collaborative study, respectively. The Hastings 
clusters are the most dense of the lot, given their size, and contain 
the most reciprocal choices. In terms of sociometric distance (i.e., 
those who choose similarly are closest together), the ethics clusters 
and the neurology clusters are farthest apart with the general medicine 
and medical-law clusters between. 
Although no variable is associated with the social organization 
of the definers quite so much as disciplinary affiliation, I will 
discuss four other respondent attributes which characterize the networks' 
organization to some extent. These are: cross-disciplinary choosing, 
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professional generation, present or past geographical proximity and 
el ite status. An attribute is considered to characterize a cluster if 
it co-occurs within more than 50% of the members of the cluster. 
Table 10 shows the percentage of total clusters characterized by each 
attr'ibute in each network. 
Only one attribute is related in a general way to the organization 
of all three networks. Since choices are the bases for clustering, 
interdisciplinary (as well as intradisciplinary) choosing characterizes 
all networks to some extent. However, as an attribute, the tendency to 
choose across disciplines is more associated with some respondents, 
ethicists, than others, neurologists. In all networks, members of the 
ethics clusters (primarily ethicists with some lawyers and physicians) 
chose representatives of both other disciplines. Members of the neu-
rology clusters (physicians and lawyers), if they chose beyond their 
specialties or discipline at all, chose only members of the one other 
discipline represented in their clusters, and not ethicists. The gen-
eral medicine clusters contain respondents who chose in the style of 
either the ethicists or the neurologists. 
Variations in Structure and Attribute Characterization Among the Networks 
Contact and Friendship: Contact and Friendship have more in common 
structurally than either has with Importance. Each has three isolate 
clusters (clusters in which members choose primarily within and not 
outside of their cluster) composed of collaborators or neighbors, and 
each exhibits a center-periphery pattern (cf. Brieger, 1976: 128), char-
acterized by strong ties to, and weaker ties from, the major clusters, 
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Table 10. The percentage of clusters characterized by respondent 
attribute for three networks. 
Network 
Attribute Contact Importance Friendship 
l. Interdisciplinary 39 47 27 
choosing ( 5) ( 8) ( 4) 
2. Proximity 54 29 67 
(7) ( 5) (10 ) 
3. Professional 39 24 47 
generation ( 5) ( 4) (7) 
4. El ite status 31 18 27 ( 4) ( 3) ( 4) 
N of clusters (13) (17) ( 15) 
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and weak or non-existent ties among the smaller clusters (Mullins et al., 
1977:557). Contact is the more integrated across disciplines of the two 
and contains more interdisciplinary choosers. In other words, definers 
established more discussion partnerships than friendships with members 
of other disciplines. On the other hand, most respondents choose their 
own disciplinary colleagues as friends, making the clusters in that 
network more discipline-specific than the others and making Friendship 
the least integrated of the networks. One reason for the difference 
in interdisciplinary integration between the two networks is that making 
a choice on Friendship entails no reference to the topic of death 
definition, so respondents were free to choose any professional buddies 
on the list whom they knew through professional associations and other 
disciplinary contexts. Many respondents may have established ties 
with members of other disciplines only in the context of this topic. 
The attribute associated with most clusters in both Contact and 
Friendship is past or present geographical proximity. That is, neigh-
bors, more than non-neighbors, contacted one another and considered one 
another professional friends. Secondly, both contain "elite" clusters, 
reflecting perhaps the elites' participation in many of the same 
symposia, committees and professional associations. 
Contact and Friendship differ with respect to characterization by 
professional generation. In Friendship, definers of the same profes-
sional generation, who may share the same professional "heroes" and 
values, are clustered together. 
Importance: Importance is the most integrated and the most inter-
disciplinary of all the networks --in terms of choosing, inter-cluster 
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connectedness, and cluster membership. Nearly everyone, students and 
eminent professionals alike, agreed that certain definers were 
important (e.g., Beecher, Fletcher, Curran, Capron, Ramsey) and many of 
these notables were chosen by members of all three disciplines. A 
choice on this tie may involve only "publication" familiarity (as well 
as some professional humility). Consequently, this network is the 
most inclusive of the three -- membership is open to anyone who cared 
to make an attribution. 
Since the elite and the non-elite chose the same persons (which 
was not the case on the other two ties), elite and non-elite are 
clustered together. No center-periphery pattern is discernible in 
Importance -- the elite/non-elite structure is within the clusters, 
not among them. 
Neither geographical proximity nor professional generation makes 
much of a difference in the organization of Importance. The visibility 
of a few prominent definers who were chosen by many respondents from 
different disciplines accounts for most of the network organization. 
Recognition: Recognition (which excludes choices on all other 
ties) not only is unlike the other networks, but also is rather 
uninteresting. Twenty-nine small clusters, most of which are organized 
according to discipline, constitute Recognition. And because the tie 
excludes choices on the other ties, persons with wide bibliographic 
familiarity are clustered together regardless of any rhyme or reason 
derived from the patterns of the other networks. 
In summary: The differences and similarities among the networks 
are as follows: Recognition, in terms of the analysis of other 
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networks, is basically unimportant. Contact and Fri.endship, networks 
of "social" relations rather than "publication" and "social" relations, 
are composed of neighbors and collaborators, and, in Friendship, members 
of the same professional generation and profession. Both Contact and 
Friendship exhibit center-periphery patterns unlike Importance, the 
most structurally and disciplinarily interrelated of the networks. 
Attributes which facilitate the development of discussion partnerships 
or professional friendships, such as proximity, collaboration and 
professional generation,do not account for the social integration of 
Importance. Rather, wide agreement on who is important and the acces-
sibil ity of the network to persons with "publication" and/or "social" 
familiarity with important definers, constitute the major differences 
between Importance and the other two networks. 
Cooccurrences of the Three Ti es 
The relationships among the ties in terms of their cooccurrences 
on choices to respondents help to further characterize the respondents 
in terms of their organization. Are most respondents friends and 
discussion contact partners, related through print importance or 
charismatic importance, or some combination of these? Respondents 
chose others on all three ties more often (116 times) than on any two 
ties (Contact and Importance, 41 times; Contact and Friendship, 31 
times; and Importance and Friendship, 23 times). And almost all persons 
choosing others on all three ties are elites and/or members of 
intensive work groups such as the Hastings Research Group, the NINDS 
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collaborative study, persons involved in the Tucker v. Lower case, or 
in the Massachusetts General Hospital environment (out of which 
developed the Harvard Report). And recalling the statements made in 
interviews discussed in Chapter 3, it seems that the intense innova-
tive collaboration characteristic of committee work on this issue was 
a highly socially bonding experience for many respondents. In 
addition there seems to be a temporal development of relations with 
fellow committee members; I know from the interviews that in some 
cases contact led to collaboration and subsequently to attributions 
of importance, and finally to the formation of professional friendships. 
Since one might expect friends to be more influential or important 
than non-friends (Back, 1952; Kadushin, 1975), it is interesting to 
note that both other combinations of ties occur more often than the 
cooccurrence of Friendship and Importance. Considering that Friendship 
as a tie was not bound to the topic of death definition, it may be 
that respondents chose friends with whom they had not discussed the 
issue, or whom they did not consider important. 
I can distinguish between attributions of importance made on 
the basis of social vs. publication knowledge of others by noting the 
cooccurrence of Importance with either Friendship or Contact. 
Importance occurs alone 200 times, and in conjunction with either or 
both Friendship and/or Contact 190 times. So, for this population, 
attributions of Importance are based almost as often on social contact 
as on readership familiarity. All three kinds of Importance noted 
previously -- charismatic, status and cognitive importance -- could be 
operating in attributions of "social" importance, and all but interaction 
or charismatic importance could be operating in attributions of 
publ ication importance. 
Comparison with Other Network Populations 
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The definers share some qualities of work, work place, and 
social organization with both science researchers, particularly those 
studied by Kadushin (1976), Crane (1972) and Brieger (1976), and those 
intellectuals studied by Kadushin in The American Intellectual Elite 
(1974). Before discussing their respective commonalities, I want to 
point out one substantial and glaring difference between the de-
finers and the other two populations. The substance of their work 
acti vi ty is different: Defi ners are neither concerned with further-
ing research within a narrowly defined research specialty, nor with 
the broad cultural, political and social criticism characteristic 
of intellectual work. In this instance, they are concerned with 
the evol ution and appl i cati on of a concept and the establ i shment of 
medical and public policy. Given that difference, theirwork can be 
characterized as both collaborative and cumulative (after Kadushin) as 
can the workofscientists. The work of intellectuals is not neces-
sarily either, according to Kadushin (1976:115). 
The three groups can be compared as well with respect to their 
work "places". Definers have direct associations with professional 
schools, universities, and formal organizations such as hospitals, 
unlike intellectuals who tend to associate more informally with and 
in bars, cafes and restaurants (Kadushin, 1976). In this regard, the 
definers are more like scientists than intellectuals. However, the 
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definers and intellectuals are not bound to narrow specialties or 
"invisible colleges" as scientists are. Scientists also work all 
over the conti nent, whereas thedefi ners, 1 ike i nte 11 ectua 1 s, seem to 
have a primary location -- the Boston-Washington corridor. The 
intellectuals, of course, have New York City (Kadushin, 1974). 
With respect to their internal social organization, however, the 
cultural definers have more in common with science researchers than 
Kadushin's intellectuals, and particularly with respect to the role 
of the elite. Kadushin (1976:114-115) states that the elite do not 
playas prominent a role in the organization of intellectual circles as 
they do in scientific circles. The "center-periphery" pattern noted 
in Contact and Friendship is characteristic of science researchers 
(see Brieger, 1976; Crane, 1972; Mullins et ~., 1977). In the present 
study, the center-periphery patterns are arranged along disciplinary 
lines, as would be expected for an interdisciplinary population. 
The elite are the keystones of the definer social structure. They 
are the centrals (by definition), the non-elite are the "peripherals". 
The eli.:te form the links which connect the clusters of the networks. It 
is thei.r choices which link all of the major disciplinary clusters 
into a relatively coherent, those loosely connected network. About 
five times as many elites as non-elites chose across disciplines on 
Contact and Friendship, and twice as many elites as non-elites chose 
across disciplines on Importance. Without them, the networks would 
have been comprised of three discrete sets of cluster groups bound by 
disciplinary affiliation. 
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Crane (1972:51) also found that her scientist elite (the High 
Producers) linked clusters into single, coherent networks, and func-
ti oned to ti e the research areas together. Crane's elite formed the 
most dense clusters with the most reciprocal choices in the networks. 
Both the ethics and neurology cores comprised primarily of elites, 
are the most dense clusters in the n.etworks and those which contain 
the most reciprocal choices. Both the elites of this study and of 
Crane's formed large groups in networks and were comprised of fellow 
collaborators or committee members. The elite in both studies seem to 
be what Hagstrom (1976) would call "work groups". 
Brieger (1976) found that the elite in his group of neurology 
researchers evidenced what he calls an "elder statesmen" phenomenon. 
That is, the elite were highly visible to others but showed low 
awareness of those others, suggesting that the older elite were freed 
from keepi ngup with the contri buti ons of younger researchers. In 
this study, the elite made the most choices, and chose non-elites 
slightly more often than non-elites chose themselves on Contact and 
Friendship. There is some evidence of an "old boy" tendency to 
attribute importance only to other elite among the definers, but for 
the most part, the definer elite seem a bit more egalitarian and more 
widely aware of other definers than Brieger's researchers were. 
Summary 
So this is what the organization of the definers "looked like" 
during the institutionalization of the redefinition of death. In the 
sample there are those who are very well known, definer cosmopolitans, 
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and those who are not, local and students definers. They have a 
variety of ties to one another -- affiliations in organization and 
institutions, geographical propinquity, and relations of contact, 
importance and friendship which emerged in the process of explicating, 
refining and diffusing the redefinition. The cosmopolitan elite were 
most likely to establish relationships which consisted of all three 
sociometric ties; the locals established all three with their neighbors 
and collaborators and ties of importance with the cosmopolitans. 
With respect to other network populations, the definers are 
similar both to intellectuals and scientists. As regards their work 
and the locations of the forums for their work, definers are similar 
to both. And as regards their internal organization, they are more 
like science networks than intellectual networks. 
It may seem to the reader that after all manner of warnings about 
nominalizing social processes, that that is just what I have done in 
discussing the social organization of the definers. I have not been 
able to find a way to discuss structure without seeming as if I am 
rectifying the struture or engaging in what Whitehead would call 
"misplacing concreteness". It is difficult to discuss process while 
delineating structures, or to talk about an aspect of a social 
relationship which is based on the occurrence of contact (a process) 
in other than a structural way -- by referring to the process that the 
tie refers to as a tie, and the organization of ties/processes as 
networks. Perhaps other social scientists are more adept at discussing 
structure/process than I. I can only discuss one while putting the 
other aside. One way to diminish the dysjunction between the two 
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would be to assess structural changes through time by administering 
sociometric surveys at different stages of a process. This research 
design did not include such an assessment. 
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Endnotes 
lBY "tie" I mean the aspect of social relation utilized in the 
analysis. By "network" I mean the social organization of a population 
"revealed" by subjecting a sociometric matrix of choices on a specified 
tie to manipulation and analysis. The name of the tie, capitalized, 
is used to refer to both ties and networks. I will consistently 
distinguish between the two with the phy,ases "On ties" and "in 
networks" . 
2For an instance of treating such different kinds of ties as 
hospital affiliation, discussion partners and friendship as similar, or 
at least not different enough to warrant a comparison, see Coleman, 
et ~., 1966:72-78. 
3Adjustments were made eliminating all respondents who choose no-
one on any tie (one respondent) and all non-respondents receiving less 
than five choices on all ties taken together. 
4None of these members of the committee wrote articles on death 
definition or wrote articles which fit the same definitions, and I 
searched long and hard - I wanted to include them in the respondent 
sample. 
5Since all data came from the respondents, I can compare respondents 
only. 
60ensity, as used here, refers to the number of choices (permuta-
tions) and not the number of ties (combinations). As stated pre-
viously, I am not assuming that choices made are reciprocated. 
7"Recognition" overl aps with contact, importance, fri endshi p 
insofar as the 1 a tter i ncl ude the former. "Recogniti on," as a ti e, 
refers to the number of times a respondent choise on any tie. 
"Recognition only" refers to choices made only on recognition and not 
on the other ties. "Recognition" overlaps with other ties, "recogni-
tion only" excludes all other ties. 
8Actually Brieger used "unawareness" rather than "ever heard of", 
and Mull ins et al. (1977) adapted the complement of "unawareness" for 
comparison toatie they used, "ever heard of." I have used the figures 
reported in Mullins, et~. (1977). 
9Srieger applied his analysis to researchers in the field of 
neurol control of food and water instake, and Mullins et al., studied 
two biochemical and genetic specialties, Australia Ant;gen-and Reverse 
Transcriptase. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH: ARTICLE CONTENT 
After discussing who the definers are, their communication 
activities and social organization, I turn now to the conceptual 
approaches definers took toward the redefinition of death in their 
articles. Doing justice to authors' conceptualizations of an issue 
as interdisciplinary and value-laden as the definition of death 
requires the analysis of the actual conceptual treatment of the issue. 
One cannot simply identify conceptual approach with disciplinary 
affiliation and assume that physicians write medical articles, lawyers 
write legal articles, and so on. However, as we shall see, fdr many 
definers, conceptual approach is closely related to discipline. The 
first section of the chapter acquaints the reader with the structure 
of the content ana lys is scheme and its elements, and the second 
section describes the interrelationships of these thematic elements. 
The amount of consensus on the various aspects of the issue is noted 
throughout. The relationship of conceptual approach and social 
organization, a difficult one to determine, concludes the discussion 
of article content. 
The Content Analysis Scheme 
Devising an analytic instrument which helps to make some sense 
of 75 articles written by lawyers, _Rhysicians and ethicists on a 
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topic of considerable variety and complexity is not a simple task, 
and there is no reason to assume that the following schema is the 
only one, or even the best one which could be constructed. The 
content analysis instrument (see Appendix D) contains general items 
referring to the context of the article (date, place of publication, 
whether or not the article was also a paper delivered at a symposium, 
etc.). The rest of the instrument contains six conceptually inter-
related sections organized around the assumption that most, if not all 
of the articles were discussions of a solution to some problem --
problems for which the redefinition of death was a solution, problems 
incurred by redefining death, problems in statutory definitions, etc. 
Each article contained statements about 1) the etiology of the 
issue, 2) reasons why death should be redefined in terms of brain 
function, 3) statements about the sort of issue redefining death is 
(ethical, public, medical, etc.), 4) a mode of interpretation, 
5) several specific issues and concerns and 6) suggested remedies 
(legislation, further research, etc.). 
Each article was sorted on the basis of: 1) its overal concern 
or purpose, and 2) whether the article was concerned primarily with 
definition, or procedures for determining death or both. I will 
describe the major sections of the scheme and discuss the results in 
terms of general frequencies and the cooccurrence of each variable with 
the disciplinary affiliation of the authors. Tables including both 
frequencies and cooccurrences accompany the discussion. 
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General Concerns 
The range of concerns of the articles extends along temporal and 
disciplinary dimensions. For example, the earliest articles were 
written by physicians and concerned the use of the EEG in assessing 
prognosis. Conceptual critiques of medical and legal proposals, of 
course, must come later than the medical and legal proposals them-
selves and medical critiques of criteria and suggestion of new methods 
follow the first statements of methods and procedures. There are 
eight groupings: 
1. The first group, wbich includes seven articles, consists of 
the earliest statements on utilizing the EEG in determining death and 
reports of cases in whi ch "fl at EEGs" were fo 11 owed by recovery or 
statements criticizing primary reliance on the EEG in determining 
death. 
2. The second group, which includes ten articles, involved dis-
cussi ons of the "pro 1 ongati on of 1 ife" and transpl antati on problems 
("problems in recent medical advances") and medical and bioethical 
proposa 1 s for managi ng the probl ems. Haml in's "Life or Death by EEG", 
AYd's "When Is a Person Dead" and the Harvard Report provide examples 
of articles in this category. 
3. Another group of 15 articles constitute the reviews of the 
problems and proposals and reports of research which support the 
proposals; some of these inlcude minor modifications of the original 
statements. 
4. Thirteen articles, all published in 1968 or later, address 
medicolegal issues without specifically discussing statutes or court 
cases. 
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5. Eight articles criticize and evaluate (legally, ethically, and 
conceptually) the Kansas and Virginia statutes and the Tucker v. Lower 
case. 
6. Conceptual and ethical critiques and clarification of 
particular proposals, such as the Harvard Report, or the general effort 
to redefine death are the concern of another ten articles. Most of 
these were written by ethicists. 
7. There are four theological critiques, or four articles which 
treat the issue from a specifically theological point of view. 
8. Finally, eight articles concern criticism of either criteria 
or definition on other groups. Authors in this category promoted the 
noti on of "neocorti ca 1 death," criti ci zed the use of the EEG, and 
advocated the acceptance of cerebral angiography as a criterion for 
determining death. 
Definition or Determination of Death 
In terms of article purpose, it was important to distinguish 
between those articles concerned with the definition of death and those 
concerned primarily with techniques and procedures for the determina-
tion of death. Forty percent of the articles dealt primarily with 
definition, 23% primarily with determination and 37% with both. Most 
of the determination articles are discussions of research and clinical 
findings, critiques of criteria and methods, or the early EEG state-
ments. These 17 articles, almost a quarter of the sample, were written 
entirely from a medical perspective, with a medical audience in mind, 
and are lodged firmly within a medico-technical framework in a way that 
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most of the other articles are not. Yet they constitute important 
steps in the development and evolution of the concept and are essential 
to the purpose of the study. 
Etiology of the Need to Define Death 
Hith striking consistency, most of the articles begin with a 
discussion of why death should be redefined, for example: 
Hith the advent of organ transplantation and the 
development of excellent respiratory support, the 
determination of death is once again a problem for 
organized medicine. (Paulson, MD, p. 39) 
Most articles (52%) simply include a list of the recent advances in 
medical technology (transplantation, mechanical respiration, hemo-
dialysis, defibbrillation, etc.) or refer generally to the advances. 
An additional 15% refer to heart transplantation in particular and a 
few (9%) mention only organ transplantation as the major stimulus. 
Among the. disciplines of the authors, few differences occur. 
Reasons Hhy Death Should Be Redefinied 
Apart from the factors which prompted a redefining of death, 
authors also listed various reasons why redefining death is appropriate 
or des irab 1 e, emphasi zi ng a vari ety of concerns. These re.asons are 
responses to the question, "Hhy is it a good idea to define death in 
terms of brain function?" Table 11> shows the frequency of articles 
containing each reason and the breakdown by discipline. 
The most frequently stated reason for updating the definition of 
death is to facilitate transplantation. More physicians and lawyers 
than ethicists cited this reason. 
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Table 11. Reasons why death should be redefined. Rounded percentages 
of whole sample and breakdown by discipline mentioning 
reasons. 
Cramer's V 
Death should be rede- Frequency Medicine Law Ethics discipline 
fined in order to: N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 x reason* 
1. facilitate general 57.3 64.1 71.4 20.0 .38 
transplantation (43) (25) (15 ) ( 3) 
2. cease useless, futile 53.3 66.7 47.6 26.7 .31 
prolongation of life (40) (26) (10) ( 4) 
3. allow persons to 34.7 46.2 14.3 33.3 .29 
die humanely (36) (18 ) ( 3) ( 5) 
4. mitigate burden 
(emotional and finan- 32 35.9 23.8 20.8 
ci a 1) of family (24) (14 ) ( 5) ( 5) 
5. update the definition 
in light of new medical 26.7 12.8 61.9 13.5 .50 
knowledge (20) ( 5) (13 ) ( 2) 
6. mitigate burden on the 25.3 28.2 23.8 20.00 
community (19) (11 ) ( 5) ( 3) 
7. facilitate heart 10.7 10.3 19 0 
transplantation ( 8) ( 4) ( 4) 
8. death should be re-
defined in terms of 
the higher, specifi- 28 30.8 14.3 40 
cally human functions (21) (12 ) ( 3) ( 6) 
9. redefinition is not 
needed, or redefini-
tion presents seri ous 24 9.7 19.0 73.3 .59 
problems (18 ) ( 3) ( 4) (11 ) 
* Cramer's V is an association measure, based on x2, which indicates the 
strength of the relation between 2 variables, (in these cases, the 
difference each theme makes in the distribution). See pp. for 
more detailed discussion of the choice of this measure of association. 
Insofar as transplantation of organs is facilitated 
(by redefining death) death may even be viewed as a 
creative act, in the sense that another desperately 
ill individual may be made whole by the gift of an 
organ. (Luchi, MD, p. 284) 
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Several ethicists took issue with this reason on ethical grounds. Some-
what surprisingly, only 11% of the articles mentioned that redefinition 
was needed to facilitate heart transplantation in particular, although 
most of the articles were published around 1968-1971 in the midst of 
and immediately following the heart transplant furor. 
Another frequently cited reason for redefining death is in order 
to cease futile prolongation of life, a reason which contains at least 
two implications: 1) that the quality, not the presence of life is of 
upmost importance in defining death, and 2) that it is somewhat grossly 
inappropriate or immoral to continue treatment on a person who is 
already dead. 
Death, thus identified (with the brain) will be marked 
by a greater dignity than that which may accompany 
death defined by traditional criteria and following 
prolonged futile attempts at mechanical support ... 
(Luchi, MD, p. 284) 
This reason is distinguished from the next one, "in order to allow 
persons to die", primarily in terms of the perspective from which one 
takes her concern. Mentioning that a person ought to be allowed to die 
expresses a concern with the dying person -- that his dying ought not 
to be interfered with. An emphasis on the cessation of useless pro-
longation of life derives from the perspective of those concerned with 
the allocation of care and resources. The distinction is at best 
rather slippery. From the Table, we see that fewer ethicists than 
lawyers or physicians stated that redefining death would allow the 
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cessation of futile treatment. The disciplinary distribution is more 
even for "to allow a person to die. ,,2 
As well as the physician's and patient's perspective, the family's 
emotional and financial burden and the community's burden and resources 
were mentioned as considerations involved in redefining death with 
little disciplinary variation. Another reason some authors, about 20, 
mentioned was that it is fitting to define death in terms of the organ 
which houses the higher human functions, e.g. rationality, conscious-
ness, etc. in terms of the whole brain or the neocortex. Finally, 
almost one quarter of the articles stated either that the redefinition 
was not needed, or that the effort was laden with ethical, philosophical 
and conceptual dilemmas requiring caution and serious consideration. 
Far more ethicists than members of either of the other disciplines 
took this position. 
As the German people discovered thirty years ago, it 
would lead to social disaster if we were to accept the 
proposition that some lives are worth less than others 
and that the treatment of some patients is too arduous 
or too expensive. (Toole, MD, 1971,599). 
Now my point is a very simple one. It is this. We do 
not know with certainty the borderline between life and 
death, and a definition cannot substitute for knowledge ... 
In this state of marginal ignorance and doubt, the only 
course to take is to lean over backward toward the 
side of possible life. (Jonas, ETH, 1974,138) 
Mode of Interpretation 
Each author interpreted the issues involved in death definition 
according to a particular conceptual framework or mode. For the most 
part, the author's mode of interpretation of the issues coincides with 
his disciplinary affiliation. Most physicians either interpreted the 
issue in a medical mode, discussing the determination of death, 
criteria, (62%) or a medical-ethics mode (20%). A few physicians 
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utilized medico-legal or historical modes. Lawyers and lawyer-physicians. 
interpret the issue according to a medicolegal mode, and ethicists 
treated the issue from philosophical, ethical or theological perspectives. 
What Kind of Issue is Redefining Death? 
Almost all articles contain some statements about the kind of 
issue redefined death is and/or about the sorts of competencies re-
quired for making decisions about the new definition. Table 12 gives 
the frequency of each variable in this group. 
Less than one third of the sample as a whole, composed almost 
entirely by physicians and lawyers, stated that definition and determina-
tion are medical issues, requiring medical competencies. Others (41%) 
from all three disciplines said that determination is obviously a 
medical issue, but that the definition of death entailed other 
considerations and competencies. Once again, it is no surprise which 
discipline is associated with which judgment. Physicians assert that 
the issue is medical and requires medical competence. Lawyers held the 
issue to be a medico-legal one, requiring the collaboration of lawyers 
and physicians. Ethicists stated that the issue is bioethical, and 
some physicians and lawyers agreed. 
The question of the time of death, however, is not 
eclusively within the realm of medico-legal concern. 
Today, philosophers, theologians, moralists -- in 
fact, almost everyone is concerned with the question, 
'When is a person dead?'. (Joling, JD, 162) 
The substantial differences between ethicists and the other two groups 
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Table 12. Whose issue is the definition of death? Rounded percentage 
of whol.e sample and breakdown by discipline. 
Cramer's V 
for Di sci-
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics pline x 
N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 whose issue 
1. Determination and 
definition are medical 30.7 51. 3 14.3 0.0 .47 
issues (23) (20) ( 3) ( 0) 
2. Determination is a 
medical issue, defini-
tion involves other 54.7 43.6 71.4 60 
cons i derations (41 ) ( 17) (15 ) ( 9) 
3. Definition is a 49.3 33.3 95.2 26.7 .57 
medico-legal issue ( 37) (13 ) (20) ( 4) 
4. Definition is a bio- 28.0 25.6 23.8 40 
ethical issue (21 ) (10) ( 5) ( 6) 
5. Definition is a social 26.7 15.4 19.0 66.7 .56 
or public issue (20) ( 6) ( 4) (10) 
6. Definition is a 
philosophical and 21.3 7.7 14.3 66.7 .45 
ethical issue (16) ( 3) ( 3) (10) 
7. Definition is a 17.3 15.4 9.5 33.3 
theological issue ( 13) ( 6) ( 2) ( 5) 
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hinge on the fact that more ethicists than laywers or physicians con-
sidered redefining death a philosophical and/or public issue. Ethi-
cists frequently argued that the issue entails careful delineation 
and clarification of meanings, not simply the application of various 
technological competencies or blue-ribbon documents. Another ethicist 
emphasis is that the topic demands public and not just professional 
debate and discussion. Not many definers stated that the issue involves 
theological considerations, and those that did did not specifically 
argue that defining death required theological competence, apart from 
philosophical or ethical competence. 
To go back to the medico-technical framework that "determination," 
rather than "definition", articles are lodged in, we can compare the 
two sorts of articles (determination vs. definition or definition and 
determination) on some of the variables discussed thus far. Most of 
the determination articles were written in a medical mode, and over 3/4 
of these authors consider both determination and definition medical 
issues, perhaps only because they did not adequately distinguish 
between the two topics. Only one fourth of the "definition" articles, 
on the other hand, contain statements that definition and determination 
are medical" issues. Most of these authors stated that determination 
requires medical competencies but that definition entails other con-
siderations. Those that discuss only definition are distinguished from 
those who discuss both aspects or determination only, in that they most 
frequently argue that the issue requires philosophical competence and/ 
or public debate. Those definers concerned with meanings rather than 
methods and applications, more often consider extra-professional 
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competencies important or necessary to the resolution of the issue. 
Perhaps need1 ess to say, most of those writi ng about definition only 
are ethicists. 
Consensus? 
Thus far, the one thing definers seem to agree upon is that 
medical advances and new technologies precipitated the problem to which 
the redefinition of death is a solution. There is some consensus 
that the determination of death is a medical issue, though not everyone 
is willing to agree on that point. Most notably Veatch (1972; 1976) 
and others from the Hastings Group, argue that the essential decision 
involved in determination, i.e. which criteria, when fulfilled, re-
flect the status of human death, entails philosophical and ethical, not 
medical, judgment. As we shall see below, there is little consensus 
across disciplines on the issues involved in defining death and 
remedies for life-prolonging technology problems. 
Kinds of Issues Mentioned 
Definers express various concerns and raise issues while dis-
cussing the topic in their articles. Issues mentioned fall into six 
ca tegori es: 
1. those common to variety of perspectives, e.g. clinical, 
ethical or legal concern for the treatment of the'donor or dying 
patient; 
2. medical issues, e.g. the use of the EEG as a primary method 
for determining death; 
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3. legal issues, e.g. the need of a time of death for distribu-
tion of estates and wills; 
4. ethical issues, e.g. one must not meddle with the donor in 
order to improve the transplant; 
5. philosophical issues, e.g. criteria for determining death 
and a definition or concept of death are not the same things; and 
6. tlieologicaJ issues, e.g. the theological meaning of death, or 
death as when the soul leaves the body. 
Bioethical, philosophical and theological issues were distinguished 
in the following manner. If the issue concerns values and imperatives 
outside of specific reference to a theology or system of religious 
thought, I treated it as a bioethical issue. If the issue refers to 
conceptual confusion, mistakenness or refinement, ~ to metaphysical 
or existential meanings in general (e .. g the meaning of personhood, 
death, etc.) I treated it as a philosophical issue. Theological issues 
are those which refer to theological symbolism, reference to biblical 
text, or to meanings grounded in specifically religious traditions. 
My apologies to those who would make finer or different distinctions 
than I have. 
In Table 13, it can be seen that nearly everyone raises common 
issues, a somewhat tautological point. Two-thirds of the entire 
sample in the following order of frequency -- medicine, law, ethics 
raise medical issues. Most definers found it somewhat necessary to 
raise at least a few medical issues just to discuss redefinition. But 
for the most part, the kinds of issues raised parallel the discipline 
of the author - lawyers raise legal issues, ethicists and some 
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Table13. Kind of issues: Rounded percentage of whole sample and 
breakdown by discipline mentioning general kinds of issues. 
Cramer I s V 
discipline 
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics x kinds of 
N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 issues 
1. Common issues - issues 
common to more than 
one disciplinary 97.3 97.4 95.2 100 
perspective (73) (38) (20) (15 ) 
2. Medical issues 66.7 76.9 61.9 46.7 
(50) (30 ) (13) (7) 
3. Legal issues 52.0 38.5 95.2 26.7 .55 
(39) (15) (20) ( 4) 
4. Bioethical issues 48.0 48.7 23.8 80.0 .38 
(36 ) (19) ( 5) (12 ) 
5. Philosophical issues 33.3 15.4 28.6 86.7 .58 
(25) ( 6) ( 6) (13 ) 
6. Theological issues 13.3 7.7 0.0 46.7 .49 
(10) ( 3) ( 0) (7) 
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physicians raise bioethical issues, and ethicists raise philosophical 
and theological issues. 
Common issues: (See Table 14) The most frequently mentioned 
"common" issue is concern for the transplant recipient and his need. 
In discussions which center around the development of and the need for 
organ transplantation, it is the organ recipient who is of most con-
cern. More authors took their bearings in terms of potential good to 
the recipient than in terms of potential harm to, or concern for, the 
donor (although some authors may not have made a distinction between 
the dying patient and the potential donor). However, some authors 
urged that the potential donor not have his dying interfered with in 
order to obtai n organs. "Mi gh t not the overenthus i asti c heart surgeon 
be tempted to declare the donor dead before death occurred in order to 
have a viable heart to transplant?" (Appel, MD: 513) 
Ethicists frequently oriented their discussions toward the dying 
patient as such, not toward the dying patient as potential donor. 
Several ethicists and physicians argued that the dying patient ought to 
be allowed to die without the imposition of unnecessary treatment, 
(or, in somewhat different words, to die a dignified death). 
We must learn to desist from those useless technological 
interventions and institutional practices that deny 
to the dying what we must owe them - a good end. This 
purpose could be accomplished in large measure by 
restording to medical practice the ethic of allowing a 
a person to die. (Kass, ETH, 1971 ;701) 
In contrast to those who would simply allow a dying person to die, 
a few others advocated the active interruption or stopping of some 
person I s dyi ng. 
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Table 14. Percent of whole sample and breakdown by discipline mention-
ing theme. 
Cramer's V 
associative 
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics discipline 
Common Issues N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 x theme 
l. Concern for trans- 49 51 57 33 
plant recipient (37) (20) (12 ) ( 5) 
2. Advocates allowing to 
die, withdrawing 43 44 29 60 
futile treatment (32) ( 17) ( 6) ( 9) 
3. Concern for protection 36 33 38 40 
of donor (27) (13) ( 8) ( 6) 
4. Concern for the 27 18 14 67 .45 
dying pati ent (20) ( 9) ( 3) (10) 
5. Concern for the threat 
to, or confusion of, 27 15 33 47 .29 
the public (20) ( 6) ( 4) (7) 
6. Transplantation dis- 27 18 52 13 .36 
cussed substantively (20) ( 8) (11 ) ( 2) 
7. Euthanasia discussed 23 13 19 53 .37 
substantively (17) ( 5) ( 4) ( 8) 
8. Allocation of scarce 21 26 14 20 
resources (16 ) (10) ( 3) ( 3) 
9. Death as a process 19 28 10 7 
(14 ) (11 ) ( 2) (1) 
10. Advocates active 
euthanasia in some 17 10 14 27 
circumstances ( 13) ( 4) ( 3) ( 4) 
ll. Distinction between 
passive and active 17 15 14 27 .30 
euthanasia ( 13) ( 6) ( 3) ( 4) 
12. Oeath is an event 15 2.6 19 40 .41 
(11 ) (1) ( 4) ( 6) 
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Table 14 continued. 
Cramer's V 
associative 
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics discipline 
Common Issues N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 x theme 
13. Abortion discussed 13.3 5.1 9.5 40 .39 
substantively ( 10) (2) (2) (6) 
14. Concern for the 
treatment of senile 8 1 0 33 .47 
and retarded ( 6) (2.6) (0) (5) 
Squirm as we may to avoid the inevitable, it seems time 
to admit to ourselves that there is simply no hiding 
place and that we must shoulder the responsibility of 
deciding to act in such a way as to hasten the declining 
trajectories of some lives, while doing our best to 
slow down the decline of others. (Morison, ETH, 697, 
emphasis mine) 
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And a few definers, nearly all of them ethicists, asked what, in the 
current effort to define death, would keep all manner of social 
"undesirables" -- most specifically, the retarded or senile -- from 
being declared dead. 
What of the senile who populate our rest homes and 
mental institutions? Such patients are also a drain 
on family and society. They, took, have a hopeless 
prognosis and have suffered death of portions of their 
brains. Change the legal definition of death a bit 
more and they, took, will be dead! (Toole, MD, 603) 
Definers of all disciplinary persuasions mentioned the problems 
involved in the allocation of scarce resources (organs, respirators, 
etc.): who gets the resources and who makes that decision. 
Some expressed concern (primarily ethicists) that many discussions 
of the redefinition of death would be confusing and threatening to 
the public. Notable emphases were: 1) the tendency to refer to two 
kinds of death, e.g. "heart death" or "brain death" or "legal death" or 
"medical death," and 2) the constant association of transplantation 
and the redefinition of death with the implication that anyone's death 
can be "redefi ned" in order to obtain organs for others. 
The articles were sorted as well in terms of other related topics 
definers discussed in some detail, namely transplantation, euthanasia 
and abortion. Nearly one fourth of the authors spend considerable 
space discussing transplantation and euthanasia. Lawyers were more 
likely to discuss transplantation because it was in the context of 
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transplantation that they argued physicians could be held liable for 
wrongful death. Euthanasia was raised by ethicists primarily, perhaps 
because of their concern with distinguishing the definition of death 
from notions of euthanasia, and their fear of allowing the definition 
debate to get onto the slippery conceptual slopes of euthanasia 
advocacy. Only ten authors discussed abortion, over half of them 
ethicists. 
Death: process or event?: The seemingly simple debate between 
those who consider death a prooess ("Death does not occur at a single 
instant. Death of the cells in various organs can be extended over a 
period of minutes or hours." (Paulson, MD, 39) and those who consider 
death an event hides some rather profound disagreements about the 
interpretation of the issue. If one conceives of dying as a process, 
then one appropriate question is "at what point is the process irrevers-
ible?" Consequently, in determining death one is likely to look for 
the deaths of particular organs, since organs die differentially. A 
more subtle result of this assumption is that once the relative indeter-
minacy of death is granted in arguing that death is a process, questions 
of who is "less dead" or "more dead" arise as well as questions of the 
relative worth of persons in this or that stage of dying. However, if 
one argues that death is an event, one is more concerned with the 
death of the organism as a whole, not the death of the various organs 
and cells; and the focus is on just that, the death of the individual. 
Even though one may recogni~e that tissues and organs 
"die" at different times, this still does not answer 
the question of the death of a person, unless one 
argues misleadingly that the person is the sum of the 
total parts or that the person is a system of cells 
and tissues and nothing more. (High, ETH, 445) 
.... the phenomenon of interest to physicians, legisla-
tors, and laymen alike is human death, therefore the 
statute should concern the death of a human being, not 
the death of his cells, tissues or organs , and not the 
"death" or cessation of his role as a fully func-
tioning member of his family or community. (Capron 
and Kass, LAW and ETH, 104) 
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Authors who view death as an event tended also to argue for 
allowing a person to die all the way, to argue for the sanctity of the 
body, and generally, to be less likely to participate in debates on 
the relative worth of dying persons. As is clear from Table more 
authors consider death a process than an event, and those who do 
consider death an event are primarily ethicists. 
Medical issues: (See Table 15) Over half of all articles mention 
the general criteria for determining death according to brain dysfunctin. 
the time interval used for reassessing the status of the patient, 
cauti on about confus i ng "death" with barbiturate poi soni ng or 
hypothermia, specifics regarding EEG amp1ications, general methods, etc. 
In this regard, more authors showed approval than hesitation over primary 
use of the EEG in death determination. One fourth of the sample (a 
higher proportion among physicians and lawyers than among ethicists) 
expressed concern that in transplant situations, no member of the 
transplant team be responsible for the care of ot the definition of 
the death of the donor. 
Since 1970, some authors have distinguished between whole brain 
and neocortical death, sometimes arguing that the latter is a more 
valid indication of the death of a person than the former, and 
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Table 15. Percent of whole sample mentioning issues and breakdown by 
discipline of author. 
Cramer's V 
for dis-
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics cipline by 
N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 issue 
Medical Issues 
1. The usual specifica-
tions of criteria 
and methods of 53 69 48 20 .38 
determinations (40) (27) (10) ( 3) 
2. Encourages primary 
EEG use 27 41 14 7 .34 
(20) (16 ) ( 3) ( 1) 
3. Hesitant about EEG 20 23 14 20 
use 
(Hi) ( 9) ( 3) ( 3) 
4. Concern that no trans-
plant team member 
care for or declare 25 23 38 13 
death of donor (19) ( 9) ( 8) ( 2) 
5. Distinction between 
whole brain and neo-
cortical or cerebral 20 15 14 40 
death (15 ) (15 ) ( 3) ( 6) 
Legal Issues 
1. Medical liabil ity 31 18 76 0 .63 
of concern ( 23) (7) (16 ) 
2. Present legal defini- 28 13 62 7 .48 
tion inadequate (21) (7) ( 13) ( 1) 
3. Need time of death 25 13 62 7 .52 
for wills, estates (19 ) ( 5) (13 ) (1) 
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Table 15 continued. 
Cramer's V 
for dis-
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics cipline by 
N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 issue 
Bioethical Issues 
l. Persons should be 
allowed to die 35 36 19 53 
humanely (26) (14 ) ( 4) ( 8) 
2. Reference to physician-
patient ethics, con-
tract, ethical codes 31 26 24 53 
in medicine (23) (10) ( 5) ( 8) 
3. The body is sacred, 16 8 5 53 .51 
inviolable (12 ) ( 3) (1) ( 8) 
4. The definition of death 
should not be con-
taminated with prag- 8 0 5 33 .47 
matic concerns ( 6) (1) ( 6) 
Philosophical Issues 
1. Existential or meta-
physical meanings 
of life, death, 27 13 14 80 .60 
personhood (20) ( 5) ( 3) (12 ) 
2. Distinction between 
"when is death" and 12 0 10 47 .54 
"when to allow to die" ( 9) ( 2) (7) 
3. Distinction between 
concept or definition 12 36 14 33 .36 
and criteri a ( 9) (1) ( 3) ( 5) 
4. Identification of 
death of organ with 
death of a person 8 3 5 27 .35 
reductionist mistaken ( 6) (1) (1) ( 4) 
5. Value-free or techno-
logical approach in-
appropriate for this 8 3 0 33 .47 
issue ( 6) 1) ( 5) 
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Table 15 continued. 
Cramer's V 
for dis-
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics cipline by 
N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 issue 
Theological Issues 
l. Th~ological meanings 
or considerations 
involved in concept 11 3 10 53 .38 
of death ( 8) (1) ( 2) ( 8) 
2. Death as departure 11 8 0 33 .55 
of soul from body ( 8) ( 3) ( 5) 
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sometimes criticizing the Harvard criteria (whole brain criteria) as 
being inclusive a method for determining human death. 
With the death of the neocortex, human life is ended 
because the potentiality to reflect consciously is 
eradicated in the organism. (Rizzo, ETH, 23) 
The point is that without the synthesizing function 
of the cerebral cortex (without thought or mind) 
whether before it is present or with its end, the 
person is nonexistent no matter how much the individual's 
brain stem and mid-brain may continue to provide feel-
ings and regular autonomic physical functions. 
(Fletcher, ETH, 1974, 6) 
Assertions'about the essential qualities of human beings frequently 
accompany the distinction between cerebral and whole brain death, 
making this, of all the medical issues, the most morally and conceptually 
ponderous. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is the medical 
issue most frequently raised by the ethicists. It will remain an 
issue for some time to come as more cases like Karen Quinlan's arise. 
Lega 1 issues: (Table].5) The 1 ega 1 arguments ra i sed most often 
are that the potential medical liability in either transplantation or 
withdrawal of treatment situations is of legitimiate concern to 
physicians, and that current legal definitions of death (cf. Blacks 
Dictionary) are inadequate and do not reflect medical knowledge. Also 
at issue in the legal realm is the need for a clearly specified 
standard for determining the time of death for estate and heritance 
1 aws. 
Bioethical jssues: (Table 15) The ethical issues raised most 
often, and by all three disciplines, are 1) that persons should be 
allowed to die humane or dignified deaths and not have their dying 
interfered with and 2) the content of and appeal to the general tenets 
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physician-patient ethics and general medical ethics (such as the 
Hippocractic oath and the AMA ethics code). Most authors when dis-
cussing the latter mentioned merely that one ought to consult or 
consider them, or that the general tenets of such systems or codes 
, 
should still hold in new situations. 
A smaller number of definers, mostly ethicists, raised a third 
bioe.thical issue, that is that the body is a substantial part of what 
we mean by "person" or "human being" and, therefore, organ removal 
for transplantation may undermine the inviolability of the body. De-
fining death solely in terms of brain function ignores the significance 
of the rest of the human body. 
The body isasuniquely the body of this brain and no 
other, as the brain is as uniquely the brain of this 
body and no other ... My identity is the identity of the 
whole organism, even if the higher functions of 
personhood are seated in the brain. How else could a 
man love a woman and not merely her brains? How else 
could we lose ourselves in the aspect of a face? Be 
touched by the delicacy of a frame? .. the body of the 
comatose, so long as -- even with the help of art --
it still breathes, pulses, and functions otherwise 
must still be considered a residual continuance of the 
subject that loved and was loved, and as such is still 
unentitled to some of the sacrosanctity accorded to 
such a subject by the laws of God and men. That 
sacrosanctity decrees that it must not be used as a 
mere means. (Jonas, ETH, 1974, 139) 
Fourth among the bioethical issues is the notion that the definition 
of death should not be designed or enforced with reference to pragmatic 
concerns such as costs, transplantation, or the allocation of scarce 
resources. 
If no persons' death should for this purpose, be hastened, 
then the definition of death should not for this purpose 
be updated, or the procedures for stating that a man has 
died be revised as a means of affording easier access to 
organs. (Ramsey, ETH, 103) 
We need to recover both an attitude that is more 
accepting of death and a greater concern for the 
human needs of the dying patient. But we should 
not contaminate these concerns with the interests 
of relatives, potential transplant recipients or 
"society". To do so would be both wrong and 
dangerous. (Kass, ETH, 1971, 702) 
The contami nati on of the absolute end to a person "s 1 ife with a 
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concern or intent of "meddling with the donor, in order to improve the 
transplant" (Wolstenholme and O'Conner, 1966) is a cause of confusion 
and fear for the lay public. These warnings by ethicists stand in 
opposition to article after article which state that the essential 
reason for redefining death is in order to facilitate transplantation. 
Philosophical issues: (Table 15) Approximately one fourth of the 
definers, mostly ethicists, mentioned that defining death entails 
struggling with philosophical conceptions such as life, death, and 
the nature of humanness (or personhood). 
What it means to be (as a person) and to cease to be 
(as a person) is not just another example of a problem 
of knowledge. It is at the very center of what is 
real, knowable, and of value. (High, ETH, 455) 
The idea of death is at least partly a philosophical 
question, related to such ideas as "organism", 
"human", and "1 iving." Physicians ~ physicians 
are not expert on these philosophical- questions, nor 
are they expert on the question of which physiological 
functions decisively identify a "living human 
organi sm" . (Capron, LAW and Kass, ETH, 94) 
Secondly, seven ethicists have argued that the question "When is 
death?" should be conceptually distinguished from the question "When do 
we allow this person to die?" The close conceptual association between 
the two questions burdened the redefinition issue for a long time with 
issues properly belonging to the realm of euthanasia or caring for the 
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dying, and seems to have mistakenly encouraged the hope that redefining 
death would ease the grotesque problem of "unburied corpses" and 
hopelessly comatose persons much more than it has. 
As Professor David Daube has written, 'The question of 
at what moment it is in order to discontinue extra-
ordinary -- or even ordinary -- measures to keep a 
person alive should not be confused with the question 
at what moment a man is dead" or with the question of 
the procedures by which the presence of life or death 
is to be determined. (Ramsey, ETH, 99) 
Some argued that it is important to distinguish between the concept 
or definition of death and the criteria or procedures utilized to tell 
that a person is dead. Those that did, did so most often to point out 
either that the issue is not merely a technical one, or that one needn't 
discard all the traditional meanings death has had just because 
physicians use new and different criteria to tell when a person had died. 
Additionally, objections were raised to the reductionism implied in 
the notion of "brain death" - in defining death in terms of a single 
organ. These authors argued that what is at issue is the death of 
persons, human beings, or the organism as a whole, not the death of 
organs. 
Finally, among the philosophical points made is the notion that 
primarily medical, scientific or technological approaches to the 
question of death are conceptually, if not ethically, inappropriate 
for the resolution of an essentially moral issue. 
Death is not straightforwardly cashable in empirical 
terms or in empirical criteria. (High, ETH, 454) 
The cowardice of modern secular society shrinks from 
death as an unmitigated evil needs the assurance (or 
fiction) that he is already dead when the decision is 
to be made. The responsibility of a value-laden 
decision is replaced by the mechanis of a value-free 
routi ne. (Jonas, ETH, 139) 
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These issues are conceptually interrelated. Distinguishing be-
tween concept and criteria, for instance, allows for the suggestion 
that the issue is not reducible to technics but involves grappling with 
essential, basic, philosophical meanings of life and death. And the 
physician, qua physician, is not necessarily the person to whom 
responsibility for redefining death should be relegated. Distinguish-
ing between concept and criteria also allows one to conclude that only 
the means or criteria for determining death needs to be updated, and 
not the definition or concept of death. 
Theological 'issues: (Table 1:» Few definers, excepting ethicists, 
mentioned any theological issues. Some mentions were as general as 
stating that theological meanings of death should be addressed in the 
debate. A few authors in discussing traditional meanings of death 
included "the time when the soul leaves the body," and a few ethicists 
discussed the issue of death definition in terms of religious texts. 
It may be an indication of the extent of secularization in our society 
that 85% of the authors, some of whom interpreted the issue philosoph-
ically, conceptually and even ethically, made no mention of religious 
or theological tenets or beliefs. 
Remedies 
Most authors suggested remedies to the problems they discussed. 
(See Table 16). Some remedies are not substantially different from 
issues raised. For example, several authors considered "allowing 
persons to di e" a key issue and a key remedy to the central di ffi culti es 
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Table 16. Remedies: rounded percentage of whole sample and breakdown 
by discipline mentioning the following remedies. 
Cramer's V 
Frequency Medicine Law Ethics (discipline 
N=75 N=39 N=21 N=15 x theme) 
l. Redefine death in 
terms of (whole) 63 77 71 13 .51 
brain function (42) (30) (15 ) ( 2) 
2. Leave the issue 
entirely to medical 
practice and/or train 
physicians in human 40 49 47 7 .34 
va 1 ues, ethi cs (30 ) (19) (10) ( 1) 
3. Advocates allowing 29 21 19 67 .41 
persons to di e (22) ( 8) ( 4) (10) 
4. Legislation 23 13 52 7 .45 
( 17) ( 5) (11 ) ( 1) 
5. Involve the public 
in consideration of 20 
the issue (15 ) 
6. More research, new 16 21 9.5 13.3 
technologies (12) ( 8) ( 2) ( 2) 
7. Leave definition of 13 8 29 7 .28 
death to the courts (10) ( 3) ( 6) (1) 
8. Establish interdisci-
pl inary of 1 ay 
committees to make 13 10 0 40 .41 
decisions (10) ( 4) ( 6) 
9. Respect the sanctity 
of the human bodY, use 
caution with redefin- 12 5 0 47 .54 
ition ( 9) ( 2) (7) 
10. Advocates stopping 11 10 5 20 
dying in some instances ( 8) ( 4) (1) ( 3) 
ll. Redefine death in terms 
of neocortical or 8 10 0 13 
cerebral function ( 6) ( 4) ( 2) 
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a redefinition of death could mitigate, i.e. undignified dying and 
futile treatment. Other remedies are indeed different from the issues 
(e.g. legislation) discussed so far. The remedies suggested focus on 
two clearly distinguishable issues: 1) who should decide, and 2) what 
should be done. 
Over half (63%) of the group suggested redefining death in terms 
of brain function, and only a few argued that the definition should be 
refined to assess only neocortical, and not merely, whole brain func-
tion. In other words, all but about 20 definers advocated a redefini-
tion with no hesitancy. On that point, there is considerable consensus, 
although obviously definers came to that conclusion via different 
conceptual avenues. And 40% of the definers thought that the redefini-
tion issue should be left entirely in the hands of medical practitioners. 
Some others (20% - primarily ethicists) advocated restoring the prac-
tice of "allowing" terminal patients to die, but only a few (11%) 
advocated active euthanasia, actively shortening the dying process in 
some instances. Some physicians and over half the lawyers argued 
that legislation would be the answer, a few arguing that the issue 
should be debated in a public forum and before a public body and most 
others arguing that transplant physicians should be protected by law. 
Only a few suggested that the courts would be the most appropriate 
arena for resolving the definition of death debate. 
About 20% thought that the issue should be open for general 
public debate and discussion, since the definition of death is pre-
sumably an issue which affects and is of substantial interest to us 
all, Establishing lay and/or interdisciplinary committees to make 
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decisions to "pull the pl ug" or to allocate resources was mentioned by 
only 10 definers. Consistent with their stands throughout, most 
ethicists argue conservatively for allowing persons to die (rather 
than interfering with the dying process), for respecting the sanctity 
of the body, and for taking the decision-making and responsibility 
out of the hands of the physician. 
Consensus? 
Most definers agreed that modern technological advances in 
medicine have created a problem not easily foreseen, namely, the fact 
of unburied corpses whose hearts still beat and who breathe with the 
aid of a respirator; and most agreed that redefining death in terms of 
brain, rather than heart or respiratory function, was the first step 
towards a solution. Other than that, they differ widely with respect 
to their major concerns and values, their attributions of responsibility 
and competence, and their views on how to solve the many other prac-
tical, legal and moral problems. Some take their bearings from the 
point of view of the dying patient, others from the point of view of the 
family or the community, and still others from the point of view of 
other dying patients esperately in need of new organs. And added to 
this particular matrix of concerns are professional orientations which 
variously emphasize medical, legal, ethical or philosophical approaches 
and definitions. Once could say, at one level, there is some minimal 
amount of consensus for a group as diverse as this one, and at another 
level, using a finer mesh, one could say that across and even within 
di sci pl i nes, defi ners have wi de ly di sparate vi ews on the topi c, as wi 11 
become obvious in the next two sections. 
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Results of the Clustering Analysis: 
The Dying Patient vs. the Common Good 
The elements of the content analysis were subjected to an analysis 
in which all elements appearing most often together (apart from their 
location in particular articles) were amalgamated. I have called the 
resulting clusters of themes "conceptual approaches" although that 
phrase stretches what the clusters of elements or themes are in fact. 
Each cluster represents consensus on an approach to the topic but is 
not neatly composed of a reason or two, a statement about what kind of 
issue redefining death is considered to be, a few central issues and a 
remedy; but the clusters and their relationships do represent lines of 
agreement and, as we will see, there are several. 
The different clusters and their elements appear in Table 17. Fig-
ure 4 is a clustergram representing the relationships among the clus-
ters, and those most strongly associated are closest together. In 
addition, they have been listed in Table 17 in order of closest associa-
tion. (That is, clusters A-D are closely related and more closely 
related to E-G than to H-K, or, in other words, authors who expressed 
themes present in the first four clusters did not often express themes 
in the last few.) 
Clusters A-D: The Philosophical-Ethical Approach: One Side of the Story 
The first four clusters comprise the general philosophical-ethical 
approach, patient-centered in orientation and containing the conserva-
tive "sanctity of life" conceptualization. The first cluster, 
"Hastings Center clarity" includes many of the points made by members 
of the Hastings Center Research Group on Death and Dying. Cluster B 
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Table 17. Results of the cluster analysis of themes present in 
definers articles. 
Cluster A: Hastings Center clarity 
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Distinction between "When is death?" and "When to allow to die?" 
Distinction between concept or definition and criteria 
Identification of death of organ with death of a person is reduction-
ist, mistaken 
Definition of death should not be contaminated with pragmatic concerns 
Reference to physician-patient ethics, contract or ethical cDdes in 
medicine 
Concern for the threat to, or confusion of, the public 
Cluster B; Sanctity of the body approach 
The definition of death is not needed, or presents serious ethical/ 
conceptual problems 
Respect the sanctity of the human body, use caution as remedy 
The body is sacred, inviolable 
Concern for the dying patient 
Concern for the treatment of senile and retarded 
Death is an event 
Death as departure of the soul from the body 
Cluster C: Leftovers from A and B 
The issue is philosophical/ethical 
Existential or metaphysical meanings - of life, death, personhood 
Technological or "value-free" approach inappropriate for this issue 
Advocates allowing to die as a remedy 
Cluster D: Theological orientation 
Euthanasia discussed substantively 
Distinction between active and passive euthanasia 
Abortion discussed substantively 
Theological meanings and considerations 
Cluster E: Involve the public approach 
The issue is a public issue 
The issue is theological 
Involve the lay public in the issue 
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Tab 1 e 117 conti nued. 
Concern for the· protection of the donor 
Establish interdisciplinary or lay committees to make decisions as 
remedy 
Cluster F: Death with dignity approach 
Death should be redefined in order to let persons die humanely 
Death should be redefined in order to cease useless or futile pro-
longation of life 
Persons should be allowed to die humanely 
Advocates allowing to die or withdrawing futile treatment 
Cluster G: General medical ethics approach 
Death should be defined in terms of the higher human functions 
Death is a process 
The issue is bioethica1 
Concern that no transplant team member care for, or declare death of 
donor 
Cluster H: Society-centered approach 
Death should be redefined in order to !'litigate burden 
Death shou1 d be redefined in order to miti gate burden 
community 
Allocation of scarce resources 
Advocate hastening or stopping dying in some instances 
Advocates stopping dying in some instances as remedy 
Encourages EEG use 
Cluster I: Medical approach 
on the family 
on the 
Death should be redefined in order to facilitate transplantation 
The issue is medical 
Usual specifications of criteria and methods of determination of 
death 
Concern for transplant recipient 
Hesitancy ab()ut use of EEG 
Death should be defined in terms of whole brain function as a 
remedy 
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Table 17 continued. 
Cluster J: Legal approach 
Death should be redefined in order to facilitate heart transplanta-
tion 
Determination only is a medical issue 
The issue is medico-legal 
Present legal definitions are inadequate 
Need time of death for insurance, wills 
Transplantation discussed substantively 
Legislation advocated as a remedy 
Cluster K: Neocortical death 
Distinction between whole brain and neocortical death 
More research, new technologies as a remedy 
Redefine death in terms of neocortical function as a remedy 
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representi ng the "sanctity of the body" approach, although closely 
related to A, contains fewer philosophical statements and more conserva-
tive ethical statements than A. General philosophical issues which 
are associated with those in A and B, but not strongly enough to be 
included in those clusters, comprise cluster C. Cluster D implies 
that authors who discussed euthanasia, also discussed abortion fre-
quently in terms of theological considerations. 
Because this general approach is comprised of four clusters, no 
entire approach is contained in anyone cluster, unlike several of the 
others (see the "medical" or "legal" clusters). For that reason, I 
have combined the four into an approach complete with reasons, 
remedies, issues, etc. which appears in Table 18. 
Clusters E-G: The Midst 
Not as strongly interrelated as the previous four clusters are 
clusters E-G which are grouped together primarily because they fall 
between the patient-centered (A-D) and the society-centered approaches 
(H-I). From the "death with dignity" approach (Fl, one can easily slip 
into a society-centered position, a medical position, and even into a 
patient-centered approach. Several authors found nothing inconsistent 
about arguing for both the dignity of the dying and for the benefits 
incurred by others in their dying. The path one takes presumably de-
pends on whether one holds that death should be redefined to allow the 
dying to die or to withdraw futile treatment and make scarce resources 
accessible to others. One has the suspicion, however, that respect for 
humane dying can slip quickly into an enforcement - a notion that one 
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Table 18. Philosophical-ethical approach (combining clusters A-D). 
A. Reasons for a redefinition of death: 
1. The redefinition of death is not needed, or presents serious 
ethical/conceptual problems 
B. What sort of issue is the redefinition of death? 
1. A philosophical/ethical issue 
C. Issues raised/stands taken 
Common issues 
1. Concern for the threat to, or confusion of, the public 
2. Concern for the dying patient 
3. Concern for treatment of senile and retarded 
4. Death as an event (not a process) 
5. Euthanasia discussed substantively 
6. Distinction between active and passive euthanasia 
7. Abortion discussed substantively 
No medical or legal issues 
Bioethical issues 
1. The definition of death should not be contaminated with pragmatic 
concerns 
2. Reference to physician/patient contract, ethics 
3. The body is sacred, inviolable 
Philosophical issues 
1. Distinction between "When is death?" and "When to allow to die?" 
2. Distinction between concept and criteria 
3. Identification of death or organ with death of person reductionist 
mistake 
4. Existential or metaphysical meanings of life, death, personhood 
5. Value-free or technological/scientific approach in appropriate 
for an ethical issue 
Theological issues 
1. Theological meanings and considerations 
2. Death as departure of soul from body 
Table 18 continued. 
D. Remedies 
1. Respect the sanctity of the human body, use caution with 
redefi niti on 
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2. Advocates a 11 owing to di e, wi thdrawi ng futil e treatment as a 
remedy 
246 
perhaps ought to die to make scarce resources available. Perhaps a 
"right to die" can turn into a duty to do so (cf. Kass, 1972; Veatch, 
1976). As mentioned previously, the "involve the public" approach (E) 
appears in both philosophical-ethical arguments and legal arguments. 
Of these three clusters, the "medical-ethics" cluster (G) is most closely 
al igned with F, the "death with dignity" approach and to the "society-
centered" and "medical" approaches. 
Clusters H-I: The Society-Centered and Medical Approaches: 
The Other Side of the Story 
In Cl uster H we find most of the items whi ch comprise a "society-
centered" or "common good" approach to redefining death, including 
attention to the allocation of scarce resources and all other considera-
tions external to the dying patient, except obtaining organs for 
transplantation. The "medical" cluster (I) focuses on items of concern 
to physicians as well as the notion that death should be redefined in 
order to afford easier access to transplant organs and concern for the 
transplant recipient. Both clusters contain items negatively associated 
with items in Clusters A-D. 
'The Remaining Clusters J and K: The "Legal" and 
"Neocorti cal" Approaches 
These two clusters have nothing in common other than that both lie 
to some extent outside the patient centered-society centered dimension. 
The "neocortical" cluster contains items regarding neocortical as opposed 
to whole brain death, and is related only minmally to the medical 
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cluster. The "legal" approach, associated with items in both the 
"involve the public" and the "medical" approaches, reflects lawyers' 
interest in legislation to protect physicians from liability from 
wrongful death. Many of the legal issues appear with medical issues 
because most lawyers echoed physicians' interests but asserted the 
necessity of updating the legal definition of death through legislation. 
It would be mistaken to assert that the clusters do not overlap 
with one another, or, that the "common good" clusters contain no 
elements related to those in the "patient-centered" or "sanctity of the 
body" clusters, or, even more to the point, that authors concerned 
with the sanctity of the bOdY, for instance, are not also concerned 
with humane dying or the potential benefits of transplantation. The 
clusters are both abstractions -- they do not reflect any particular 
amalgamation of themes found in a specific article -- and fictions of 
sorts. However, given these hesitations (as well as the current 
state of dissertation funds and network methodology) this is more or 
less what the thematic patchwork of the article sample looks like. 
Conceptual Approach and Social Organization 
The relationship of the conceptual approaches and the social 
organization obtained in the last chapter is a difficult one to specify. 
Posing the problem in terms of a question which asks which is primary 
or most determining in the relationship practically assures a chicken-
and-egg solution. There is no way, apart from applying scarce 
interview notes on the topic for me to come to grips with the follow-
ing question: Did respondents approach the issue in a certain way 
co 
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because they were members of a specific discipline or group or did they 
join the discipline or group because of a basic value or epistemo-
logical orientation which would influence both the choice of a 
discipline and the interpretation of the definition of death? 
Similarly, one might ask, did respondents approach the issue in a 
certain conceptual style because they had been included in a particular 
symposium roster because they had a specific approach to the issue? 
No doubt some persons of similar conceptual persuasions come together 
and some of those who are related by discipline or other organizational 
variables express similar persuasions -- a conclusion of questionable 
insight and merit. 
Conceptual approach and social networks. The most simple 
question to manage is, what sorts of conceptual approaches are 
associated with the sociometric networks? Many of the people who 
utilize the same approaches are clustered together sociometrically. 
By now, it is clear which kinds of approaches go with which disciplines, 
and in the last chapter, it was stated that the sociometric clusters 
are at least somewhat organized according to disciplinary parameters. 
Figures 5-7 show the sociometric clustergrams for the three 
major ties with the major approaches utilized by the members of each 
cluster imposed on the,cluster area. The first impression received by 
looking at them is that the ethics clusters on the left sides of the 
sociometric clustergrams are most closely associated with conceptual 
cl usters A-D, the pati ent-centered and ethi cs approaches. Li kewise, 
the right sides of each clustergram go together, so that the neurolo-
gists and lawyers are most closely associated with the society-centered, 
--
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medical and legal approaches. In the middle of the sociograms, i.e., 
the "general medicine area", there are a few "involve the public" 
approaches (E) some "death with dignity" (F) and "medical ethics" (G) 
approaches, as well as some general medical and legal approaches (I 
and J, respectively). It is the general physician clusters which link 
the ethics and neurology-law clusters, and it is the members of those 
cl usters who uti] i zethe approaches whi ch fa 11 into the trans iti ona 1 
conceptual space between the patient-centered and society-centered 
arguments. 
On second impression, it is obvious that this matching of thematic 
and sociometric clusters is a bit oversimple and overgeneral. Clearly, 
some members of the ethics clusters utilize society-centered approaches 
and at least a couple of neurologists and general physicians use 
strong patient-centered, medical ethics, and death with dignity 
approaches. 
When discipline and conceptual approach do not coincide, assessing 
what factors might be at work in determining either approach or 
organization is a matter of some speculation. A respondent's intellec-
tual tastes and attractions, his deep value orientations, chance 
intellectual meetings, exposures and the like, all could be factors 
which could account for an approach to this issue which is different 
from one's disciplinary colleagues. And these are factors which I did 
not include in the questionnaire. 
First, how do the different social ties respondents have bear 
on the relation? In the network, Contact, influence is not at issue, 
just contact of some kind is. Most of the clusters which contain 
p 
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persons of varied disciplines and approaches can be readily explained 
by participation on the same symposium rosters or committees. In 
other words, social organization accounts for persons with different 
approaches showing up in the same clusters on Contact. 
Differences for Importance are another story. This is the social 
tie on which respondents chose persons of other disciplinary and con-
ceptual persuasions most often. Importance refers to, by definition 
and direction to respondents, provocation, aid and influence, and I can 
assume that at least some of the provocation, aid and influence is 
conceptual and not social. Many respondents considered authors they 
had not contacted, or who were not professional friends, important. 
Participation on research committees and the process of conducting 
research includes conceptual wrestling, at least some of the time, 
with conceptual opponents. As one respondent put it, "To a great 
extent, I believe, people with opposite views to mine have been most 
instrumental in sharpening my own views." It is not surprising, then, 
that respondents followed directions and considered persons who were 
provocative as important, i.e., who took different or opposing 
approaches. 
The directions for both Contact and Importance refer to the re-
definition issue in particular, but directions for Professional 
Friendship do not. And for the most part, persons who chose others 
with different approaches on the other two ties, chose their own 
disciplinary colleagues on Friendship. It seems that the longer period 
of involvement with one's professional colleagues in school and work-
places, at professional meetings and the like determines choices on 
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Friendship -- not the conceptual or social relations formed while 
debating the definition of death. Only the Hastings Group chose 
persons with other approaches (their committee colleagues) on Friend-
ship. And as noted before, the intensity of the conceptual and social 
involvements on this committee have set this group apart from others 
in a number of respects. 
Social organizational factors (disciplinary membership, participa-
tion on committees, in symposia) do shape conceptual approach, no doubt. 
On the question of conceptual influence or importance in turn shaping 
the establishment of social ties and organization, I can relay one story 
which implies that exposure to important conceptualizations of an 
issue can result in theformation of other social relationships. One 
informant spent considerable time relating to me the history of his 
intellectual involvement with defining death. During medical school he 
had ties with both a professor and a friend who introduced him to the 
philosophy of biology and organism and Aristotle's, Ethics. These 
experiences led to a developing interest in the relation of ethics, 
philosophy and medicine. He actively sought out persons interested in 
the same relation, particularly, persons who conceptualized the relation 
similarly. Eventually, they all ended up on a committee together to 
discuss this issue. Intellectual experience and conceptual style can 
stimulate the formation of some of social ties, some of them quite 
strong. We all know that; we've.all had similar histories. 
Some other respondents named a variety of historically significant 
thinkers whose work had been significant to them in establishing their 
conceptual orientation to defining death: Whitehead, Tillich, Arendt, 
--
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M. Polyanyi, Neibuhr, Heidegger, Jaspers and Aristotle. More often, 
respondents mentioned local, disciplinary colleagues. No doubt 
respondents view their own intellectual histories differently, some 
placing their involvement squarely in a tradition of intellectual 
history, others lodging their in their disciplinary training and daily 
professional experience -- one of the several differences between 
ethicists and their few lawyer and physician associates and the rest of 
the respondent sample. 
Conceptual approach and religion: While discussing one cultural 
variable writ large, intellectual influence, let's turn to another 
cultural variable assessed in the questionnaire: the importance of the 
respondents' religions. Do respondents who argue the patient-centered 
or philosophical-ethical line differ from those who argue the society-
centered, medical and legal lines according to their religion's 
importance? In a word, No. 
I take two reasons stated by respondents - that death shoul d be 
redefined in order to facilitate transplantation and that death should 
not be redefined or that doing so presents serious problems - to be 
good predictors of the two orientations, respectively. The first - to 
facilitate transplantation - is negatively associated with elements 
of the patient-centered approach and substantively associated with 
elements of the society-centered approach. The opPosite holds true for 
the position that redefinition is not needed. Moreover, these two 
reasons are conceptually central to both positions. 
Collapsing the five point religious importance scale to a three-
point scale, the reasons and religious importance are compared in 
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Table 19. Little difference between authors who present either reason 
in their assessment of the important of their religion hold, except 
that fewer who question the need to redefine death feel so-so about 
the important of their religions, and more state that their religions 
are unimportant. 3 
Conceptual approach, ethicists, and the elite: I can approach 
the problem once more by asking who choose authors who have other 
approaches? Primarily, it is ethicists and the elite who do, along 
with those who had been involved in creative working committees (there 
is considerable overlap among the elite, the ethicists, and committee 
associates). I would suggest that it is ethicists and/or ethically 
oriented physicians and lawyers who do, because it is against the 
opposing points of view - the prevailing medico-legal consensus -
that they sharpened their stances. 
The same dynamic of opposition seems to have worked for committee 
members, especially the members of the Hastings Research Group on 
Death and Dying. They set up several public debates in which persons 
argued from differing points of view, the most widely known of which 
is the Kass-Morison debate published in Science. I was told of other 
debates of somewhat longstanding known to the committee members, and 
in particular of one, between Paul Ramsey and Henry Beecher. More 
fittings representatives of the patient-centered (Kass, Ramsey) and 
society-centered (Morison, Beecher) perspectives would be difficult to 
find. 
The elite also chose others with different conceptual approaches 
than their own. Perhaps there is a professional obligation to (or 
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Table 19. Religion importance by reason to redefine death (in rounded 
percentages. 
Religion Importance 
Reason for redefining 
death Important So-So Not important Total 
l. Redefine death to 
facilitate trans- 56 17 22 100 
plantation ( 23) (7) (11 ) (41) 
2. Do not redefi ne 
death or serious 53 6 41 100 
problems ( 9) (1 ) (7) ( 17) 
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interest in) taken into account another "well known's" work, whether 
or not it meshes with one's owo. The elite also happen to be those for 
whom disciple and approach coincide least often. In their various 
intellectual travels and wanderings, they may have more occasion to be 
exposed to other points of view than those which tend to be associated 
with their discipline than the non-elite. In this study, at any rate, 
the elite are more intellectually cosmopolitan, ;n terms of both what 
and whom they know. 
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Endnotes 
lThroughout, when quotations supplement the text, the respondent's 
last name, discipline, and the page on which the quotation is found 
are all the reference elements given. A bibliography of all 
respondent articles used in the analysis is given on p. 
2Mos t authors who mention "to allow to die" (85%) also mention 
"to cease useless prolongation". In other words, those concerned with 
the dying person also express concern that useless prolongation of 
life be stopped. However, the opposite is not the case: Less than 
half of those mentioning "cease useless prolongation" also mentioned 
"allow to die". Several who had the physician's or community's concern 
in mind (the allocation of resources) did not also explicitly emphasize 
concern for the patient from his perspective. 
3I suspect that if I had approached the respondents with a differ-
ent query about their religious beliefs, in an interview or, in some 
other than the standard demographic questionnaire format, a different 
relation might have emerged. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE POLICY-MAKERS AND DEFINER/POLICY-MAKER INTERACTION 
The formation of social policy has been discussed in many contexts, 
though not often in terms of interpersonal or of formal communication. 
The interpersonal communication which precedes the introduction of a 
bill to a state legislature, and the testimony at committee hearings and 
the consultation with experts that continue after the bill is introduced 
are all important communication activities which underlie the enactment 
of policy. In this chapter, I will introduce the policy-makers con-
tacted for this study and describe their occupations and political 
affiliations, as well as definer/policy-maker interaction. 
The Policy-Makers: Who They Are 
I was able to contact drafters or sponsors of brain death statutes 
in the five states already discussed. As mentioned previously, after 
repeated attempts, I was unable to contact anyone integral to the 
passage of the Alaska statute. Eighteen out of 22 persons whom I con-
tacted, responded for interviews and/or to a questionnaire (82%). Half 
of the 18 who were major figures involved in successful legislation 
efforts are physicians, including two medical school administrators, 
two neurosurgeons, two physician legislators and three nephrologists, 
or kidney transplant surgeons. Two are lawyer-physicians. Of the 
remaining seven, four were legislators and four were connected with the 
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state attorney general's office as either assistant or deputy attorneys 
general. Of all those in public office, six are democrats and three 
are republicans. 
Physicians provided the primary impetus and organization for bills 
in Kansas, Maryland and New Mexico. The bills suggested by the physi-
cians were introduced to the legislative body by legislators with strong 
connections with local university medical schools. The Virginia statute 
was drafted and organized from within the attorney general's office by 
two assistant attorneys general who had cou,nseled the defense in 
Tucker v. Lower; the bill was introduced to the legislature by a physi-
cian legislator who was a friend of one of the drafters. California's 
statute was the result of a complex collaboration among the state 
attorney general's office and a committee organized by that office with 
five active members, including a representative from Attorney General 
Younger's office, two kidney transplant surgeons, a legislator previ-
ously associated with Shumway's transplant program at Stanford 
University, and a lawyer-physician. 
Physicians involved in the legislative efforts provided a few 
functions--as organizers, expert consultants, or witnesses, or as direct 
links to their legislatures. Some of the lawyers and legislators became 
involved because of strong ties to local university medical schools, out 
of personal interest, or through direct contact with the issue in court 
cases. Other legislators were identified with the bill simply through 
normal legislative duty. Some expressed little knowledge of this highly 
complex and rather profound issue--making statements which are both 
amusing and alarming: "Recalling specifics on one relatively minor 
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piece (of legislation) like this is difficult"; "I really didn't do very 
much on it"; and "You aren't going to ask me any tough questions, are 
you, ma' am? I'm jus t a cowboy!" 
Definer/Policy-Maker Interaction 
A little over one-third of the definers (36%) participated in 
policy-making activities with regard to redefining death. Most served 
as expert consultants or witnesses at legislative hearings or committee 
meetings. Three opposed legislation as private citizens in their com-
munities, and three drafted or authored bills. Only a few who indicated 
legislative involvement are identified with the enactment of the five 
statutes incl uded in tlli s study. Others parti ci pated in efforts either 
which did not succeed (Massachusetts, New York) or which were successful 
between 1974 and the spring of 1976, when the questionnaires were mailed 
(Georgia, Michigan, West Virginia, Oregon, Louisiana). 
Defining death is not exactly one's everyday legislative affair, 
and one might think that policy-makers would familiarize themselves with 
the professional literature and/or seek the assistance of those persons 
or committees who had made the greatest contributions to legitimating 
and explicating the issue. But how much interaction between definers 
and policy-makers was there--or, in terms of this study, how socially 
integrated are the two stages, defining and policy-making, of institu-
tionalization of the definition of death? The two stages, defining and 
policy-making, were not as socially integrated as they might have been. 
Sustained collaboration between definers and policy-makers did not occur 
as often as it should have, given the subtle and intricate nature of the 
issue. Legislators and even physicians do not necessarily have the 
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competencies, ~ legislators and physicians, to fully define the issue. 
Though not one of the imperatives of policy-forming, in each state 
there were some instances of policy-maker/definer interaction. A few 
policy-makers, primarily physicians or physician-lawyers, indicated 
social ties to physician definers. I suspect that the ties were formed 
in the context of professional associations, rather than in the context 
of redefining death. Other pol icy-makers only had ties with their local 
cohorts. Two participants in the Tucker v. Lower case, the judge and 
the medical examiner, later wrote articles on the issues involved in the 
case. William Sweet of the Harvard Committee and Joseph Fletcher, an 
ethicist definer, each contributed to the decision in that case. Four 
other definers functioned as policy-makers. Mills co-authored the first 
statute enacted in Kansas and authored the California statute. Another, 
chair of the NINDS collaborative study, was head of a committee to 
establish legislative policy in New Mexico (Walker). The task force 
established by Evelle Younger in California included three definers, the 
author of the final version of the California statute among them. In 
addition, members of Younger's task force contacted a member of the 
Hastings Center Research Group on Death and Dying (Capron) who had co-
authored a statutory alternative to the model Kansas statute (cf. Capron 
and Kass, 1972) though they did not adopt the alternative. 
Though there were these instances, it was not really the case that 
policy-making was executed with reference either to the professional 
literature or to contact with the definers. Definers' (usually ethi-
cists') efforts in publishing articles calling, 1) for open public 
discussion or 2) the careful consideration of ethical and conceptual 
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problems, had little, if ~ bearing on policy-making. In three of the 
five states, policy-making was not accompanied by widespread public 
\ 
debate and discussion. In Kansas and New Mexico the statutes were 
enacted through the considerable social and political engineering con-
ducted by the states' medical schools. Only in the presence of widely 
publicized court cases concerning physician liability in transplant 
situations (Virginia and California) were the bills discussed vocifer-
ously in public arenas. In all states, policy-making was accomplished 
in or with reference to clinical and courtroom settings; in a sense, the 
legislature's only function was to stamp the pre-determined policy with 
legal authority. Medical needs and opinion dominated policy-making in 
all cases, in part because the policy issue was the facilitation of 
transplantation and legal protection for medical school transplant 
programs. 
In their 1972 critique of the Kansas statute and legislative 
proposal, Capron and Kass mention several problems which might be 
incurred if the redefinition of death were to be legislated. Among them: 
" ... the possibility that the statutes enacted may reflect primarily 
the interests of powerful lobbying groups - for example, state medical 
societies or transplant surgeons" (p. 100). The groups were associated 
with university medical schools and budding transplant programs, rather 
than state medical societies, but otherwise their warning characterized 
legislative efforts through 1974. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
After discussing the social organization of the definers and their 
varying conceptual approaches to the issue, the question remains --
what facilitated and constrained the process of institutionalization, 
or what are its dynamics? In this chapter I will discuss the medical 
and conceptual evolution of the first stage and the evolution of policy 
in the second stage, and suggest that part of what is meant by insti-
tutionalization is diffusion. In addition, I will describe the role 
of the elite in both stages. Finally, the dynamics of the two stages 
are compared to assess what factors prohibit the integration of the 
two stages and consensus. 
Stage I: Medical Evolution 
Technology 
Quite obviously, but not less interestingly, knowledge and mean-
ings change when technological developments prod them. As stated in 
Chapter 3, the death of the brain could not be recognized until new 
technologies made it possible to arrest the death of the organism as a 
whole (with resuscitation and respirators) and to assess brain activity 
otherwise not discernible by the clinician (with the EEG). The concep-
tualization of death changed when it became possible to discern 
separately functioning physiological systems that could not be discerned 
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previously -- the electrical activity of the brain and the mechanical 
substitution for the lungs pumping a heart in a body which also con-
tained what was subsequently found to be a liquefied brain. New facts 
about physiology and the brain stimulated the reexamination of the 
relation between cardio-respiratory function, brain function and death. 
However, the meaning of death was not widely discussed until the use of 
these new technologies created new social and mora~ problems and until 
the redefinition of death was conceived as a means for the execution 
of still another medical technology -- organ transplantation. 
The Significant Statements 
The medical contributions to the process of institutionalization 
consist of specifying the problems in using respiratory and resuscita-
tive and transplantation technologies, explicating the nature of 
irreversible coma and brain death, and delimiting and refining the 
criteria for determining that a brain is not functioning. The 
significant steps in the medical development are, above all, the 
European neurologists' early explications of "coma depasse" (Fischgold 
and Mathis, 1959; ~lo11aret et al., 1959), Hamlin's address, "Life or 
Death by EEG", before the 1964 meeting of the AMA, the Ciba symposium 
(1966), the Harvard Report (1968), the Declaration of Sydney (1968) 
and the NINDS collaborative study (1975). The single item of most 
significance which stands out beyond all others is the Harvard Report. 
The medical evolution, like the conceptual evolution, took a path 
of increasing differentiation. This is a relatively simple and 
obvious point -- that as issues evolve, they become differentiated 
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from other issues and are increasingly refined. Irreversible coma 
becomes differentiated from brain death or the death of a person 
according to whole brain criteria, and "whole brain death" becomes 
distinguished from neocortical or cerebral death. A "flat EEG" becomes 
distinguished from an "isoelectric EEG" and the latter is indicative 
of "electrocerebral silence" not isomorphic with irre_versible coma 
or brain death. But before these distinctions could be made, before 
refinements and critiques could be made, before alternative criteria 
could be established, before the phenomenon of cerebral death could be 
explicated, some general statement of procedures and definition of 
whole brain death was required: this was the primary function of the 
Harvard Report. And the Report was not just significant as a statement 
or explication of the issue against which other steps might be taken, 
but was also significant as one made by a blue-ribbon committee of 
Harvard Medical School and University faculty, one which would elicit, 
as well as represent, widespread legitimacy and consensus in the 
medical community. What was needed at the time was not just an expli-
cation, but one made by a body with reputation and clout and published 
in a national medical journal with good circulation. This was, I 
believe, Beecher's vision, and the vision of some of his committee 
colleagues. After that was accomplished -- the gathering of medical 
and legal evidence and thought up to that time into an explicit set of 
notions, practices and recommendations -- others could respond in 
terms of it: Jonas, Ramsey and the Hastings Group; those who felt the 
criteria were too strict (the NINDS committee); those who later 
advocated a cerebral definition of death; those who argued for greater 
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reliance on angiography; and those who favored legislation. 
The Harvard criteria are whole brain criteria, and the effort to 
draw attention and legitimacy to cerebral death (death only of the 
cerebral cortex as opposed to the whole brain and spinal reflexes) 
marks further differentiation in the process of evolution of the medi-
cal side of the issue. Brierley's 1971 publication in Lancet seems to 
have stimulated discussion and controversy regarding the desirability 
of updating the brain criteria further to declare dead those patients 
who breathe spontaneously but whose cerebrums are "ruined". Of course, 
the Karen Quinlan case vividly illustrated the inadequacy of the 
Harvard criteria for managing cases like hers, as does the fact of 
patients who are not quite alive but who breathe spontaneously. In 
the latter '70s one of the issues of most controversy is the desira-
bility or the practical feasibility (in terms of establishing clearly 
reliable indications of a destroyed cerebrum) of using cerebral death 
as a primary criterion for determining death (see Korien, 1978). 
The Plot Thickens: Conceptual and Ethical Development 
Other strains of interest emerged when lawyers and ethicists 
entered the discussions, enlarging the parameters and thickening the 
conceptualization of the topic. To trace the evolution of an issue or 
to discuss the institutionalization of an issue in general entails 
specifying a path of diffusion. For an issue to evolve and become 
legitimated, it must spread to different persons or groups of persons. 
But to trace, even to specify, all the conceptual differentiation and 
evolution of a topic as complex as this one is a ponderous, if not also 
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a clumsy task. Therefore, I will trace the diffusion of only two 
points: a) that redefining death with an avowed purpose is morally 
objectionable and b) that the questions When is death? and When should 
a person be allowed to die? are distinct and should be kept separate 
in discussion and policy. The first of these assertions is ethical in 
kind, the second, conceptual and differentiating. 
The Significance of Opposition 
Most early discussion of redefining death proceeded with no ques-
tion of the assumption that redefining death was an entirely appropriate 
action in response to the problems of prolonging life and transplanta-
tion. Most objections to that assumption came from ethicists and a 
couple of lawyers (neurologist James Toole, 1967 and especially 1971, 
" a glaring exception) -- first, to my knowledge, from theologic lawyer 
David Daube during the Ciba symposium in 1964, subsequently from Hans 
Jonas at the AAAS meeting in 1968, from Paul Ramsey in the Lyman 
Beecher lectures at Yale in 1969 and from other ethicists, especially 
those members of the Hastings Research Group on Death and Dying. 
Thus, my first generalization regarding "what got the issue going" 
is: the issue developed substantially when tension against the medical 
consensus was expressed. The two points partially constitute arguments 
against that consensus. As Daube first presented them: 
Still, the special interest of transplanters does intro-
duce an ethical and ultimately legal facet -- the question of, 
one might say, trust ... it is arguable that precisely 
because of this pronounced interest of transplanters ... far 
from extending the notion of death, we should, on the contrary, 
be doubly cautious and rather restrict. A redefinition with 
an avowed purpose might well create doubts in the mind of the 
layman; he might fear that there is room here for a transition 
from a definition to euthanasia or kakothanasia. (Daube, in 
Wolstenholme and O'Conner, eds., 1964:191, emphasis added) 
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Daube introduced another important conceptual step in the evolu-
ti on of the issue, that "The questi on of at what moment it is in order 
to discontinue extraordinary -- or even ordinary -- measures to keep a 
, 
person alive should not be confused with the question of at what moment 
a man is dead" (Daube, in Wolstenholme and O'Conner, eds, 1964:190-191). 
Daube expressed his moral concern in a way very similar to the conser-
vative, patient-centered ethicists writing several years later: 
Discontinuation of such measures is often justifiable even 
while the patient is conscious. Under the classical defini-
tion of death, which should not be lightly discarded, an 
irreversibly unconscious person whose life depends on a 
machine is still alive. The doctor may be right to stop the 
machine and let him die. But until death occurs, interfer-
ence with his body is illicit: it is not a corpse. 
Use of a corpse is also a wide problem ... I submit 
that this meeting seriously underrates the feelings of the 
public concerning the inviolability of the body ... The 
feeling is found not only in conspicuously religious countries 
like the United States but also in nominally atheist ones. 
How else do you explain the enormous queue which I saw on an 
ordinary weekday when I was taken to see the body of Lenin? 
(I had the eerie feeling that there might be a kidney 
missing.) Even at this meeting we speak of the respect 
always due to the body, of certain consents needed for its 
disposal. But why, if the body is nothing? (Daube, in 
Wolstenholme and O'Conner, eds., 1964:191) 
The question to ask (which I have been asking myself now for some 
time) is why, for all the citations of this volume published in 1966, 
these particular conceptions were not integrated into the literature 
and discourse on redefining death until Ramsey cited Daube and 
expressed the same and other concerns in his examination of the liter-
ature in 1970. And even then, as I will discuss below, these points 
only became integrated into the ethical literature. The possible 
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responses which might fit the question are a bit obvious. Physicians 
and lawyers were looking for consensus and legitimation for redefining 
death in order to develop organ transplantation and did not read, did 
not consider important, or perhaps even did not fully comprehend 
Daube's words. And this is the second instance of physicians and 
lawyers ignoring the ethical literature discussed herein -- the first 
described in Chapter 5 on the definers' communication activities. 
Ethicists pick up ethical and conceptual points; lawyers and physicians 
are concerned with other, more pragmatic matters. In this case, the 
omission is puzzling. A physician need not ever come across or look 
for Ramsey's Patient as Person or other ethical works, but the Ciba 
symposium is a group of essays written by eminent physicians and law-
yers. Physicians and lawyers with an interest in the topic would 
almost have to make an effort to avoid Daube's essay. And one only 
has to read the literature on the topic from 1966 to 1975 and the 
managing of the Quinlan case to see what a difference -- in terms of 
the time and effort spent stumbling over the confusion among the 
issues of withdrawing treatment, allowing to die and redefining 
death -- use of Daube's essay would have made. 
Is the omission of his essay simply a matter of neglect? It could 
be the case that points like these have to be explicated again and 
again and again before they make a dent in the conceptualization of an 
issue such as this one. Perhaps some conceptual distinctions and 
ethical concerns are simply too subtle, too fragile and intangible 
against the prevailing pragmatic and technological ethos governing the 
definition of contemporary issues. At any rate, the Ciba symposium 
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did not contribute to the ethical or conceptual development of the issue 
except in terms of legitimating and providing consensus for transplan-
tation. 
The Importance of Interdisciplinary Discussion 
My second generalization regarding conceptual development is that 
the issue evolved primarily in interdisciplinary settings. The Ciba 
symposium, the AAAS symposium, the Lyman Beecher lectures at Yale and 
the organization of the Hastings Center are all examples of such 
settings which provided the context for conceptual and ethical advance. 
In The Patient as Person, the publication based on the 1969 Lyman 
Beecher lectures, Ramsey reiterated and expanded Daube's points, among 
others. The two points diffused through the social connections made 
by Ramsey in Georgetown and in the organizing of the Hastings Center. 
I have every reason to believe that Ramsey had a profound influence on 
the publications which derived from the work of the Hastings Research 
Group. Jonas, who first articulated his objections to the redefining 
effort during the 1967-1968 AAAS symposium, was another particularly 
influential member of the Group. 
In each of the publications of the Group or its members (the Kass-
Morison debate on death as process or event, the Group's critique of 
the Harvard Report, the Capron and Kass critique of the Kansas statute 
and Veatch's critique of the handling of the Tucker case) one or both 
of the points originally made by Daube and expanded by Ramsey was 
stated. l These articles were published, moreover, in journals which 
would be perused by physicians and/or lawyers: Science, JAMA and The 
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University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 
The points of the Hastings Group were not picked up in the profes-
sional literature except by some ethicists. Although one or another of 
the Hastings articles was cited by authors of 10 of the 17 articles in 
the sample published after 1972, neither of the two points was men-
tioned. The Hastings Group's articles were cited, but none of the 
substantive conceptual or ethical issues raised in them were integrated 
into other publications. 
The conceptual separation of the two questions did not become 
clear until there was an actual illustration of the distinction in 
1975 -- the Karen Quinlan case. During the case, the definition and 
allowing to die issues were confounded until Julius Korien and other 
neurologists called on to testify during the case stated very clearly 
that Karen was not dead according to the Harvard criteria and that 
hers was not a definition of death issue (cf. In the Matter of Karen 
Quinlan, 1975). The Quinlan case itself did more to clarify the 
distinction between deciding when a person is dead and when to discon-
tinue treatment than the Hastings publications. It seems that the 
other ethical point -- that it is morally objectionable to redefine 
death for an avowed purpose 
progression of pragmatism. 
has been lost in the relentless 
The Importance of Committee Organization 
In both the medical and conceptual evolution of the issues, organ-
ized creative working groups played a particularly significant role in 
and were essential to the issue's development. Some were 
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interdisciplinary and some were not -- of particular note: the Harvard 
Committee, the Hasti ngs Center Research Group and the NINDS coll abora-
tive effort. Some of the most important statements and critiques were 
products of committee meetings or committee organization. 
The members of the committees were particularly well chosen, 
whether by determination or fortuity. One could say that the issue 
became thicker when certain people came together -- people with profes-
sional eminence and political clout, certain others with eminence and 
conceptual, ethical and legal analytic competencies and still others 
with eminence and an eye for gathering data. 
The medical evolution of the issue was prodded by technological 
developments which rendered physiological and neurological functions 
visible and determinable, and no less by significant statements of how 
to manage the probl!ems incurred by them and transplantation and by 
further refinements and research. The assumptions of the medical 
authors were straightforward: redefining death in terms of brain 
function would solve many of the problems and facilitate organ trans-
plantation to boot; redefining death is for them, of course, a matter 
properly relegated to physicians. 
The issue became more complex when the medical consensus was 
challenged by ethicists and some lawyers. The challenge was profound 
indeed and enlarged discussion to a robust debate on the sanctity vs. 
the quality of life, death as process or event, individual rights vs. 
the common good and egalitarianism vs. professional expertise and 
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various other arguments, among them the two discussed above. 
Organized creative work groups, the concentrated effort of the 
right people, were the contexts for the production of the significant 
statements and opposition. 
Defining as Diffusion 
Technological developments, significant explication, opposition 
to the prevailing consensus and interdisciplinary discussion are among 
the social and cultural "prods" in the evolution of the issue. Part 
of what is meant by the institutionalization or evolution of an issue 
is diffusion -- for the issue to evolve or for it to become an inte-
grated part of a social structure or cultural system, it must spread. 
I have already acknowledged this rather simple point by discussing the 
conceptual evolution in terms of the diffusion of the two arguments. 
The dynamics of the group include the cultural "prods" mentioned above 
and vehicles of diffusion. The major vehicles of diffusion are the 
professional journals and the definers themselves. 
The Role of the Professional Journal 
The professional journal is the most obvious vehicle of institu-
tionalization of this issue. Policy statements, definitions and 
objections are more enduring and accessible if made in the professional 
journals than if made at symposia or conferences. Professional journals 
are somewhat more enduring than the mass media. All three -- the 
journals, the mass media and symposia and conferences -- are signifi-
cant vehicles for the diffusion and the legitimation of this issue. 
For a discussion relatively confined to professional arenas, the 
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professional journal is particularly important as it helps to spread the 
issue to professional domains outside particular geographical locales--
beyond the Boston-Washington corridor, for instance. 
Specific journals were used by definers and editors for placing 
statements of definition (such as the Harvard Report) or critiques 
(such as Kennedy's critique of the Kansas statute or the Hastings 
critique of the Harvard Report), namely JAMA and NEJM and the better 
known law reviews. These respected journals are the ones most likely 
to be reviewed by science journalists for the mass press. Definers 
also used what one might call the scholarly or academic press 
Daedalus, Science and the Hastings Center Report -- to spread their 
treatments of the issue. 
No doubt some defining work got done at conferences and symposia, 
though none of the informants mentioned those situations in that 
regard. Of course, just their occasion prompts and centralizes concen-
trated analysis of an issue. But to know just how much was accomplished 
and in what sorts of contexts and interactions, one would have to 
attend them. At any rate, the most important conference proceedings 
and lectures were published immediately, thereby becoming more acces-
sible and a part of the professional literature on the topic. 
The Definers: Contribution and Diffusion 
As stated at the outset, cultural change is neither a simple nor 
complex matter of drifting social or cultural forces entirely. Persons, 
in this case the definers, spread the i~sue and its significance within 
and outside the professional arenas. They did the explicating, the 
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opposing and the contributing to interdisciplinary discussion, all of 
which kept the issue evolving. Some, however, did more than others. 
The elite and the non-elite differ with respect to their contri-
butions to the process of redefining death. The major figures in both 
the medical and conceptual evolution of the topic were the elite. Many 
of the elite were members of the major committees which were central to 
the medical and conceptual eveolution of the issue -- the Harvard 
Committee, the Hastings Center Research Group on Death and Dying and 
the NINDS Committee. They authored the major statements of explication, 
the most important conceptualizations and critiques. In other words, 
they provided the various conceptual frames through which the issue 
took shape from 1964 to 1975. I vlould expect that every social history 
of an idea has particular persons who are responsible for the dominant 
conceptualizations of any particular time. (In this instance, of 
course, they happen also to be those chosen most often on sociometric 
ties by their colleagues.) The rest of the definers reported research 
and clinical findings in line with and sometimes a bit at odds with, 
but always with reference to, the elite's conceptualizations. 
Diffusion and Social Networks 
Without some means of assessing the development of the clusters and 
ties and the development of the issue, it is difficult to say whether 
the networks obtained facilitated the evolution of the issue, merely 
accompanied it, or resulted from it in part. I am willing to assume on 
the basis of interview data and my familiarity with the chronology of 
the issues that the clusters of ties, particularly Contact and 
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Importance facilitated diffusion. Since the choices definers made for 
Friendship were not made in consideration of the topic, and since 
Friendship occurred so often in tandem with either Contact or Importance 
or both, Friendship was not as important as the other two. 
There was an informal division of labor of sorts in this process 
of institutionalization: the elite provided the major cultural contri-
butions and the non-elite performed what might be called "supporting 
and relaying work". The elite published their articles in journals of 
large circulation, such as JAMA, and in eminent journals, such as 
Science, NEJM, and the Hastings Center Report. The non-elite addressed 
local readerships in state and university journals and general medical 
readerships in journals such as Hospital Tribune, American Family 
Physician,and Pediatrics. Both groups published with about the same 
frequency in specialty journals such as Neurology and university law 
revi ews. 
In public discussions such as symposia, conferences and panels on 
the topic, similar differences between the two groups hold. Table 20 
contrasts elites and non-elites on these variables, and as can be seen, 
more elite than non-elite addressed national, interdisciplinary and lay 
audiences and participated in public discussions on death definition 
outsi.de the professional arenas. 
The elite are the prime moving and determining forces in the 
institutionalization of the redefinition of death. As prominent repre-
sentatives of their respective professional hierarchies, they explicate 
and refine the concept, shape and legitimate its cultural career. The 
non-elite perform an important function by diffusing elite work through 
Table 20. Comparison of Elites and Non-elites on Communication 
Behavior Variables (in percentages) 
Communication Behavior El ites Non-el ites 
1. Participation in panel s 91. 7 (22) 66.7(34) 
and conferences 
2. Participation in interdis- 79.2(19) 39.2(20) 
ciplinary and lay, as well 
as professional conferences 
3. Mass media discussions 62.5(15) 31.4(16) 
4. Di scussi ons in the national 37.5(9) 3.9(2) 
media 
N 24 51 
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.072 
.137 
.087 
.196 
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the professional press to local professional groups and to physicians 
outside the neurological sciences. 
I have discussed the soci.al and cultural factors involved in the 
first stage of the institutionalization of the redefinition of death 
and the roles the elite and non-elite had in the process. It would be 
mistaken to conclude that this was an integrated process with medical 
and conceptual developments contributing equally or with all of the 
.elite equally affecting the development of the issue. There is a poli-
tics of cultural defining -- a differential power to define and to 
affect policy. The differentiation of power is not as much between 
the elite and non-elite as it is between physicians and lawyers on 
one hand and ethicists on the other. 
The Power to Define 
Examples in this chapter have been cited which support the 
assertion that conceptual and ethical points do not become integrated 
into the whole redefinition literature, just into the ethical litera-
ture. For example, Daube's insistence that the question when is death 
be distinguished from that of when to allow to die and the subsequent 
reiteration of that point again and again by the members of the Hastings 
Group were neglected by physicians and lawyers. Another example is the 
neglect of the ethical notion that death should be defined apart from 
pragmatic considerations. The import of that ethical criticism seems 
to have disappeared -- except for the fact that the California/ABA 
statute and the Capron-Kass statute make no mention of transplantation. 
In Chapter 4, I described patterns of communication in publication, 
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symposia and mass media discussions -- patterns of exclusion and inclu-
sion of audiences and readerships of different disciplines and the lay 
public. A hierarchy of exclusion was drawn, with physicians addressing 
primarily other physicians; lawyers addressing lawyers, physicians and 
policy-makers; and ethicists addressing each discipline, policy-makers 
and the lay public. Whom one addresses and what kinds of literature 
or arguments one absorbs or considers relevant is based to some extent 
on one's conceptualization of the issue. In addition, I would suggest 
that it has something to do with the cultural assumptions regarding 
which professional groups should govern which kinds of issues. 
First of all, if one argues that the issue is a medical issue, 
properly relegated to physicians, rather than lawyers, ethicists, or 
the lay public, one might address his message to physicians most often. 
And, in fact, the patterns of communication fit each discipline's 
general sense of the kind of issue the redefinition of death is. As 
seen in Chapter 7, ethicists have a larger conception of the issue than 
either physicians or lawyers; for them the issue entails social, 
ethical and philosophical considerations, as well as medical or legal 
ones. 
There is another way in which ethicists regard the topic differ-
ently from most physicians and lawyers which probably affects their 
communication activities and intentions. Most physicians and lawyers 
tend to accept the desirability of redefining death as a given; the 
major questions, then, are of procedure. Some ethicists, on the other 
hand, have challenged the assumption that redefining death is an 
appropriate response to the problems involved ("unburied corpses", 
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the need for cadaver organs). In taking an alignment against the 
prevailing medico-legal consensus, an intent to reach other disciplines 
and the lay public would seem to be part and parcel of the process. 
In any society there are cultural assumptions regarding appropriate 
expertise and the power to affect decisions on important issues such as 
the definition of death. And, there seems to be a particularly well-
entrenched assumption in our society that the best way of handling 
this kind of issue is to relegate it to scientific, medical, or tech-
nological experts, with the implication that issues like redefining 
death are matters of medicine, science and technique and not matters of 
philosophical meanings or ethics. Physicians and lawyers are granted 
a considerable amount of power to define and decide about important 
issues in our society. There is little question that philosophers, 
ethicists and theologians, while they may be considered appropriate 
consultants, are not vested with the power to affect cultural defini-
tions or major policy decisions. In other words, the hierarchical 
pattern of exclusion seems to be indicative of a hierarchy of power in 
the realm of cultural defining. One step in establishing legitimacy 
in a cultural debate, or of obtaining leverage in the power to define, 
as it seems several ethicists know, is to speak and become known within 
and beyond the realm of the "opposition". 
In a very real sense, physicians and lawyers do not need to try as 
hard as ethicists. Both are in line with the prevailing cultural 
consensus on the power to define the issue and with the mainstream 
conceptualization. And they have either neglected, excluded, overlooked 
or misunderstood the ethical literature. Possibly, quite probably, 
283 
they feel no need to review it. In effect, they have claimed the issue 
and the power to define it -- what they say counts. One can imagine 
that if the cultural assumptions were otherwise, for instance if 
ethical and philosophical interpretations of societal problems took 
primacy over pragmatic, economic, scientific or technological ones, 
the communication patterns might be reversed with ethicists addressing 
other ethicists because that primacy and the power that accompanies it 
. . 2 
1S glven. 
The cultural power to define can be seen more readily if we look 
at the ability to affect action and policy rather than at the omission 
or neglect of certain authors by others and the communication patterns 
of those arguing against the medical consensus. The subsequent sections 
of this chapter concern first, the development of policy in the second 
stage of the process of institutionalization and secondly, a comparison 
of the dynamics and politics of the two stages. 
Stage II: The Evolution of Policy 
Death statutes were enacted primarily because of the threat of 
physician liability for the death of donors in transplant situations 
under the old legal definition after such problems arose in Virginia 
and California, and secondarily, to create standards for annulling 
physician liability in some cases of resuscitation and termination of 
life-support systems. In short, these are the dynamics of the develop-
ment of policy. 
The first of these statutes, passed in Kansas in 1970, was met 
with both approbrium and harsh criticism. And once again, OPposition 
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and criticism proved essential to refinement and development. The first 
critique, by philosopher of law Ian Kennedy (1971), objected to the 
fact that the statute was drafted with primarily transplantation in 
mind and that it implied that there are two kinds of death. Kennedy 
util i zed the 1966 Ci ba vO,l ume essays by Daube and Cal ne who opposed 
"meddling with the donor for the purposes of improving the transplant". 
The Kennedy critique was important to the Hastings Group (Informant 
notes), as they worked on their critique. The statutory proposal con-
tained in the article written by Capron and Kass corrected Kennedy's 
objections and embodied corrections of several of their own objections. 
The proposal (see page above) does not imply that there are two kinds 
of death, one for transplant donors (brain death) and one for everyone 
else (cardio-respiratory death) or that persons could be "medically or 
legally" dead. Most importantly, the statute contains no mention of 
transplantation. The authors stated repeatedly that mention of trans-
plantation " ... has no place in a statute on the determination of 
death" (Capron and Kass, 1972: 117), thus embodyi ng in pol icy at 1 east 
something of the ethicist objection to defining death for an avowed 
purpose. 
California came closest to adopting the Capron-Kass proposal 
before 1975, but di d not. t·li 11 s, one of the members of Younger's com-
mittee, suggested a simplified bill which the state adopted. The ABA 
recommended a similar statute in 1974-1975 (ABA, 1974). 
Michigan and four other states finally adopted versions of the 
Capron-Kass proposals after 1974, but I have no information regarding 
legislators' motivations to deviate from the Kansas or California/ABA 
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models to adopt the Capron-Kass version, except that the model is par-
ticularly well reasoned, and policy~makers in some states have finally 
caught on to that fact. 
There is little doubt that the Capron-Kass critique prodded the 
California/ABA model; Mills cites its virtues (and what he considers 
to be its flaws) in an article he wrote as medico-legal editor of JAMA 
in 1974 (p. 1226) and the ABA cites the article as well (ABA, 1974). 
Both the California/ABA model and the Capron-Kass model avoid much of 
the clumsiness, mistakenness and ambiguity of the Kansas model. 
Criticism (differentiation and refinement) spurred the development of 
policy as well as definition. 
Those who have had the roles most integral in shaping the form 
that policy has taken in the various states which passed death legis-
lation through 1974 are among the elite, namely Mills,3 Capron and 
Kass. Two other elite definers influenced the outcome of policy 
decisions in three other states, Walker and Fletcher. The elite 
determined the form the issue has taken in both stages of the process 
of institutionalization of the redefinition of death. 
Evolutionary Staqes in the Career of an Idea 
If one were to specify stages of the progression or evolution of 
the redefinition of death, they would be somewhat similar for both 
stages. I am always somewhat hesitant about the usefulness of abstract-
ing generalizations of this form from a process of such detailed and 
specifi c hi story. They are only useful if they are regarded as 
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tentative, if one can use them as something on which one can hang one's 
hat temporarily. Integrating the defining and policy-making stages, I 
can posit eight secondary stages: 
1) Emergence - emergence of the problem, anomaly; 
2) Explication and Elaboration - stating the problem and elaborat-
ing its implications and solutions; 
3) Opposition - criticism of the major statements of the problem 
and emergence of new threads of concern (ethical and legal, in this 
case) ; 
4) Refinement and Reexplication - the absorption of some of the 
criticisms and new pOints of view and restatement of the issue; 
5) Making Policy - formal coding into law; 
6) Opposition - criticism of policy; 
7) Refinement of Policy - the absorption of criticism; and 
8) Reexamination of the whole issue - as the topic evolves and 
becomes differentiated and institutionalized in some forms, new issues 
arise (in this case, cerebral death, uniform death acts, etc. -- see 
the Epil ogue below). 
Defining and Policy-Making Compared 
The two major stages of the institutionalization of the redefini-
tion of death are dysjunctive. First, the defining efforts in 
professional and interdisciplinary settings did not have much to do 
with the policy enacted in state legislatures. Policy and definition 
are discussed in both stages, although Stage I consists of defining 
concepts, delimiting conceptual parameters and offering criticism 
2~ 
toward conceptual refinement and policy alternatives and Stage II 
consists of fixing policy. I don't want to imply that policy-makers 
selected from the policy alternatives suggested by definers in the 
journals; it is clear that most policy-makers contacted in this study 
hadn't the vaguest notions of definer work. If they had any notions 
at all, they usually concerned the major medical and legal pieces and 
perhaps the Capron-Kass critique of the Kansas statute. And if they 
were familiar with the Capron-Kass article, it seems clear that they 
took the obvious criticisms of the Kansas statute and altogether missed 
ethical and conceptual arguments present in the article. Moreover, 
interaction among policy-makers and definers left much to be desired; 
for the most part, policy-makers did not know the definers or their 
work. 
Differences in the two stages can be discerned in an examination 
of the institutional and political constraints and dynamics character-
istic of each stage. At first glance, the two stages differ with 
respect to their respective boundaries. Discussions in the first are 
bound primarily by discipline and discussions in the. second are bound 
by geography, local medical concerns or court cases. Other differences 
between the two stages turn on 1) the degree of interdisciplinary 
dialogue and 2) the kinds of constraints on discussion by political 
considerations and situational exigencies. 
The defining process in the first stage was based upon consider-
able social relatedness among the definers and consisted, at least to 
some degree, of interdisciplinary collaboration and dialogue. The 
policy-fixing enterprise, on the other hand, consisted of the 
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collaboration of physicians and lawyers toward the enactment of policy 
based on a single disciplinary perspective. The policy-fixing process 
lags behind the defining process in terms of both conceptual complexity 
and ethical concern. I can suggest some reasons for the lag or 
dysjunction by examining the institutional and political constraints 
in which discussions in each stage occur. 
Though entry is delimited by editorial and political constraints, 
the professional press, conferences and symposia are settings at least 
somewhat broad in access whi ch provi de re 1 ati ve ly fl exi b le structures 
for the discussion and debate of ideas -- at least in comparison to 
policy-fixing settings. In the professional press, for instance, there 
is the time for conceptual clarification and for ethical points to be 
made, as well as some degree of access to those who would include such 
issues in discussion. 
Change the discussion settings to local clinical and medico-legal 
situations in which medical technologies are being developed, and lives 
are being lost for the want of a kidney, or in which physicians are 
accused of the wrongful death of transplant donors, and discussion is 
likely to be sharply delimited in terms of the kinds of issues consid-
ered legitimate and imperative. The parameters of discussion are 
governed by urgency as well as by professional domination. Compara-
tively few institutional or political constraints govern the parameters 
of discussion in symposia or the professional press. But when 
discussion enters the policy-fixing arenas, ethical considerations of 
profound import become lost in the pragmatics of clinical or techno-
logical imperatives and the politics of professional dominance. 
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What Prohibited Consensus? 
In both stages there is little consensus regarding 1) what the 
issue entails and what should be done about it and 2) what sort of 
policy, if any, should be enacted and for what purposes. Issues as 
complex as this one are comprised of different levels, and different 
kinds of concerns which do not facilitate consensus. 
Clinical physicians on the one hand, and philosophers or ethicists 
on the other, work from within what are rather different "occupational 
worl ds" with different parameters, different obl i gations and different 
rhythms of time. (They al so, I suspect, approach those worl ds with 
different phenomenological screens.) Conceptual and ethical analysis 
can be slow and imbedded in the history of our most basic meanings and 
values. In any case, it is removed from situations in which one must 
take action or put those basic meanings and values to use or effect. 
Working with the dying in emergency situations where resources are 
limited and where, most importantly, one must act and be considered 
liable for one's actions, is another situation and requires another 
bearing altogether. In the world of action, necessity and use, mean-
ings and action or events are tied together in a way they never are in 
the conceptual world -- the sheer progression of events and the exi-
gencies of the former govern how meanings are acted upon, if not also 
how matters mean. It would seem nearly impossible to stop the relent-
lessness of clinical work for an ethical or conceptual concern which 
has no immediate effect; whereas, if kidneys or respirators are not 
found, persons die. The clinician says to the ethicist, "Is it not 
just the livelihood of persons in terms of which your ethical and 
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conceptual concerns matter?" And the ethicist can respond, "If some 
of these ethical concerns are not instituted, culture and human nature 
may change profoundly for the worse; and in the slow, thick time in 
which these developments emerge, there is no turning culture back." 
But that may be in the far distant future. If a kidney or heart is not 
made available for fear of liability, a person will die imminently. 
The potential for harm is immediate (if not also somewhat restricted). 
Many other problems our society faces can be drawn in exactly 
these terms -- among them recombinant DNA research, nuclear energy 
and the problems of environmental pollutants in general. This con-
flict -- between praxis and theory or between the slow and subtle 
notions and the urgent and necessary ones -- has riddled thought and 
action for some time and obviously is not readily resolvable. 
These are some of the reasons I would argue why policy has been 
enacted with regard to some needs and not others, and why it is that 
physicians and ethicists generally approach the redefinition of death 
from such different orientations. There are other polarities besides 
"theory vs. praxis" which prohibit consensus. As discussed earlier, 
the definers' approaches to the topic turn on three polar concerns: 
1) egalitarianism vs. professional or disciplinary dominance in deter-
mining the issue; 2) individual rights vs. the common good; and 3) the 
sanctity of life or the human body vs. the quality of life. The first 
two characterize the nature of the central conflicts of the twentieth 
century -- not just the debate over redefining death. The third is 
inextricably linked with the ability to prolong and resuscitate life. 
I am aware of the precariousness of interpreting cultural patterns in 
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terms of dualisms or polarities, yet I would argue that it is just 
these three, and that between the physicians' and philosophers' con-
cerns which are difficult to resolve and which prohibit consensus. I 
would add to the list unequal access or power to define cultural issues. 
Opposition, interdisciplinary discussion and, no less, the elite 
themselves who provided the dominant conceptualizations of the issue in 
both stages are some of the factors which facilitated the process of 
institutionalization. Toward the end of this discussion, I have drawn 
attention to some of the situational and political constraints on the 
integration of the two stages, and some of the philosophical and value 
constraints on definer consensus. ~1y recommendations for facilitating 
and better integrating the process of institutionalization follow in 
the concluding chapter. 
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ENDNOTES 
lAnother philosopher, Dallas High, came to conclusions about the 
redefining effort that are strikingly similar to those of the Hastings 
Group, though at the time High was not a member either of the Group 
or the Hastings Center. Included in his citations were both Ramsey 
and Jonas. 
2The elite as well as the ethicists (remember that many of the 
elite are ethicists -- chosen primarily by other ethicists) addressed 
different audiences. The elite physicians and lawyers may be under a 
kind of noblesse oblige to familiarize themselves with other elite 
work -- especially if they are invited to the same conferences. And 
they are likely to be asked to address lay audiences as well. Their 
communication patterns may be less a matter of "swimming against the 
stream" than a matter of the professional obligations which accompany 
rank and regard. 
3As mentioned in Chapter 1, I neglected to include D. H. Mills 
on the questionnaire list. Had I remembered his name, I am certain 
that he would have met the elite criteria. 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION: SU~1f~ARY, EPILOGUE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Sum 
It has at times occurred to me that reporting this study of insti-
tutionalization is somewhat like telling a "story" -- as thickly as I 
can through the styles of various conceptualizations and methods -- a 
kind of story complete with actors, settings and communities, dramatic 
action, dynamics, goals, politics and a determinate end -- statutory 
legislation. The story -- to stretch the analogy still further -- has 
two dysjunctive though somewhat overlapping parts: defining and 
policy-making. 
The actors in the first stage are 75 professionals and academics, 
almost all of them university faculty, from the areas of medicine, 
law and ethics/philosophy/theology. They came to the issue of redefin-
ing death through various professional and personal avenues many 
because they worked with the dying, with organ transplantation, and 
others because they were concerned with areas of knowledge conceptually 
related to redefining death, such as euthanasia and the philosophy of 
organism. Some were invited to join committees or to present papers at 
symposia, and a few had personal relationships and interests which led 
to the topic. They live in all areas of the country and some abroad, 
though slightly more live in the Northeast and the Midwest. 
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Defining and Interdisciplinary Discussion 
Definers conducted their defining work in various communication 
arenas. By definition, all published articles on the topic in profes-
sional journals. Almost three-fourths discussed the issue as well in 
symposia and conferences, and nearly half appeared in the mass media to 
express their views. I had asked them what they had wanted their 
articles to accomplish and, according to their various competencies, 
most intended to do the different tasks required for the evolution of 
the issue: drawing attention to the problems and suggesting the 
redefinition of death as a solution; criticizing or redefining either 
methods or conceptualizations of the issue; pointing out conceptual, 
ethical or legal problems and advocating solutions. The definers 
varied, again according to their disciplines, with respect to the kinds 
of audiences they addressed in each communication arena. Physicians 
addressed other physicians for the most part. Lawyers addressed other 
lawyers and policy-makers and physicians. The ethicists most often 
addressed all disciplines and the lay public in the professional and 
mass media. Communication among definers cannot be characterized as 
fully interdisciplinary (with each discipline directing messages to 
the others), though there was considerable physician-lawyer communica-
tion. Instead, a hierarchy of exclusion, with physicians at the top 
addressing their own colleagues and ethicists at the bottom addressing 
everyone, describes the communication patterns of definers in public 
discussion arenas. 
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Defining and Social Organization 
The process of redefining death contains other organizational 
"settings" besides journals, symposia and the mass media. Apart from 
their participation in these communication arenas, definers were 
organized as a variety. of overlapping "communities" for each of three 
social ties -- Contact, Importance and Professional Friendship: "com-
munities" of discipline; elite and non-elite status; committee member-
ship and collaboration; geographical proximity; and professional 
generation. Some definers seemed to be associated with others because 
they shared a conceptual approach to the issue apart from their 
disciplinary affiliations. 
Depending on the social tie considered, different "communities" 
emerge and predominate. If one can imagine three superimpositions of 
organization for each tie, the social content of organization would 
change as one turned from tie to tie. On each superimposition are 
communities of discipline, committee memberships and collaboration. 
However, definers had contact most often with others who were in the 
same general locale, of the same professional generation and of the 
same status (elite or non-elite). They considered professional friends 
to be those of the same discipline (more often than on any other tie), 
locale and professional generation. To attribute importance to others, 
definers need not have had direct contact with them and,for this 
reason as well as a considerable degree of consensus among definers 
regarding who was important, that image of social ties was the least 
shaped by discipline, proximity and professional generation. 
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And Consensus? 
Institutionalization is a story with an end, an end which would 
indicate at least some degree of consensus about just what it is that 
should be institutionalized. In this case there was little consensus 
either across the disciplines or within the social networks. Most 
definers agreed only on the etiology of the need to redefine death; 
fewer that redefining death could alleviate some problems (either 
obtaining organs in the best condition for transplantation or termin-
ating treatment on persons who are dead). Otherwise, definers did not 
agree on the composition of the issue or who should be relegated the 
responsibility for managing the issue. One controversy centered on 
whether the issue is, broadly speaking, a professional or public issue, 
and within the former, on whether the issue is medical, medico-legal or 
ethical/philosophical. Physicians and lawyers were in general agree-
ment on most issues, though lawyers differed from some physicians by 
asserting their right to define and by advocating legislation. Gener-
ally, that is, leaving discipline aside to some extent, definers 
interpreted the issue from a perspective which emphasizes either the 
quality of life or the sanctity of the human body and from another 
which emphasizes either the common good or concerns which apply to the 
dying person only. But regardless of the lack of consensus, policies 
were enacted. 
Defining and the Elite 
Not all definers contributed equally or in the same ways to the 
redefining process. If one looks at the entire samples' statuses and 
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contributions, two groups clearly emerge. And both groups seem to be 
aware of the differences -- their sociometric choices confirm the 
binary grouping into elites and non-elites. 
The elite are the definers' definers, the prime movers of the 
redefinition process from defining to policy. The elite published 
more articles on the topic and participated more often in public dis-
cussions than the non-elite. They were the keystones of the definer 
social cohesion, having formed the ties which linked the various 
"communities" together. And it was the elite who most often trans-
cended their professional training in their conceptual approaches to 
the topic the cosmopolitan definers in terms of what and whom they 
know. 
Pol icy-Making 
When the story gets to Stage II, the actors change to policy-
makers: those physicians, lawyers and legislators who prompted and 
developed legislation in Kansas, t~aryland, Virginia, New Mexico and 
California through 1974. There was little overlap between definers 
and policy-makers, but the few instances there were mattered. Four 
definers, all among the elite, contributed in substantial ways to the 
development of legislation in three of these states (Kansas, Califor-
nia and New Mexico). Otherwise there was little general interaction 
between policy-makers and definers and little familiarity on the part 
of the policy-makers with the professional literature. 
In all cases policy-making was dominated by professional, more 
specifically, medical and medico-legal interest. Laws were enacted 
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with primary reference to transplantation and secondary reference to 
protecting physicians from liability of other wrongful death. Except 
in those states where cases of phys i ci an 1 i abil ity for "wrongful" death 
causes local furor, the redefinition of death became law with little 
public discussion. 
The Dynamics of Cultural Defining: Facilitation and Constraint 
All stories have their dynamics, and in this one, as in so many 
others, one of the major dynamics was conflict, or opposition -- between 
lawyers and physicians on the one hand, and the ethicists and ethics-
oriented physicians and lawyers on the other. The tension of opposition 
and of interdisciplinary discussion and collaboration prompted a more 
complex and conceptually sophisticated issue and more thoughtful 
policy. Originally the use of new medical technologies stimulated and 
set up the medical issues and some of the social and ethical ones, but 
the process of redefining death would not have taken place without 
timely, explicit and well-placed statements. Someone had to say: 
This is a problem; this is what that problem looks like, and this is 
what should be done about it. Most of the first statements were made 
by physicians. 
The development of the issue took a path of increasing differenti-
ation and diffusion. Perhaps that is just what is meant by cultural 
evolution: differentiation and diffusion. The issue progressed: from 
whole brain death to cerebral death; from redefining death in order to 
pull the plug to two different questions (Is she dead? Should she be 
allowed to die?); and from a simple, direct path of redefining death 
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to obtain organs for transplantation to many other complex lines of 
public, ethical and philosophical concern. 
However, some voices and arguments were heard more than others. 
Some opinions and constructions were negotiable as policy, others were 
not. No such story is without its politics and this one is no excep-
tion. Physicians and lawyers with medical concerns had the power to 
define the issues for policy and the power to be heard by all partici-
pants in the redefinition debate. Ethicists, with their interest in 
ethical social action and in safeguarding the public interest were not 
heard or read except by other ethicists and a few physicians and 
lawyers. Strikingly few of their most substantive criticisms and 
arguments made any difference in the policy arenas. 
None of the constraints which prohibit equal contribution by 
members of all disciplines or consensus are easy to resolve. Re-
examining notions of expertise and power and redistributing power in 
a culture is not an easy task. For whatever reasons, finely drawn, 
subtle ethical and conceptual arguments do not make the difference that 
pragmatic arguments and imminence of catastrophe arguments do in our 
culture. And the polarities that emerge in discussions on redefining 
death -- the sanctity of the body vs. the quality of life, individual 
rights vs. the common good and elite or expert control vs. egalitarian 
control -- are among the most divisive and agonizing in civilization 
as grandiose or overgeneral as that may sound. But policy continues 
to be enacted, and policy fixes the issue is some form regardless of 
the lack of consensus. Perhaps eventually the concept will take the 
shape of the policy, as policy becomes fixed, utilized and reconfirmed. 
So the story went as the redefinition of death took shape in 
definition and policy through 1974. 
A Summary of the Social Processes and Organization Associated 
With the Evolution of the Redefinition of Death 
The progression of the idea was facilitated by both specific 
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processes and kinds of social organization. The most obvious social 
process, simply because it underlies or constitutes the others, is 
communication. Reading, writing and discussing (Contact), almost all 
too obvious kinds of communication required for this process of 
institutionalization, form the basis for the others: influence, diffu-
sion and the kinds of discussion and writing (interdisciplinary 
discussion, the significant statements and statements of opposition) 
which stimulated the issue's development. The processes are insep-
arable from (and in some sense were facilitated by) the organizational 
loci in which they occurred, namely: the structure of definers' 
social ties, the committees and symposia, the journals and the mass 
media. 
All the definers participated in some of these processes and loci, 
though not in the same ways. The elite made the significant statements 
and significant critiques and used the "big" journals for publication; 
other definers reviewed and added to the significant statements and 
critiques and diffused elite work through the smaller and more general 
professional press. 
The process of policy-making, of course, is also composed of 
reading (not as much as one would like, perhaps), writing (drafting) 
and discussing (and testifying, consulting) as well. In this stage, 
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actual and potential legal problems stimulated policy as the use of 
certain technologies prompted medical and conceptual action. The 
primary dynamics of policy-making were the exercise of professional 
power or cultural privilege and criticism or opposition. Power was 
exercised in policy-making committees, the courtroom and, most impor-
tantly, the state legislature. The critiques were placed in the 
professional press. 
Before making any recommendations for the institutionalization 
of issues like this one, and for studies like this one, I will discuss 
the most significant events that have happened since 1974 and where 
the issue stands at present (without, of course, the detailed and 
quantitative analysis that was conducted on data collected before 
1975). These events have a bearing on the conclusions and implications 
I would draw based on my research through 1974. 
Epilogue: The Issue Since 1974 
The redefinition of death as an issue and process, has changed, 
or evolved, in some respects, though it has kept its basic shape. 
The year 1975 brought the Karen Quinlan case, two significant 
court cases in r~assachusetts and New York, and the first legislation 
based on the Capron-Kass model statute and the ABA model statute. In 
1976, California enacted the first "Natural Death Act" as a set of 
guidelines for withholding or withdrawing life support to allow persons 
to die, legislation basically designed to help answer the second ques-
tion, Should this person be allowed to die? (For further discussion 
see Capron, 1978a, 1978b; High, 1978; Hastings Center Bibliography, 
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1979-1980:26.) rof course, "definition of death" statutes are designed 
to help answer the first question, Is this person dead?) 
And since 1975, an effort to enact legislation in New York 
defining death in terms of brain function with many new faces and a 
coupl e of the "old defi ners" di rect i ng the effort has failed. In 1 ate 
1978-1979, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
developed a statute in consultation with several physicians and lawyers. 
And in early 1979 the AMA changed its stand against "brain death" 
legislation (Mills, 1979; Cranford, 1979a). To this date, 22 states 
have enacted death definition legislation (Cranford, 1979a). 
Karen Quinlan 
The case of Karen Quinlan did almost as much to bring the redefini-
tion and the "allowing to die" issues before the public eye as did the 
first heart transplant and the publication of the Living Will (Eutha-
nasia Education Council, 1967) in "Dear Abby" in 1969. So much has 
been written on this case in the professional and mass press (the 
interested reader may peruse the New York Times or any press reference 
source and the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature from September, 
1975 through 1976; the Hastings Center Bibliography, 1979-1980:25-26; 
and In the Matter of Karen Quinlan: The Complete Legal Briefs, Court 
Proceedings, and Decision in the Superior Court of New Jersey for 
thorough saturation on the subject) that I will not discuss the facts 
of the case substantively. As stated previously, it was generally held 
early on in the case that Quinlan's situation was one which would be 
solved as soon as either the New Jersey courts or the legislature 
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adopted the new brain criteria (see The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), 
September 9 and 18, 1975). With her case came the widespread knowledge 
that application of the Harvard criteria or a brain death statute would 
not mitigate such problems. How much damage to her cerebrum had 
occurred was indeterminate, though obviously portions of her brain stem 
are still intact or she would not continue to breathe on her own today. 
Public discussion of the case loosed whatever opinions had been 
fixed in the professional press to distinguish cerebral death from 
who 1 e bra in death, "hopel ess ly unconsci ous" or "sufferi ng i rreversi b 1 e 
loss of brain function" (partial or whole) from "dead" and "the two 
questions". As an illustration, take the following statement made by 
the assistant legal counsel for the Ar~A and paraphrased by a reporter 
for the New York Times. 
Miss Anderson said that the brain death statutes were designed 
to facilitate organ transplantation by allowing terminally ill 
donors to be maintained on mechanical respirators after the 
brains, including the respiratory centers, had ceased to 
function. (September 28, 1975:50, emphasis added) 
These are just the confusions which some definers had identified for 
years since 1968 as those which would rightly befuddle and frighten the 
public: redefine death just to obtain organs for other persons and 
then terminate the lives of those not yet dead for that purpose. 
Members of the original Hastings Research Group had the opportunity 
to contribute to the clarity of the case when prosecuting, and defense 
attorneys and at least one reporter (see Kron, 1975) contacted them at 
the Hast.ings Center and the Kennedy Institute. One informant later 
implied that the trial participants had done their homework, if not 
the trial reporters and medical and science journalists. 
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Although many treatments of the case in the news media served to 
muddle the issues, the case itself eventually became a stark illustra-
tion of the distinction between the two questions, Is she dead? and 
Should she be allowed to die?, and of the distinction between whole 
brain and cerebral death. It became vividly clear that none of the 
new whole brain criteria for determining death, including the Harvard 
criteria, would help resolve cases like Quinlan or lessen the 
emotional and economic costs that accompany them. 
The Quinlan case was a turning point in the. evolution of the 
issue. It stimulated increasing advocacy of cerebral, rather than 
whole brain criteria as well as successful efforts to legislate "nat-
ural death acts" or "Living Wills" as attempts to avoid such situations 
in the latter '70s. 
New Court Cases 
Also in 1975, cases arose in The Bronx, New York and Boston, 
Massachusetts significant to the evolution of the issue. In New York, 
the city's Health and Hospital Corporation ignored the local medical 
examiner's office policy that all homicide victims be autopsied before 
organs could be removed for transplantation after being pronounced 
dead according to brain criteria and removed two kidneys from a homi-
cide victim, R. Daniel Sulsona. The Health and Hospital Corporation 
had suffered too many lost opportunities to obtain kidneys under the 
medical examiner's policy. The two agencies were pitted against one 
another in the Bronx Division of the Supreme Court,l and the presiding 
judge acknowledged "brain death" as the legal end of human 1 ife (New 
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York Times, ~Iarch 8, 1975; April 26, 1975). The Court suggested that 
the state legislature take action to redefine death to mitigate the 
situation (Veith, 1978). On April 18, 1975, New York medical and legal 
officials held a news conference to announce their intent to advocate 
a redefinition of death to include brain criteria (New York Times, 
April 19, 1975). To this date, 1979, they have not as yet succeeded. 
(The New York effort is discussed further below.) 
As in Virginia, California and New York, a case involving a homi-
cide victim arose in Massachusetts, but in this instance the defense 
argued that disconnecting the victim's respirator caused death (rather 
than the accused's action of smashing the victim's head with a base-
ball bat) whereas in the other states at issue was the removal of 
organs as a cause of death. One of the key prosecution witnesses in 
the trial was William Sweet, Chair of the Department of Neurosurgery, 
Harvard Medical School and member of the Harvard Committee. As men-
tioned above, Sweet was a key witness in the Tucker v. Lower case as 
well -- another instance of Harvard's role, by invitation and deter-
mination, to legitimate the redefinition. Sweet testified that the 
victim's brain was "a decomposed, gelatinous mass" and that therefore, 
the victim had to have been dead for more than two days before the 
mechanical support was terminated (Boston Globe, May 15, 1975). In 
1977, the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted the concept of death 
determined with reference to brain criteria (Oregonian, August 28, 
1977), to my knowledge the first state to adopt such a definition in 
its highest court. 
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Recent Legislation 
Since 1974, several states have enacted death statutes based on 
the Kansas model, the Capron-Kass model and the California/ABA model. 
Oregon enacted a statute similar to the Kansas statute in 1975, and in 
1975, as stated previously, Michigan2 became the first state to adopt 
the Capron-Kass model. Subsequently five other states enacted versions 
based on the Capron-Kass strategy: West Virginia,3 Louisiana,4 Iowa,5 
Montana,6 (Isaacs, 1978) and Texas. 7 Six others, Georgia,8 Illinois,9 
Oklahoma,lO Tennessee,ll Idaho,12 (Isaacs, 1978) and Wyoming,13 
adopted versions of the California/ABA model. The Capron-Kass model 
keeps intact the traditional definition based on heart-lung criteria 
and addresses the situations in which mechanical means obscure those 
traditional signs. The California/ABA model seems to supercede the 
traditional definition (cf. Isaacs, 1978:7). 
In 1977, North Carolina14 enacted a bill which combines the death 
definition statute with a "natural death" statute, an i nnovati on whi ch 
Capron states (1978a:52) "seems to be a virtual invitation to litiga-
tion so many are the problems and ambiguities it creates." As should 
be all too obvious to the reader by now, it muddles issues which should 
be kept separate. 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
approved and recommended a "Uniform Brain Death Act" (UBDA) at its 
annual conference meeting in 1978. The UBDA is in some ways similar to 
the California and ABA versions, but it very explicitly indicates that 
only whole brain criteria are to be used with the statute. 
For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has 
sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the 
brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination 
under this section must be made in accordance with reason-
able medical standards. 
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The Act is accompanied by two comments: one stating that the act does 
not preclude a determination of death according to traditional cri-
teria; and another specifying that "functioning" is a crucial notion, 
expressing the idea of purposeful, rather than random activity in the 
brain. Another interesting characteristic of the USDA is the strong 
imperative of the second sentence. In April of 1979, Nevada 15 became 
the first state to enact the UBDA. 
There are several differences between the UBDA and the statute 
recommended by the AMA. 
Section 1. A physician, in the exercise of his profes-
sional judgment, may declare an individual dead in accordance 
with accepted medical standards. Such declaration may be 
based solely on an irreversible cessation of brain function. 
(AMA Legislative Department, 1979) 
Most statutes are definitive or mandatory and not permissive (Oregon's 
and Georgia's are exceptions). The UBDA embodies a particularly 
strong mandatory statement. On the other hand, the American Medical 
Association recommends a statute which is permissive. One of the 
drafters/consultants on the UBDA has expressed interest in having the 
A~lA back the UBDA and suggests, understandably, that a permissive 
statute, such as the AMA's, not only does not make good sense, but also 
may befuddle the public (Cranford, 1979). A statutory definition of 
death clearly is no place for indeterminacy. Another obvious differ-
ence is the UBDA's insistence on determining death of the entire brain 
and the conspicuous absence in the AMA model of the word "total" or 
"all" in or before the phrase "i rreversib1e cessation of brain 
function. " 
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Approva 1 from the "pro-1 ife movement" whi ch has provi ded oppos i-
tion to legislation in some states is one reason for the emphasis on 
whole brain criteria in the UBDA, according to consultant Cranford 
(1979b), but the primary reason is that all accepted sets of criteria 
refer to the lack of functioning of the entire brain. It is very 
interesting to note the amount of discretion accorded individual 
physicians in the AMA model. The reason for the AMA's long-standing 
policy of opposition to brain death legislation has been the fear 
that physicians' initiative, medical research and further changes in 
criteria will all be hampered by such legislation. 
New York 
An effort begun in 1975 to enact a bill defining death in terms 
of brain function has to this date not succeeded, but it has produced 
some interesting collaborations. Several definers live in the New York 
area and a number of them have been involved to various degrees in the 
several discussions and publications which have derived from that 
effort. A couple of members of the original Hastings Research Group 
and other members of the NINDS collaborative study testified at legis-
lative hearings (one of which I attended as well), and one organized 
a large conference, "Brain Death: Interrelated Medical and Social 
Issues", sponsored by the New York Academy of Sciences in 1978 
(Korien, 1978). Two recent "state of the issue" articles examining 
legal, medical and ethical issues, written by physicians, lawyers, 
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ethicists and theologians involved in that effort, were recently pub-
lished in JAMA (Veith et al., 1978a; 1978b). Some of the more 
conservative members of the Hastings Research Group have not partici-
pated in these discussions though they live in the New York area. 
One of the problems the pro-legislation group faced in New York 
was opposition from various religious groups. In the first of the 
two-part article published by the "New York collaborator", and for the 
first time in the literature, the theological positions of Orthodox 
Jews, Catholics and Protestants are delineated. I take it that the 
articles were efforts to legitimate legislation on this matter in 
New York and other states. 
In New York the public discussions and debates have been sus-
tained and open, and ethicists and theologians have contributed to the 
policy effort -- rather a contrast to the way legislation was managed 
in all the states included in this study other than California. 
As the Issue Stands 
Most of my sources for this section come from the New York publi-
cations, including the published Conference proceedings. In a nutshell, 
so to speak, the largest issues of debate at this time are 1) cerebral 
death vs. whole brain death; 2) whither policy and which model; and 
3) greater reliance on cerebral angiography as a criterion for 
determining death and revision of the Harvard guidelines in line with 
the cerebral criteria. Not an issue of debate, quite, but an issue of 
concern seems to be the public's increasing association of the issues 
of euthanasia, abortion and death definition. 
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I was somewhat struck and discouraged to find that many of the 
same old issues cluttered the New York Academy of Sciences conference. 
Several articles representing different emphases were included, notably 
a few on the differential diagnoses of various coma states in the con-
text of distinguishing cerebral death from other states of coma, and 
others on the use of cerebral angiography in the context of more 
reliably determining cerebral death. One of the old issues raised was 
the confusi on of cerebral death with whole brai n death. The confus i on 
was exacerbated by the relatively recent addition to the "brain death 
vocabulary" of new terms, all of which refer to cerebral death; 
"neocortical death" (Brierley, 1971); "persistent vegetative state" 
(Jennett and Plum, 1972); "the apallic syndrome" (Ingvar et al., 1978); 
and "cognitive death" (Beresford, 1978). I am particularly enamored 
of still another phrase, "the ruined brain" (Roelofs, 1978). 
Behind the often unclear reference to different states of 
"ruination" is the more profound problem of being able to determine 
just what it is that is assessed by either whole brain or cerebral 
.t . 16 cn ena. Some possibilities include "certainly fatal outcome", 
"death in fact", "irreversible loss of consciousness". In discussing 
the results of the NINDS collaborative study of 503 cases of what is 
presumed to be "brain death", one of the major participators in that 
study states: 
Since pathologic findings did not always confirm brain death, 
even in patients meeting the more stringent Harvard criteria, 
the end-point or proof of validity of these criteria remains 
ill-defined. Prediction of a fatal outcome is not a valid 
criterion for accuracy of standards designed to determine 
that death has already occurred. (Nolinari, 1978:65) 
311 
Indeed, in reading the conference proceedings, one is struck by the 
befuddlement and indeterminacy of just what is meant by death deter-
mined with the use of any brain .criteria. I include portions of an 
exchange between two participants in the discussion period after a 
paper was given. 
Greenvik: ... A patient [whose name translated into 
English as "Guest of Horror"] was certified as brain-dead 
at an outlying hospital within a few hours after very 
severe head injuries, and was then referred to us. 
However, after donation consents were signed by the 
parents, we found that he did not fulfill the criteria 
for brain death and was therefore resuscitated and 
supportive measures were continued. It took us only two 
weeks to get him sitting up in a wheelchair, eating, 
talking, and after another two months discharged from 
the hospital with a rather minimal hemiparesis as the 
only consequence. 
Beresford: Chilling case. 
(Korien, ed., 1978:437) 
And with the indeterminacy of what it is the criteria mean, the 
issues of "when is death" and "when should a person be allowed to 
die" slip and intermingle once again. The notion of cerebral death 
carries with it hints of euthanasia, passive and active. For in a case 
such as Karen Quinlan's, although one may be convinced she will never 
be a person (though she meets none of the Harvard criteria) and is in 
fact in some sense dead, one may not be willing to smother what life 
there is, even though what life there is is rather persistently 
vegetative. At any rate, this is exactly the issue that confronts our 
society at the present time, the "new generation of problems" in the 
redefinition of death arena, as one participant (Beresford) put it. 
A careful delineation of the issues is given by Roelofs (p. 44): 
A decerebrated human being is indeed a pitiful spectacle, 
and we may well feel that to be in such a condition is a 
fate worse than death. But this is not an argument for 
adopting a new criterion of death. It is perhaps an 
argument for a rational euthanasia policy. 
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In many ways the participants in the debate in its more recent 
emphases are spinning many of the wheels that have been spun in the 
past. There have been some improvements: new legislation is more 
sound than the old legislation, and ethicists seem to be gaining some 
ground in terms of making a difference to this cultural process. Most 
physicians and lawyers still seem to have missed the subtle conceptual 
and ethical arguments, but some have picked them up and integrated 
them into their conceptual approaches. At this point, even with the 
significant gains, I am left with the concern that again policy will 
be enacted with insufficiently thorough examination of all the issues. 
Conclusions 
This extensive study bears on the relation of communication and 
social organization to the process of institutionalization and, within 
that relation, on some of the ways in which interdisciplinary discourse 
and interaction between definers and policy-makers was conducted in 
the process. The subject of institutionalization, the redefinition of 
death, is an issue composed of ethical, legal and medical dimensions, 
an issue of public concern; it is an instance of rather profound cul-
tural change. Interdisciplinary issues of cultural and political 
import of a similar nature in the areas of ecology, bioethics, tech-
nology and society have begun or are in the midst of similar careers 
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in the second half of this century. Both pragmatic and theoretical 
concerns have motivated this particular story, and I will close with 
pragmatic and academic recommendations, respectively, for cultural 
definers and their modes of conduct and for social scientists and 
communication researchers for their efforts in studies such as this one. 
Toward More Integrated Cultural Defining 
Interdisciplinary collaboration: Most problems and topics of 
cultural concern in this period of history are interdisciplinary in 
nature and require interdisciplinary collaboration in their solution. 
However, few academics and professionals who involved themselves in 
defining and solving such problems or who are called upon to do so are 
familiar with or competent in interdisciplinary learning and discourse. 
Problems -- lack of consensus, professional domination and the resolu-
tion of complex issues -- can be mitigated by interdisciplinary 
learning and discussion. Interdisciplinary discussion is discussion in 
which definers of different professional and academic interests can 
identify and negotiate their competencies, purposes and values. 
In the problem area of medical advances, there has been a rela-
tively recent effort (in this decade) at some medical centers (most 
notably the University of California at San Francisco and Hershey 
Medical Center in Pennsylvania) to train physicians in ethics and human 
values. Even more recent cutbacks of financial support for interdis-
ciplinary programs threatens that effort, and yet more physicians and 
lawyers need to be trained in ethical and conceptual analysis and the 
social sciences especially if they are to contribute to the 
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definition of issues such as "brain death". 
For ethicists and philosophers who concern themselves with ethical 
issues in medical advances to engage in a comparable interchange with 
physicians, it is not enough, I would suggest, for them to become 
famil i ar with the rul es of c 1 i ni ca 1 practice or the major tenets of 
medical science. They should spend time in the clinician's "field" 
and experience the dynamics of having to make quick life and death 
decisions or having to adjust the allocation of scarce resources. I 
think few people understand the dilemmas involved in knowing patients 
who desperately need replacements for their diseased organs, and at 
the same time knowing that a "person" with good organs lies in another 
room in a persistent vegetative state. Ethicists have not typically 
visited the settings in which the decisions and circumstances that 
concern them are made. 17 One of my recommendations, then, is for 
increased sustained interdisci.plinary training and discussion for 
cultural definers. Interdisciplinary organizations and publications 
loci in which interdisciplinary discussion and collaboration can 
occur -- are absolutely essential to the definition and resolution of 
most of our pressing cultural issues. 
In addition to the need for more sustained interdisciplinary 
discourse, I would suggest that we should all be trained to some extent 
in ethical analysis in order to prepare for decision-making and policy-
making. There exists a need for the formal, cultural recognition of 
the ethical and philosophical dimensions of contemporary problems, and 
what better way to institutionalize that recognition than to add the 
relevant courses to high school and college curricula? 
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I would recommend widespread support of organizations like the 
Hastings Center and the Kennedy Institute for Bioethics whose primary 
intent is the interdisciplinary discussion of the philosophical and 
ethical dimensions of contemporary issues in medicine, society and 
technology. We could learn a great deal more about the dynamics and 
facilitation of interdisciplinary discussion. Federal support for that 
is in order. More interdisciplinary and ethical discourse about 
contemporary issues would affect the politics and quality of cultural 
definition. 
More communication from definers to the lay public: If the process 
of institutionalization of cultural issues (defining and policy-making) 
is to be conducted in terms of public debate and the public interest, 
the communication efforts of both definers and policy-makers should be 
directed toward those ends. Several definers in this study said that 
they wanted to address the lay public with the articles they had pub-
lished in the professional press. However, members of the lay public 
do not often read university law reviews and the New England Journal of 
Medicine. If definers wish to reach the lay public or to directly 
affect their conceptions of the redefinition of death, then they should 
publish articles in publications which members of the lay public read, 
periodicals of large circulation (the mass press): Harpers, Ladies 
Home Journal and the like. 18 
If the redefinition of death is a public and not exclusively 
professional issue, then the public needs to have ready access to 
articles on the topic written in a straightforward style. This could 
be accomplished in two ways. Definers could themselves use the mass 
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media more extensively, rather than have science and medical journalists 
relay their work to the public. If, however, definers insist on writing 
for the "teachers' teachers" or other professionals and academics, then 
they could encourage writers or journalists to become members of commit-
tees and attend conferences. Direct contact with definers might lessen 
the likelihood of inaccuracy and distortion in reporting complex issues 
for the mass media. 
Increased interaction between definers and policy-makers: The same 
recommendations for definer-public communication would, of course, hold 
for definer/policy-maker interaction. Most state legislators are 
reached more effectively through the mass media than through the profes-
sional press. 
If the issue is destined to become law or practice, then definers 
should extend their efforts to the policy arenas, as approximately 
one-third of those participating in this study did. And one always 
wishes that policy-makers would do their homework (i.e., read the 
relevant academic and professional iterature and/or contact definers) 
as well. It is rather disquieting to know that in two states redefini-
tion of death was treated as if it were just any old legislative 
issue -- appropriating funds for new highways and the like. 
One temptation is to assume that the problems of definer/policy-
maker interaction could be solved if the issue were discussed once and 
discussed well with all interests represented in a national arena with 
the intent of establishing a uniform law. On second thought, a 
national, one-time conference could cause more problems than it would 
solve. It takes time for issues to evolve, time for all the interests 
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to be stated, for a 11 the mi stakes and muddl es to be made and subse-
quently recognized and corrected. A Harvard Report must precede its 
refinements and clarifications, a Kansas statute is perhaps needed 
if only to show what improvements would look like. That takes time. 
I doubt that the redefinition of death could have been done once and 
well regardless of who contributed to it; perhaps the development and 
evolution of ideas cannot be compressed in time. The more significant, 
complex and indeterminate the issues, the more time required. 
Other than these somewhat paltry suggestions for better integrating 
cultural definition, I have none. As for the resolution of the divisive 
polarities between the sanctity and the quality of life, individual 
rights and the common good, and egalitarianism vs. professional domina-
tion, I can only take a stand on one side or the other. Of course, 
that is not what I am about here. 
Recommendations and Implications for the 
Social Scientist 
What I am about is studying how cultural definition gets done and 
what social organization and communication have to do with it. What 
follows is a set of suggestions for further research. 
Improving the basic conceptual issues: Of concern in this study 
and others in communication and culture, and the sociology of culture 
is the relation among social organization, social process and the con-
tent and style of ideas. It may well be the case that this is a triadic 
relation much like the dualistic relation between form and matter -- as 
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Aristotle had it, a relation something like that between two sides of 
a coin or (even more conceptually agonizing) two sides of a piece of 
paper. To attempt to manage such complexity along with the specificity 
and quanti ty of i nformat i on required in an empi ri ca 1 study is not the 
easiest of tasks, but there are things one might do to manage it a bit 
better than accomplished herein. 
The relation of any two of those three elements in any process of 
institutionalization or cultural change is a precarious locus of study; 
and any of the relations which includes social processes causes the 
most frustration. It seems generally clear as talk goes on in the 
social sciences that discussing structure without nodding to processes 
is inadequate (too static). In some schools of thought in communica-
tion (say, that espoused in the Annenberg School of Communications of 
the University of Pennsylvania) it is considered equally amiss to 
discuss social processes like communication without discussing social 
structures and context. (One might add that it is very difficult to 
discuss social processes without discussing social form in Standard 
Average European languages, as Whorf called them). I attempted to 
"work" the relation between structure and process by using such phrases 
as "communications arenas", "loci of communication" and by reconciling 
Contact and Importance as social processes with their structures. 
Content and social organization seems a manageable enough focus: 
How do different forms of social organization affect the content of 
ideas: One might ask, similarly, how do different kinds of social 
processes affect the styles of ideas? I would suspect that Importance 
is a process associated with some kinds of content, perhaps original 
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work, comprehensive work and, as I defined it, to include provocation, 
debate and criticism. Contact, as another social process independent 
of Importance, might be associated with other kinds of content --
review, perhaps, or "spreading the word", "what is happening" kinds of 
content. However, and this is something I had not foreseen, one would 
have to know whether the content was established before, along with, or 
after the social processes and social structures. Juggling the inter-
relation of all three elements as it changes through time stretches the 
imagination indeed. 
A means for assessing the development of social relations or 
changes in them through time is certainly in order. I would also 
suggest developing a means for coming to terms with the relation of 
development or change in social relations and change in the content of 
an issue. That is what I had intended to do, but I did not have the 
right kind of information nor the right techniques. The specificity 
required is particularly burdensome for a questionnaire survey format 
and for subjects' memories -- one ought to rely more extensively on 
in-depth interviews. Another approach or attack would be to follow an 
issue as it develops, thus mitigating the problems of memory and the 
lack of recorded history. 
In order to understand the relation of the definers to their 
defining work (to process, structure and content, that is) more detailed 
information regarding personal, intellectual and social histories and 
the ways in which definers got into the topic area would be helpful. 
The kind of information I have in mind, anecdotes and the like, could 
only be assessed in interview settings. 
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Integrating the methods and tools of social history would sub-
stantiate conceptual and methodological conduct of studies such as 
this one. But attempting to reconcile the specificity and concrete-
ness of history with a concern in communication and the sociology of 
culture for large patterns and relations is one additional task of 
considerable magnitude. 
Interdisciplinary communication and collaboration: Another 
entire area of study could be developed around interdisciplinary com-
munication devoted to answering questions such as: what facilitates 
and constrains interdisciplinary communication, and what techniques 
would allow persons of different training to work on problems together 
without their becoming generalists and thereby sacrificing their 
particular competencies or without their sticking to their disciplin-
ary guns and prohibiting consensus and integration? Therapeutic 
techniques might be relevant tools, and certainly time would have to 
be spent analyzing each discipline's argument structures and value 
structures just to be able to identify what needs to be negotiated 
in an interdisciplinary effort. 
A researcher in communications or sociology studying interdis-
ciplinary collaboration would herself be obliged to establish some 
interdisciplinary competence. To conduct this study j had to spend 
considerable time familiarizing myself with medical, legal and ethical 
terms, argument and styles of writing before constructing the survey 
and content analysis instruments. In my case, that process was eased 
by having been a philosophy student in college, having grown up in a 
medical and neurological family and having lived with a lawyer. If 
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one were to take on completely new areas of knowledge, considerable 
time would be involved. That task, however, has not hindered many 
studies on the social organization of highly specialized research 
areas in the sociology of science. 
Policy-making and cultural defining: This aspect of the re-
search effort was greatly hindered by the disturbing lack of detailed 
records of the passage of the bills. Of course, it would be cumber-
some to keep histories of each and every legislative issue, but per-
haps it is not too much to ask that ground-breaking and controversial 
legislation of national concern be treated differently from general 
legislative fare? 
Once again, this area of research could be facilitated if one 
could attend the "makings of a statute" when the significant steps 
are taken. Whether one could know where to go in time is another 
question. Would there have been any way to know to go to Kansas in 
1970? But perhaps one could attend widely publicized policy-making 
situations such as those in New York and California. 
The focus of further research: It is important for both the 
sociology of knowledge and the "cultural studies" approach to com-
munication to determine whether the patterns found in this study are 
idiosyncratic to this issue, these definers and processes or repre-
sentative of the institutionalization of complex, interdisciplinary 
and moral definitions of basic human meanings. Of course to conduct 
a comparative study, a researcher must specify a definition of com-
parable interdisciplinary and cultural import which has become 
formalized in social policy; just any old process of definition will 
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not do. A comparable process of definition would concern an issue of 
societal magnitude and deep moral, if not existential concern. Some 
potential processes of comparison are the professional and interdisci-
plinary efforts to define the beginning of human life, to define to 
what use an aborted fetus or "unburi ed corpse" might be put, or to 
specify the guidelines and parameters for recombinant DNA research. 
Robert Hornik (1979) of the University of Pennsylvania has suggested 
that the interdisciplinary intelligence and educational testing groups 
associated with the American Psychological Association would provide 
an appropriate focus of comparative study. There are others, no doubt, 
but these most readily come to mind. 
What follows is a list of the patterns found in this case study 
and suggestions for comparative research. Though the patterns are 
organized according to specific areas of concern (e.g., social organ-
ization, communication, etc.), I am not thereby implying that isolated 
patterns could be appropriately abstracted for comparison without due 
attention to the process as a whole. 
Communication: We could ask whether some communication settings 
are more closely associated with some definitions than others. Do 
other defining populations utilize professional journals, conferences 
and the mass media, and in the same proportion and in the same ways 
this group of definers utilized them? 
In this case, most of the redefining of death was done in com-
mittee settings and professional journals. And different kinds of 
journals had different functions in the process: Journals with wide 
circulation and repute were used for the most significant explication 
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and policy statements concerning the redefinition of death; other 
journals were used, in effect, to "pass the word along", or to diffuse 
the major statements through the local and general (general practice, 
internal medicine, general law, etc.) professional populations. I 
suspect that similar patterns of journal use and function would be 
found in other instances of cultural defining. 
In this study, I had no means of comparing the relative contri-
butions of different kinds of communication to the process of in-
stitutionalization. Another researcher might ask: How do different 
communication settings, in particular journals and sumposia, function 
in cultural defi ni ng? What sort of "defi ni ng work" is characteri s tic 
of each? What gets done in informal workday discussions compared to 
the informal discussions that accompany symposia and conferences? 
One might also ask to what extent other interdisciplinary de-
fining populations actually conduct interdisciplinary discourse in 
journals or other settings, or to what extent there are structural 
patterns of exclusion and inclusion similar to those discussed in 
Chapter 5. In addition, one could assess the extent to which other 
populations contacted one another, or considered one another either 
important or professional friends across disciplinary boundaries. 
Social organization: Obvious points of comparison for other 
interdisciplinary defining populations are 1) the density of different 
kinds of association and social relation and 2) the structure of 
social networks, i.e. the presence or absence of center-periphery pat-
terns in social networks. Of course, it would help if the same or 
similar social ties were used. 
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This defining population is clearly bipartite, that is, comprised 
of an el ite and non-el He group. We might ask if other defining popu-
lations fall into such clearly marked binary groupings with respect to 
either sociometric choice, actual contribution to the defining process, 
or demographic characteristics. (The elite of this population tend to 
be professionally elder, alumni of ivy league universities, and resi-
dents of the Boston-Washington corridor.) The definers are structured 
in terms of a clear division of labor in the process of redefining 
death; perhaps a similar division of labor is characteristic of other 
cultural defining processes. 
Besides the bipartite organization of the group, committee 
organization is also central to the process of redefining death. Com-
mittees served legitimation, critical and creative functions in the 
process, functions one might expect given the dual nature of the pro-
cess of institutionalization (defining and policy~making) and given 
the complex moral, legal and medical nature of the definition. Is 
committee organization characteristic of interdisciplinary defining 
processes which eventually result in legislation or other kinds of 
policy? Do those committees function to legitimate the definition, 
refine or explicate it? According to Hornik, the APA intelligence and 
education testing groups and committees seem to function in a similar 
way. 
One more note of interest on the social organization of the de-
finers is the relationship of the definers' disciplinary affiliations 
to the social networks, communication patterns and coneptual approaches 
found in the study. Knowing only a definers' discipline, one 
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could decently predict his sociometric choices, his communication in-
tent, journal use, intended audience and readership, and reasonably 
well, the content of his artiel e. Membership in a particular disci-
pline may not shape other interdisciplinary defining processes to the 
to the extent that it did in this case, though one wonders. A task 
for the sociology of knowledge is to determine just what it means to 
be a member of a discipline, in terms of the "places" one inhabits, 
the values one expresses, and the kinds of work characteristic of 
that membership. 
Content: There must exist defining populations who agree on 
substantial aspects of their definitions -- unlike this one. How-
ever, I would guess that whenever members of three institutions with 
different intellectural histories, values, occupational concerns and 
methods collaborate to define an important idea, one can expect little 
consensus, and considerable conflict -- that is, until we can find 
ways to conduct egalitarian interdisciplinary discourse with compro-
mise and resol ution. Until then, it seems those with the big sticks 
have the greatest likelihood of imposing their definitions of the 
situation on the lasting cultural forms (e.g. social policy). 
In this case, the content of the issue took a particular kind 
of shape, the shape of three divisive polarities: egalitarianism vs. 
professional dominance; the sanctity of life or the inviolability of 
the body vs. the quality of life; and the rights of the dying person 
and the inviolabil ity of the body vs. the common good. It would be 
interesting to determine whether or not other defining efforts are 
characterized by such seemingly irresolvable polarities of concern. 
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The integration of defining and policy-making: The defining and 
the policy-making effort in the redefinition of death were not as 
integrated as one might imagine. Are there issues in which defining 
and policy-making are integrated, in which many of the same people are 
prominent in both efforts, and in which definers' work is known to 
policy-makers and vice-versa? Explicating patterns of definer policy-
maker interaction associated with different concepts of definitions is 
another task which would increase our knowledge of the relation of 
society to culture and of the politics of defining cultural issues. 
The factors which facilitated and constrained the process: The 
redefinition of death grew by leaps in interdisciplinary discussions. 
Also important for the evaluation of the issue were the significant 
explications, the significant statements of what's what and what should 
be done. The issue took a path of progression in these stages (from 
Chapter 9): 
1. Emergence 
2. Expl ication and elaboration 
3. Opposition to the explication 
4. Refinement and reexplication 
5. Making Pol icy 
6. Opposition to policy 
7. Refinement to policy 
8. Reexamination of the whole issue from definition 
to pol icy 
Is the development of other definitions spurred by interdisciplinary 
discussion and opposition, marked by significant statements or char-
acterized by similar stages? 
~7 
And of course there are always the questions of the distribu-
tion of power: Whose definitions take hold? Who or which groups have 
particular claims on the issue. and of just what do those claims con-
sist? Does the differential power to define have roots in basic 
cultural assumptions regarding professional and disciplinary domin-
ance for some issues and not others? 
Contributing to the resolution of complex moral issues: Many of 
these conceptual and methodological problems could provide a focus for 
further research. In addition to the intellectual motivation to re-
solve these conceptual issues and conquer the research questions, 
there is an opportunity in this kind of study to contribute to an 
understanding of how policy regarding complex moral issues develops 
and how it might better develop. Social scientists study social pro-
blems, among other things, and many, if not most, of these problems 
contain ethical issues; however, the moral and ethical "field" is one 
not much explored by social scientists. Here, of course, I echo 
Renee Fox in her consistent advocacy of the social study of moral is-
sues. These are opportunities to contribute to the resolution of 
contemporary social and ethical dilemmas. 
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ENDNOTES 
lThe Supreme Court is not New York's highest court. The state has 
a higher Court of Appeals. 
2Mich . Compo Laws Ann. §326.8b, 1975. 
3W. Va. Code §16-19-1(c), 1975. 
4 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §9:111, 1976. 
5Iowa Code Ann. Ch.l, §208, 1976. 
6Mont . Rev. Code Ann. §69-7201, 1977. 
7Tex . Civ. Ann. (H.B. 12), 1979.) (incomplete) 
8Ga . Code Ann. §88-17S1.1, 1975. 
911 . Ann. Stat. Ch.3, §552(b), 1975. 
100kla. Stat. Ann. Ch.63, §552(b), 1975. 
llTenn. Code Ann. §53-459, 1976. 
121977 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch.130, 1, 1977. 
13 Wyo. Stat. Ch. 20, §l, WS 35-20-101, 1979. 
14 1977 N. C. Adv. Legis. Servo Ch.815, §90-320, 1977. 
15 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch.451, §l, 1979. (possibly incomplete) 
16This point brought to my attention in a discussion with Robert 
Veatch, 1979; see Veatch, 1978 and following discussion. 
17There are notable exceptions, of course -- those ethicists who 
teach and work with medical students. Another instance of this kind of 
collaboration occurred several years ago when philosopher Hans Jonas 
was invited to the University of California Medical Center by three 
physicians to attempt some reconciliation with Jonas with regard to his 
objection to redefining death to obtain organs for transplantation (see 
Jonas, 1969; 1974). 
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l8Anthropologist Margaret Mead was known for deliberately publish-
ing social advocacy based on her research in mass magazines such as 
Redbook and Ladies Home Journal. Communications researcher George 
Gerbner has discussed his research on television violence on the tele-
vision program "To Tell the Truth", appropriately enough. If you want 
to speak to thepublic or include the public in a debate, then address 
the public via the appropriate media. 
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The role of professionals in defining and resolving issues which affect 
society at large is little understood. We have recently witnessed the col~ 
laboration of physicians, lawyers and ethicists (philosophers, theologians 
and clergy) in resolving the issue of death definition and determination. 
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Since this is an issue to which you have made a major contribution,* I 
am writing to ask your cooperation in a study. supported by the Russell Sage 
Foundation, designed to find out how profeSSionals collaborate with one another 
in order to resolve such difficult medical, social, ethical and legal issues. 
I am conducting this study as my doctoral dissertation .... ith the acivice 6f 
Drs. Rene·e Fox and Diana Crane, who have published several studies on the 
social and ethical aspeces of medical practice. 
My sample consists of. a small, carefully chosen group of physicians, 
la~~ers and ethicists ~ho have published articles on death definition and 
determination in professional journals and who have played a central role in 
ehe process of reformulation of these issues. In the early stages of this 
study, responses have been obtained from Henry Beecher, E. P. Richardson, 
Ralph Potter, Leon Kass and Alexander Capron. Since the sample is small, 
your participation is an essential as well as a valuable contribution to this 
study. 
I would be very grateful if you would complete the enclosed question~ 
naire, which should take no more than twenty minutes of your time. A self-
addressed, postpaid envelope is included for your convenience. Although 1 
need to know who fills out these questionnaires, I can assure you· that no 
statements will be attributed to ,you personally without your permission. 
Enclosure 
Sincerely, 
Leslie Rado 
Research Fellow 
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DEATH: DEFINITION AND DETERMINATION 
University of Pennsylvania 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about your involvement with 
the issue of how death can be defined and determine4,particularly with respect 
to the article(s) mentioned in the covering letter. Most of the questions can 
be answered simply by checking the appropriate responses. However. when you do 
not find an appropriate answer, or when you want to add an additional'response, 
nlease feel free to do.§.£. I realize the questions do not cover all the points 
that you may wish to discuss or mention, and for that reason a space is left at 
the end of the questionnaire for any additional remarks you may wish to make. 
~ information you provide will be helpful. 
~ AS ~ RESPONSES AS ~ APPROPRIATE. 
THE FIRST 5 QUESTIONS CONCERN YOUR GENERAL INVOL'1ffi'1ENT WITH THE ISSUE OF DEATH 
DEFINITION AND DETEP~NAT!ON. 
1. Under what circums~ances did you begin your involvement with the defi-
nition and determination of death? Check as many of the responses as 
apply, and if none of them fully describe the events which led to your 
involvement, please describe them in the space prOVided. 
a. The issue arose in the context of my work. 
b. I was asked to join a committee to examine the topic. 
c. I was asked to contribute to a symposium on the topic. 
d. I was asked to counsel a ~ing patient and/or his family. 
e. The topic was a personal interest. 
f. Other circumstances? ~ specify below. 
2. If you became involved in the issue because you participated in a com-
mittee or symposium, please give their titles, locations and dates. 
LOCATION 
1. 
2. 
THE FOLW"WING SEVEN QrESTIONS CONCERN .YOUR COMMUNICATION WITH" OTliLR PRCFESSIOriALS. 
rUCL'U':)ING LAWYEF.S, t;THICISTS (EIOETHICISTS, THECLOGIAi'rs, PHILOSOPHERS AND CLERGY) AND 
PHYSICIANS l,of.>J:O HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN T:>{IS ISSL"E. 
Questions 1-10 concern your relationship ,,,ith other professionals who have either 
written articles on death defini·tion and determination or vho have been involved 
in the formulation of death legislation. Below and on the following page you viII 
find the names of other authors of articles appearing in professional journals and 
sponsors of death statutes. Next to each name are four columns. 
7. If you recognize any of these names, please place a check ::,eside the relevant 
names in the first col'.lIDIl marked "Recognize." 
340 
8. If you contacted, i.e., either talked or corresnonded wit~, ~~y of these ueople 
..,hile you ;tere formulating the ideas expressed in your article, please pl~ce a 
check beside the rele-vant na=n.es in the second column marked "Contact." 
9. If ~~y of these people were particularly ~mPortant, e.g., helpful, provocative, 
influential, to you in terms of your interpretation of the issues involved in 
death definition and determination, please place a check beside the relevant 
names in the third column marked "Important." 
, 
10. If you consider any of these people to be urofessional friends, i.e., close 
colleagues or collaborators, please place a check beside the relevant names 
in the fourth colu.r:rn marked "Friend." 
PLEASE RESPOND 1D ALL Fot,,!, QUES~IONS FOR EACH INDIVIDUAL ON THE LIST. IN OTEER 
WOR9S, FOR SOMEONE WHOSE NAME YOU iBCOGNIZE, WITH WHOH YOU TALKED OR CORRESPONDED, 
wlWSE IDEAS WERE IMPORTANT TO YOU, A....l'iD WHO IS ALSO A PROFESSIQNH FRIE1ID, YOU WOULD 
PLACE A CffECK I:N .ALL FOUR COL1'MNS. IF YOU HAVE NEVER CONTACTED A PERSON. BUT HIS 
'WRITINGS ARE IMPJRTAtl'I' TO YOU, YOU WOULD CHECK THE FIRST COLUMN' ("Recognize") AND 
THE THI?D (ttI:nportant"). HO~VER. IF A NAME MEANS NOTHHfG TO YOU, DO NOT CHECK ANY 
OF THE COLlJHNS. OF COI.JRSE, YOU SHOULD nOT EXPECT TO KNOW ALL OR EVEN MOST OF Th'ESE 
~LAMES. THE NAMES !I.BE ARR.A1J\"GED JlLPHABETICALLY BY SPECIALTY Pu'fD OCCUPATION. 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Recog_ Con- Impor_ Friend Recog Con- Impor- Friend 
nize tact tant nize tact tant 
ETHICS-BIOETHICS 13. R""" Bernard 
1. BleiCh, J. Dav. 
2. Carrol, Chas. i 
14. !\amsey, Paul 
15. Rizzo, Robert 
3. Fletcher, Jos. 16. Veatch. Robt. 
4. High, Dallas 17. Wasmer, Thom. 
,. Jonas, Hans I 18. '..reber. Leon 
6. Kass, Leon LAW-MEDICAL LAW-LEGISLATIOc 
7. Kosnik, Ant. 19. Arnett. Dixon 
8. Mendelsohn ,Bv. 20. Bergen, Rich. 
(Hist.of Med. ) 21. Brown, Torrey 
9. Morison,Robt. 22. Bynd. Rich. 
10. Norvell, 'im. 23. Capron, Alex. 
11. Parsons, Tal. 24. Compton, A.C. 
12. Potter, Ralph 25. Crevs~ John 
3. ',fuat kind of vark 'Were you 'doing when you became involved in the issue of 
death definition and -determination? Check as many as apply. 
a. Electroencephalographic research. ~. Eioethical analysis, 
b. Neurological research. m. Philosophy. 
c. Clinical neuroIog:;-. n. Theology. 
d. Neurological surgerJ. o. Pastoral counseling. 
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e. General surgery, 
f. Organ transplantation. 
__ p. Legal counsel to physicians. 
q. Legislative d~ty. 
--g. 
h. 
i. 
Anaesthesiologf. 
Internal medicine, 
Specialty: 
CPR-ECG education. management, 
__ j. Community health education. 
k. GenereJ. ethical. analysis, 
r. 
s. 
t. 
Judicial duty. 
Developing social policy. 
College teaching. STIeci~( 
areas: 
u. Other. Please sped!,,!. 
4. Were you involved in any way in organ transplantation--either as a principal 
or auxiliary member of transplant operations. e.g •• as an anaesthesiologist, 
lawyer to physiCian or donor's family. etc.? 
a.. Yes. D. No. 
4.1. If yes, what was the nature of your involvement? 
4.2. What vas the kind of transplant? 
a. Heart. b. Kidney. c. Other. ~ sDedfy. 
5. Were you involved in the clinical care of dying or irreversibly comatose 
patients or in the counseling of their f~lies? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
5.1. If yes~ what was the nature of your involvement? 
5.2. What kind of terminally ill patients did you work vith most? 
a. Ter:ninal renal disease. d. Terminal cancer. 
b. Ter:ninal heart diSease. e. Terminal cerebro ... -ascular 
c. Heart attack or arrest. disease. 
f. Other intracranial conditions. 
6. In what year and month did you begin your involvement with the issue of death 
definition and determination? If you are not certain. please estimate. 
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1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Recog- Con- Irnpor- Friend 
nize tact tant 
J{e~og- Con- Impor- Friend 
n~:z.e tact tent 
26. Curran, 11m. J. 68. nraustein, P. 
27. Dworkin. Rog. 69. Brierley, J.B. 
28. Fletcher, Geo. 70. Bravo, S.B. 
29. Fritz, Milo 71- Collins, Vine. 
30. Grant. P. Bob 72. Corbett, L.P. 
3l. Green> John C. 73. Corday , Eliot 
32. Halley ,Martin 74. Crafoord, C.C. 
33. Hamner, Reg. 75. Delmonico ,Fran. 
34. Hirsh, Harold 76. DeMere ,rl\cCarth) 
35. Routs, Marsh. n. Denny-Broiro , D. 
36. Hutton, WaJ.l. 78. Elam, James O. 
37. JOling, Root. 
38. Kennedy, Ian 
79. Elkington, J.R. 
I 80. Farnsworth, D. 
39. McIntyre,Kev. 8l. Fatteh, Abdul. 
40. Markov. Thea. 82. Fermaglich. Jos. 
4l. I-bskoW'itz, J. 83. Folch-Pi, J. 
42. Pearson, John I 84. Goodnan, Julius 
43. Reid, 'Hm. F. 85. Guttentag, O.E.I 
44. Sadler, Blair 86. P.:amlin, Ha.n..71ibal 
45. Smith. Glee 87. Hannah, James 
46. Sommer, Thea. 88. Harp, James 
47. Taylor,H.Merr. 89. Ivan, Leslie 
48. 'lIard,Walter C. 90. Jude, James 
49. ''';asr:mth, Carl 9l. Kaufer, C. 
50. Wilder. Lavr. 92. Kimura, Jun 
5l. ',.food, Jerry 93. Korien, Julius 
52. Younger, Ev. 94. Levin, ?hilip 
MEDICINE 95. Lewis, Howard 
53. Acnerknecht,E. 96. Lowrey, John 
54. Adams, Ray. D. 91. Luchi, Robert I 
55. Alderete, J.F. 98. McCutchen. J. 
56. Appel, James 99. Masland, Rich. 
57. Arnold,John D. 100. Merrill, John 
58. Ayd, Frank J. 101- M.ohandas ,Anav. 
59. Barger. Clif. 102. Moore, Francis 
60. Becker, Don,P. 103. Mo1laret, P. 
6l. Beecher ,Henry 104. Murray, John 
62. Belleville ,J . w. 105. Negovsky • V.A. 
63. Belzer, Folk. 106. Ouaknine, Geo. 
64. Berne, Thorn. 107. Paulson, Geo. 
65. Bickford, R,G. 108. Penin, H. 
66. Biorck. Gunnar 109. Riehl. Jean-L. 
67. Borel, David I 110. Rosoff. Sid. I 
Ill. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
l2. T • 
118. 
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1 2 3 ! 4 I 2 3 4 
Recog- Con- ImDor-! t~t ! Friend I IRe?~g- Con- Impor- Friend nize tact n1ze tact taut 
Sadler, AI. . I 119. Stevenson,Robt 
Satmders,Mich. 120. Sweet, Hilliam I 
Scherlis ,Leon. I 121- Taylor ,Loren 
Schwab, R.S. I 122. Tentler, Robt. 
Shalit, M. N. 123. Toole, Ja..,es 
Silverman,Dan. I 124. Walker,A.Earl 
Smit,h, Andrew I . 
Solnitslq,Oth. I 
125. Tdilliamson, tlim. 
126. T.-linter ,Arthur I I 
11. Are there any persons whose names are not on toe list who have been important to 
you in terms of your interpretation of the issues involved in death definit.ion and 
·iete!"mination? If so, -olease state their names, their specialties (e.g. surgery, 
law, philosopb..y), where-~ 'Nork and your ~tiOIi'ShTp to ~. They can be 
personal friends, family. students. colleagues, or ~~y cQ~bination of these. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
NAH2 SPECIALTY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
• I 
I 
12. Of' "he persons whose names apnear on the list end those '"hom you have added, who are 
the three DE'rSOnS ~ imDort~t to ~ in term7ot' your interpretation of the issues? 
L 
2. 
3. 
13. Of both those groups, who are the three ~ closest to ~? 
L 
2. 
3. 
11.. Are there any books or articles which '"ere particularly important to you in for::nu-
1ating the views exuressed in your article whether or not the author's name appears 
on the list? Pleas~ list the author's name~xima:r;-title, journal or publisher, 
and the approximate date of publication. 
L 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
15. In researching and writing on a topic, most people talk 
and friends, as well as read books and articles. Which 
you in shaping the views expressed in your article(s)? 
a. Talking with colleagues and friends. 
o. Reading articles and books. 
c. Neither was more important than the other. 
'W-i to their colleagues 
was more important to 
Please check. 
THE NEXT 5 QUESTIONS REFER SPECIFICALLY TO THE ARTICLE(S) MENTIONED IN THE COVERING 
LETTER. IF IDRE THAN ONE ARTICLE IS MEr-i"TrONED IN THE COVERING LE'I'TER. THEN A COpy 
OF THE NEXT 5 QtJESTIONS IS INCLUDED FOR EACH ARTICLE MENTIONED. THE TITLE OF EACR 
ARTICLE FOR WHICH QJlESTIONS ARE TO BE ANSWE.'t\ED APPEARS ON THE TOP OF EACH EXTRiI. PAGE. 
PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS ONLY FOR THE ARTICLE WHOSE TITLE APPEA..-qs AT THE TOP OF 
THE PAGE. IF ONLY ONE ARTICLE IS MENTImi'ED IN THE COVERING LETTER, PLEASE CONTHTIjE 
'dITH T¥J'tT ARTICLE IN MIUD. 
16. What was your major objective in writing the article mentioned in the covering 
letter? 
17. Was :rour objective a.'1Y of the following? Check as many as apply. 
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a. To state resea~ch results. 
b. To explain or clari~J the con-
cept of death as dependent on 
brain function. 
e. To discuss a modification or 
change in criteria or procedures. 
c. 
d. 
To explain or clari~J criteria 
or procedures for the determin-
ation of death. 
To suggest a modification or 
change in the concept of death. 
f. To criticize a particular 
definition of death. 
--g. 
h. 
i. 
To criticize a particular set 
of criteria. 
To discuss a particular statute. 
To discuss a particular court 
case. 
18. Did you write ~he article in order to do either of the fallowing? Please check. 
a. Affect social policy. b. Influence a certain audience. 
c. Neither. 
19. Of the groups listed below, to which aUdience(s) was your article addressed? 
Please ~ the appropriate responses in order of importance: l=most important, etc. 
a. Physicians. e. Theologians. 
b. Allied medical professions. f. Policy-makers . 
c. Lawyers. 
--g. The 1'Y public. 
d. Ethicists. h. Other. ~e s-oecig, 
19.1. If your audience was a very specific group of persons. e,g., primarily 
anaesthesiologists or cardiologists or local physicians, please give 
that information in the space below. 
20. Did you read specific journaJ.s in order to keep up with discussions. on the 
definition or determination of death? If so, please check all that apply. 
a. Yes. b. No. 
c. JAMA.. i. Bar Association Journals. 
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d. Ne .... England Journal of Medicine j. Ethical or Theological Journals. 
e. Lancet 
f. 
g. 
h. 
Electroencephalography and 
Clinical Neurophysiology. 
" 
The Hastings Center Report 
University Law Reviews. 
Please snecify. 
k. Other. Please s'Oecii'y. 
21. How would you characterize your approach to the problem of death definition and 
determination? Check all that apply. 
a. Medical-research approach. 
b. Medical-clinical approach. 
c. Medico-legal approach. 
d. Public policy approach. 
e. Bioethical approach. 
f. 
--g. 
h. 
i. 
Social-ethical approach. 
Theological approach. 
Counseling (non-legal) approach. 
Other. Please specify. 
22. Have you been active in either public discussions (e.g. panel, lectures) or 
symposia and conferenc2s on the subject of death definition and dete~nation? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
If yes, which ones? Please check all that apply. 
c. Panels and lectures - professional audiences. 
d. Panels and lectures - la;r audiences. 
e. Conferences and syovosia - professional audiences, parti~ipants. 
~. Conferences and symposia - interdisciplinary audiences, participants. 
23. Have you discussed these issues in any of the mass media? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
If yes, in which ones? 
o. Newspapers. Please s"Decifi::. e. Radio (local program). 
f. Radio (national program). 
d. Magazines, other than g. Television (local program). 
professional journals. h. Television (national program). 
24. Have you been active in efforts to pass legislation defining death as dependent 
on brain function? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
If yes, in what state(s)? 
24.1. In what capacity? 
25. Have you Deen active in research or public discussion in other death and dying 
topics? Please state the aD-oroximate da-ces of your activity vith these topics, 
e.g., 1966-70; 1966-, etc. 
a. Yes. b. Uo. 
If yes, which ones? 
a. Euthanasia (date: 1. c. Suicide {jate: 1. 
b. Care of the dying (date: -1.-
26. Have you been active in research or public discussioo on other bioethics issues? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
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If yes, which ones? Please state the anproximate dates of your activity with these 
topics. 
a. Scarce medical resources, 
transplantation, hemo-
dialysiS (date: ). 
b. Genetics, fertilization 
and Dir;th (date: ). 
c. Population and birth cOntrol 
(date, l. 
d. Experimentation and consent 
(date: ). 
e. Health Care delivery 
(da.te: ). 
h. 
i. 
_J. 
k. 
1-
"'. 
Abortion (date: 1. 
Behavior control (date: 
Medical ethics educa.tion 
(date: 1. 
Ethical theory (date: 
Values, ethics and technology 
(date: 1. 
Other. Plea.se snec; £y. 
27. Please sta.te the date, institution and kind of your professional or academic 
degrees. 
DATE INSTITUTION DEGREE 
1 
28. When you ""ere obtaining your degree, did :rou ha.ve a special research interest or 
thesis -"hieh was related. to the issues of death definition and determina.tion, 
death and dying or other bioethics issues? 
a.. Yes. b. Uo. 
28. L If yes, what was it? 
28.2. If yes, what was the name of the person(s) who supervised your research? 
1-
2. 
3. 
29. In wha.t professional organizations are you ~ active? 
1-
2. 
3. 
1 
30. Are you a member of any organization -,.;hieh deals specifically with de8.C;n and 
dying or bioethical issues? 
a. Yes. 
If yes, which ones? 1. 
2. 
31. When you were writing the article(s) 
mentioned in the covering letter, 
were you associated with a college 
or university? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
b. No. 
33. '..mat is 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
your religious backs;round? 
Catholic. 
Jewish orthodox. 
Jewish - conservative. 
Jewish - reformed. 
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31.1. If so, in 'What capacity'? e. Protestant. ~ s'Oecii)' 
31.2. With what institution? 
32. Are you currently associa'ted with 
a college or university? 
a. Yes. b. No. 
32.1. If so, in what capacity? 
32.2. With ,,,hat institution? 
denominat'; on. e.g. Methodist 
f. Other. Please snecify. 
34. In general, how important ;;auld 
you say your religion is to you? 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
Extremely il:lpo\rtant. 
Fairly important. 
Important/unimportant. 
Fairly 1.Ulimportant. 
Not at all important. 
35. IF YOU !i.!l,.VE .t...:.'1jY ADDITIONAL cmlME~{TS OR REM.ARKS. PLEASE WRITE TH1tM BELOW AlID ON '!';IE 
BACK OF TInS PAGE. THA..>n<: YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION. 
APPENDIX C 
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As you know, the process of social change as it involves legislation is 
little understood. We have recently witnessed the collaboration of physicians, 
lawyers, ethicists and legislators in resolving and passing legislation on the 
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issue of death definition and determination. Since 1970, when the Kansas 
legislature passed the first bill defining death in terms of the absence of brain 
function, ten states have enacted similar statues. The drafting of all the statutes 
has entailed the examination and definition of several important medical, legal and 
ethical issues. 
I am writing to ask your cooperation in a study, sponsored by the Russell Sage 
Foundation, designed to find out how professionals and legislators collaborate with 
one another toward the institutionalization of the definition of death as dependent 
on brain function. Since few states have detailed legislative histories, I have 
obtained your name by writing to the drafter/sponsor of the statute enacted in your 
state, asking him/her to name five persons who were important in stimulating interest 
in the issue. drafting the statute and getting the bill passed in the legislature. 
ObViously, mine is a shotgun procedure, and the information I have to go on is scanty 
at best. Consequently. I hope you understand that your participation is an essential 
as well as an extremely yaluable contribution to this study. 
I would be very grateful if you would complete the enclosed ques~ionnaire which 
will take no more than ten minutes of your time at most. I have provided a self-
addressed, stamped envelope for your convenience~ In the near future, I will phone 
your office to arrange a short interview by phone. of apprOximately ten minutes in 
duration, which will include some general questions about your role in instituting 
death definition legislation in your state and the local pressures which led to an 
interest in the bill. Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
Enclosure 
Sincerely, 
Leslie Ann Rado 
Research Fellow 
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CONTENT ANALYSIS SCHEME 
I. Author and Publication 
1. Article Id. # __ 
2. Institutional affiliation of author 
1. medicine 3. medicine and law 
2. 1 aw 4. ethics, bioethics, theology 
3. Date of publication Month ______ Year __ 
4. Journa 1 
1. JAMA 
2. New England J. Med. 
3. Linacre Quarterly 
4. General Medical, e.g., Hosp. 
Tri b. , G.P. 
5. Specific Neurological 
6. Specific other, e . g. , 
anesthesiology 
5. Contribution to panel or symposium? 
(not journal symposia) 
II. Article Content 
6. Primary purpose of article 
7. State or Univ. Med. J. 
8. Univ. Law Reviews 
9. Law Journal 
10. Interdisciplinary J., 
e. g., Daeda 1 us, 
Science, Hastings 
Center Report 
11. Theological Journals 
12. Book 13. Other 
1. yes __ 
2. no 
1. Early reporting of potential use of EEG to determine 
death, includes research reports 
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2. Drawing attention to and proposal to help solve the advanced 
medical technology problem, includes major reports 
3. Review of advanced medical technology problem and proposed 
solutions, includes "how to determine death" and "this is what 
has been done" articles, may include minor modifications of 
major reports 
4. Criticism of a major criterion used in determination, includes 
presentation of alternative criteria or methods, includes 
research and clinical findings 
5. Research or clinical findings reports which support criteria 
and methods of determination of major proposals 
6. Criticism of major proposal (e.g., Harvard Report or a defin-
ition, including statutes. Also includes major modifications 
or refinements, e.g., suggestion of concept of neocortical or 
cerebral death vs. whole brain death 
7. Discussion of medico-legal issues, particular court cases and 
statutes, includes proposal to solve problems 
8. Discussion, critique, clarification of the conceptual and/or 
ethical issues involved in redefinition of death and/or 
general life prolongation situation 
9. 6 & 8 10. 6, 7 & 8 11.4&6 12. 3 & 5 
13. Presentation of alternate criterion - blood flow, e.g., angio-
graphy 
14. 7 & 8 15. 4 & 7 16. 3 & 8 
7. Discussion of definition (concept of death) or determination 
(criteria)? 
1. Definition 3. Both 
2. Determination 
8. Stated etiology of the need to redefine death in terms of brain 
function 
1. The usual, i.e., resuscitation technology (defibrillators) 
life-prolonging technology (respirators, hemodialysis, anti-
biotics), and general transplantation or simple "advances in 
medical technology" 
2. Heart transplantation primarily or heart transplantation pro-
vides primary impetus 
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35. Theological issues mentioned 
COMMON ISSUES MENTIONED 
36. Is dea th a process or event? 
37. Death as process - stand taken (e.g., death isthe gradual dying 
of parts of the body) 
38. Death as event - stand taken (e.g., death of the organism as a 
who 1 e) 
39. Two definitions of death - heart or brain death, legal or medical 
death - unacceptable, confusing --
40. Concern for transplant recipient (transplantation as a gift and/or 
moral imperative) 
41. Allocation of scarce medical resources should be considered and 
weighed 
42. Concern for dying patient (death should be declared only with 
reference to the dying patient, not to potential social good) 
43. Concern for donor (should not meedle with the donor in order to 
improve transplant) 
44. Confusion or threat to public with respect to potential declara-
tion errors, wrongful death, premature burial 
45. Fear of inhumane treatment of the senile, retarded or infirm 
46. Hesitant about primary use of EEG in determination 
47. In favor of primary EEG use 
48. Euthanasia discussed 
49. Distinction made passive and active euthanasia 
50. Withdrawing treatment ok: the "quality of life" ethic, stopping 
dying, not allowing to die all the way 
51. Allowing to die ok - euthanasia not so good - let die all the way 
52. Transplantation, e.g., UAGA, donor ethics discussed 
53. Care of the dying - other than allowing to die or death with 
dignity 
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54. Abortion and definition of life and death 
MEDICAL ISSUES MENTIONED 
55. The usual criterion and method specifications, e.g., time inter-
val, how to do it, confusion with barbiturate coma and hypo-
thermia, EEG amplification, etc. 
56. No transplant team member 'should declare a donor dead 
57. Attending MD should consult with neurologist or neurosurgeon 
58. Different levels of brain death: whole brain vs. neocortical or 
cerebral death (usually states that whole brain is not refined 
enough for a definition or criteria) 
59. 24 hour interval specified in Harvard Report is too long 
MEDICO-LEGAL ISSUES MENTIONED 
60. Medical liability in declaring death is valid concern 
61. Medical liabil ity is not such a val id concern 
62. Need time of death for insurance and will purposes 
63. Legislation would freeze medical community and progress 
64. Legislation would endanger donor or dying 
65. Present legal definition is inqadequate or not specified 
BIOETHICAL ISSUES SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED 
66. Dying should be allowed to die humanely and/or with "dignity" 
67. The body as well as the person is sacred: the body as inviolable 
68. General ethics of the MD-patient contract, Hippocratic Oath, A~lA 
ethical code 
69. A concept or definition of death should be considered apart from 
any practical considerations such as transplantation or costs to 
soci ety 
CONCEPTUAL/PHIOLOSOPHICAL ISSUES SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED 
70. Identification of death of person (or life) with death (or life) 
of organism - reductionism 
71. Identifying criteria with concept; concept f criteria 
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72. Confusing "When to declare death?" with "When to allow to die?" 
73. A value-laden issue (death) treated by value-free routine 
(medicine, technology) - inappropriate 
74. The meaning of life or death largely, but not theologically, writ 
THEOLOGICAL ISSUES SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED 
75. Death and relationship of soul to body; death as the soul leaving 
the body 
76. Meaning of death (or life) interpreted within context of reli-
gious traditions or texts (life is divine, God's gift) 
REMEDIES 
77. Legislation 
78. Let the courts decide if and when there is a problem 
79. Leave entirely to medical practice 
80. Increased research, new technologies 
81. Advocates "passive" euthanasia and withdrawing treatment, i.e., 
stopping dying - more radical 
82. advocates allowing to die vs. 81. - more conservative 
83. Respect human body, hesItate with redefinition of death and pro-
ceed with caution 
84. Involve public and individuals in consideration of'death and their 
own deaths 
85. Establish a committee of non-MD's or interdisciplinary to declare 
death, consider cases 
86. Use concept of "brali n dea th" 
87. Use concept of neocortical death 
88. Legislation undesirable, not needed 
INDEX 
Committees: and cultural defining, 273-274; The American Electroencep-
halographic Society's Ad Hoc Committee, 74; The Harvard Committee 
(Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to examine the 
definition of brain death), 61-66; The Hastings Research Group on 
Death and Dying, 83-88, 191, 203; The NINDS (National Institute of 
Neurological Diseases and Stroke) collaborative study committee, 
74, 130-132, 191 
Communication: and cultural defining, 11-13, 152-166, 260-264, 294, 
300-301; and social organization, 169, 181, 300-301 
Cultural change, 1-3, 8-11 
Cultural definers, 7; definition of, 8-11; compared with scientists and 
intellectuals, 201-203 
Diffusion: and cultural defining, 268-280; the elite and non-elite, 
277-280 
Elite: characteristics of, 186-189; compared with scientists and 
intellectuals, 202-203; and communication behavior, 279; and diffu-
sion, 277-280; and policy-making, 285; and social networks, 189-199 
Institutionalization: and cultural change, 3-4; definition of, 2; and 
diffusion, 275-279; dynamics of, 265 ff.; redefinition of death, 3-
4; and social movements, 6-8; social process and organization of, 
300-301; two stages of, 8, 286-289 
Interdi sci pl i nary communi cati on: and committees, 61-66, 83-88; and con-
ceptual approach, 247-255; as dynamic of institutional ization, 268-
275; and professional journals, 153-160; research concerning, 313-
317, 320-322; and symposia and conferences; 160-162 
Mass medi a: and cultural defi ni ng, 162-164 
Policy-making: and communication, 280; and elite, 285; evolution of, 
283-286 
Recommendations: for definers and policy-makers, 313-317; for social 
scientists, 317-327 
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Social networks: and communication, 169-172; of definers, 189-199; 
density of, 182-186; and diffusion, 277; and social relationship, 
172-175 
Social organization: and cultural defining, 295, 300-301, 313-317, 323-
325; and social processes and culture, 13-14, 318-320 
Social ties (recognition, contact, importance and professional friend-
ship): definition of, 175-181 
Specialized communications, 12-13; and diffusion, 275-276; the profes-
sional journal, 153-160; symposia and conferences, 160-162 
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